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PREDICTIONS ON THE EFFECT THE
CHANGES IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES
WILL HAVE ~~IN~~ IN POLAND'S INTER*-
NAL AFFAIRS

LEADRRV
ASSIGNMENTS OF ~~THE~~ TOP PERSONALI-
TIES IN POLAND
(RESPONSIBILITIES
AND DUTIES)

PART I

PARTICULAR ASSIGNMENTS OF THE TOP LEADERS IN POLAND.

The subject ^{of} who is responsible for what ["] within the leadership is ["] a complicated one. Significant features are hidden from public knowledge. This is due to the system of "double" authority: the party leadership ^{with} is the ^{factual} ~~truly~~ leadership in Poland and the "official" administrative executives who are exposed to public and carry ² on their shoulders ["] the "nominal" responsibility. This system allows the party to direct and govern the country without ^{direct} ~~public~~ responsibility. Of course, ^{Final} people realize that the ~~ultimate~~ power and responsibility rests ^{with} on the party leaders but this ~~is~~ ^{is a} knowledge of "general" nature. ^{only} It is not always known to the ^{average citizen} ~~simple man~~ ^{which one} who of the party secretaries is ~~per~~ ^{personally} responsible for a particular area of activity.

~~For example~~ ^{for instance} it is completely unknown that the ~~aff~~ ^{makers} ~~aires~~ of internal security (security police and the assignments of the Ministry of Interior Affairs ^{are} ^{assignment} ~~are~~ ^{presently} handled at ~~present~~ by the Secretary of the Central Committee, Jerzy Albrecht. This is purposely concealed from public knowledge. This ~~is~~ ^{fact} is known only to the members of the Central Committee.

The fact

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that Jerzy Albrecht is in charge of these ^{matters} ~~affaires~~
 is of far-reaching ^{importance} ~~significance~~. ^{at present} ~~rather~~ ^{in a positive}
~~sense~~. (Albrecht himself does not favor ^{extensive} ~~an~~ expansion
 of the ~~power of the security police~~ ^{authority} - he has personal
 reasons- and this is the reason ~~that~~ Gomulka
 entrusted him with the handling of these affairs ~~in~~
 in 1956/57)

Another significant feature with respect to
^{delegation} ~~distribution~~ of authority ~~delegation of authority~~
 among the ^{leaders} ~~personalities~~ within the leadership is the
 fact that the extent of authority delegated changes
 frequently. This is an everlasting ^{game} ~~gamble~~ of
 personal intrigues and shifts in the judgement and
~~and~~ appraisal of the executives or party leaders,
 in Gomulka's personal opinion and in Cyrankiewicz's
 opinion. At present, these two men decide the extent
 of authority ^{to be} ~~delegated~~ to the ^{important group} ~~leading men~~ within the
 top leadership of Poland.

These shifts and changes ^{are} ~~look sometimes~~ sur-
^{attimes} ~~prisingly~~. For example: Edward Ochab, a member of the
 Politbureau, was in charge, (from 1956 - 1959) of Agriculture,
 and ~~now~~ ^{but} from 1960 is in charge of Propaganda,
 Press and cultural matters. It ~~might look strange~~
 How can a man, ~~be evaluated as the best judge of~~ ^{judge and voter}
~~become assigned to~~

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such a specialized and difficult ~~area of~~ ^{field} economics ~~as~~ ^{suddenly he re-} agriculture and ~~later~~ ^{an entirely different} assigned to a ~~complete other~~ ^{field} specialty such as cultural affairs, educational affairs, propaganda, press, broadcast and ^{and} spiritual life ^{who should have} again as ~~the leading man with the best knowledge~~ ^{is supposed to have} of these matters. ^{one more the best qualified choice for this assignment?}

This can be explained as follows:

The communists believe that there is only one universal philosophy i.e. Marxism and Leninism. All other areas of knowledge and science are useful but ^{of} ~~an~~ inferior significance in comparison ~~of~~ to this basic "science and faith" as represented by Marxism. Therefore they believe that a man who knows Marxism is qualified to direct any particular area of activity. They believe that party background enables a man to fulfill all assignments in any field of specialty.

This is obviously ^U not true, and this is a source of great mistakes. ^{For example, Oshab,} had no real background ⁱⁿ and agriculture and ~~he~~ ^{very much about} really does not know sufficiently ^{(this area for which he was responsible between 1956 - 1959. / He knows the area of propaganda and culture and he did work in this field long years from 1945 to 1956 as well as} ^{worked} ~~from 1945 to 1956~~ and also before 1945. /

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This does not mean that the communists do not *value* appreciate specialists. They do, but only *on* ~~to~~ a limited *scale* level. For example, positions up to a Viceminister are sometimes *(but)* ~~(rarely)~~ considered from the viewpoint ~~of~~ and criterion of specialization *of* and background in the particular ~~respective~~ area of the considered candidate. But above this level, *i.e.* that ~~is~~ Ministers, Vicepremiers, and of course party functionnaires *varies* (even if they are responsible for *certain* defined economic ~~and~~ and specialistic areas) are selected from the viewpoint of party background i.e. political capability.

Thus there are strictly appointments
~~This leads to~~ such nominations like

Julian Tokarski, Vicepremier, in charge of Machine Industry, who really ~~does not~~ *knows* know nothing about this field or Kazimierz Wlasczewski, chief of Army Intelligence, who is *rather* ~~of~~ *rather* ~~inferior~~ *inferior* intelligence, etc.

There are Of course some exceptions. For example, *Zygmunt* Baranski, Minister of Health, is an excellent professor of pediatrics *(not a member of the party)* ~~Baranski~~, the former Minister of Heavy Industry - Zemaitis *in party member since* a member of the party from 1947 (but not highly rated in the party hierarchy) was an excellent metallurgist, *but general rule, however, appointments are given* but in general ministerial positions are assigned mostly *to people of party and political background rather than* ~~of~~ *of* ~~specialistic or managerial background.~~ *Admiral*

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Therefore a party leader never ^{says} ~~ever~~ ^{is not familiar} that he ~~does not know~~
 a particular area of ~~special~~ activity. ^{He knows every}
 thing. ^{That is the communist} ~~if he knows marxism.~~ ^{this is the way of thinking of the communists}

This explains some ridiculous features ^{in viewpoint} of the

behavior of party leaders in the communist countries.)

KHRUSHCHEV, For example, ~~Chrusczew~~ ^{claims (and maybe is even convinced)} emphasizes and probably believes
 himself that he is the ~~best~~ ^{world's greatest} expert in agriculture in the
 world. Since he likes ~~maize~~ ^{corn} he forces ~~maize~~ ^{corn} cultures in
 the USSR and ~~even~~ ^{at the same time} in the satellites. But not only this,
 Chrusczew claims that he is an outstanding military
 expert and is proud of his general's distinctions and
 he bullies an opinion that he was the ~~leading~~ ^{is building up} ~~strategist~~ ^{He attempts to express the might} ~~during~~ ^{responsible}
 World War II in the operations in the Ukraine and Kau-
 casus. ~~Chrusczew~~ ^{*KHRUSHCHEV*} also believes that he is an expert

in architecture and construction. ^{During a visit to} In 1955 he visited Cze-
 choslovakia, and ~~some~~ ^{in 1955} prefabricated structures (in rein-
 forced concrete, ^{They struck his fancy.} found high appreciation in his eyes.

^{he said} So he issued two ~~two~~ giant bills both of them as
 acts of the highest level signed by the Central Committee
 and by the Cabinet of Ministers, in which he regulated
 the use of reinforced concrete (in details). ^{As a result, building}
 of reinforced structures in the USSR increased from
 4 million cubic meters in 1955 to 22 million cubic meters
 in 1959/60 replacing steel structures.

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In Poland, for example, Bierut personally approved all ~~for construction of all~~ major buildings in Warsaw and in the larger cities, not only the funds to be appropriated ^{at the same time, he approved himself} but also the architecture ^{to the point of} ~~the architecture~~ ^{arbitrariness of architecture}. By the way, this is the architecture, that is now so sharply criticized by Chruszczew, as unnecessary monumentalism. ^{The authoritarian style and then favored by Bierut, is now} frequently criticized ^{as} ~~as unnecessary monumentalism~~. The expelled Jakub Berman dictated during 1945 - 1955 ^{to} the Polish writers in detail not only what they should ~~write~~ ^{write} but also ~~how~~ ^{how they were to write} and what type of techniques in literature are to be used.

Gomulka ^{really believes that he is an expert in agriculture} believes truly that he knows everything ^{and everything} about agriculture and business.

Chruszczew ^{Chruszczew} In his youth worked in a coal mine, ~~and~~ ^{there} fore he is convinced ~~that~~ ^{that} he is ~~the~~ ^{the} best expert in mining. As secretary of Moscow ^{the Party organization visited} he was twice ^{in the tunnel} in the Moscow metro ^{he believes make him} subway ^{he} during construction. ~~he~~ believes that he is the best expert in tunneling and subway construction.

For example: Roman Zambrowski in Poland member of the Politbureau since 1945 ^{he has retained his membership} ~~who keeps surprisingly his mem-~~ bership during all changes of regime ^{in the regime} is known as expert in matters of party organization. In 1955 in connection with ^{became} criticism ^{In 1955 due to his past involvement in security policy} because of his activities ^{Admitted, he was assigned to another field (i.e. industrial} when he was in charge of security policy) he had to be shifted to another field of activity. He was assigned ~~economical~~ ^{planning} matters in particular planning of industry. He started ~~an action~~ of the so-called planning from the "bottom". The workers themselves, ^{believed, should prepare} he announced will ~~make~~ the plans for their factory.

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Appointed. For
~~Committees were elected on each factory at least~~
~~10 - 12 committees and several subcommittees.~~ Courses were
~~opened for the workers~~
~~organized to teach the workers planning and accounting,~~
~~tens of papers were produced with planning figures and~~
~~output~~ *dropped considerably*
~~productivity during this four-month action.~~ *At the end of this period*
~~ously. It was a real mess. After this the plans were~~
~~reviewed; they were completely unrealistic and they went~~
~~all to the trash basket.~~ *They proved to be quite unrealistic and were discarded.*

Can and will shift
~~These examples show that the Politbureau has~~
~~no troubles or scrupels in shifting a party leader~~
~~from one post to a complete other contrasting field~~
~~of activity.~~ *I have described this process dubbed*
~~This also was the reason from the phenomenon~~
~~of the "Merry - Go - Round" or the carrousell that has~~
~~been explained in one of my former reports. A "tired"~~
~~Minister suddenly appeared on a high position in an~~
~~completely different area of job.~~

For assignment
~~As criterion frequently is considered~~ *is/* ~~the character~~
~~of the person. Whether or not he is sufficiently ruthless~~
~~to impose some unpopular steps or is "weak" and to the~~
~~thoughtful.~~ *or considered*

It is
~~also considered is whether a man will be obe-~~
~~dient and follow blindly all directives of the party~~
~~or he has his own character and might sometimes disagree~~
~~with certain moves.~~ *For example*
~~For example Adam Rapacki was shifted~~

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from
Minister of High Education to Minister of Foreign Affairs
~~without prior training in that field~~
~~although he has no experience in diplomacies only be-~~
~~cause he is an obedient instrument in Cyrankiewicz's hands.~~
Of course, ^{regarding employment of candidates are,} All these considerations, ~~of course are sub-~~
~~jected to the primary criterion i. e., to the opinion and~~
~~appraisal of the Russian party and of the Russian leadership,~~
~~with respect to individual candidates.~~ ^{Kept secret} and so are
The Assignments of Vicepremiers are ~~hidden~~, also
the role and assignments of the ^{to} Deputies of the Chair-
man of the Planning Commission. ^{These assignments become} However this is easy to find
^{Public knowledge, however.} Various persons attend
out after a short period since several people is invited
to conferences in the Office of Ministers and in the State
Planning Commission. ^{Conferences and} After a while they see clearly who
is in charge of a particular ^{field} ~~are~~ of activity.

Not so the 6 Party Secretaries. It is ^{difficult} ~~not easy~~ to say
what ~~is~~ the assignment of each of them.

On the basis of ^{hand down} ~~some of~~ scattered remarks
made by Cyrankiewicz during his ^{speech of} ~~expose~~ November 25 1959
(in which he formally announced the nomination of the
new Vicepremiers Tokarski and Szyr ^{to the Polish Parliament})
and on the basis of the past activities of ^{these} ~~the new men~~ ^{appointees}
and my ^{personal} knowledge of their ^{personality} ~~characters~~ capabilities and back-
ground, a fairly exact ^{correct conclusion as to} picture of the distribution of au-
thority within the Polish leadership can be made.

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Cyrankiewicz listed in his ^{speech} ~~expose~~ the following major areas of administrative activities (in order to justify the need for new Vicepremiers ^{and} the restitution ~~of~~ of the power ^{to} of the State Planning Commission) and emphasized that ~~there is a significant~~ ^{there are} ~~these major problems are~~ ^{requiring} there are 14 major problems that require coordination among Ministries. He explained that this coordination required the State Planning Commission to be ^{given decision-making power} ~~empowered as decision-making agency~~, the nomination of new Vicepremiers and centralization of authority.

These activities are:

1. Heavy Industry and Production of means of production
/ of machinery for manufacturing of ~~general machinery~~ ^{tools and equipment} manufacturing means/
2. Cooperation within the Eastern Bloc
3. Productivity, operational standards, wages.
4. Engineering Scientific - Progress
5. Capital Expenditures and Construction including the Building Materials Industry
6. Territorial Administration, Voldvodship, Township - and Cities-Councils / People's Councils/
- 7 Agriculture and Forests
8. Production and Supply of Consumer goods
9. Transportation and Communication
- 10 Communal Economy

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12 . Water Problems

13. Organization of Business Management.

14. Other matters requiring coordination; ~~he did not~~ ^{not further}
^{specified}
~~specify.~~

Of course he listed only " administrative" and mostly c
economical matters , he omitted problems reserved exclusively
~~for the Party~~ ^{to} control such as security policy, interior ~~matters~~ ^{not affairs},
propaganda, party recruiting, culture and education, etc.
~~foreign affairs, military affairs, etc.~~

These areas of activity will be discussed ^{in Part II of this report} ~~below~~ from the

point of view ^{of} who is in charge of them in the party / Central
Committee, among the Vicepremiers and ~~sporadically the Minister~~
~~Ministers~~ , ^{only the most influential ones} ~~(only those who are influential)~~

PREDICTIONS ON THE EFFECT THE CHANGES
IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES WILL HAVE IN POLAND'S
INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ASSIGNMENTS OF KEY PROBLEMS TO TOP PERSONALITIES

Responsibilities and Duties of Top Leaders
PART II

ASSIGNMENTS OF TOP PERSONALITIES

PART II

Introduction

In part I the general approach to assigning particular tasks and duties to the top personalities were discussed.

In this Part II the top personalities will be listed who are responsible for policies within the key problems enumerated by Cyrankiewicz in his address to the Polish Sejm November 25 1959. Cyrankiewicz listed 13 key problems. In this report emphasis will be given to the party functionnaires and members of the Central Committee who make the policies or have influence on policies in a particular field. The administrative persons Ministers Viceministers are executives who not always have influence of the policies outlined by the party. However some of the ministers of viceministers play a significant role due to their high position in the party hierarchy. For example a Minister who is also member of the Central Committee is an important person. The membership in the Central Committee weighs more than his administrative position. Such Ministers will be listed in this report.

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Cyrankiewicz listed ¹²13 key problems but he omitted several problems many of them of greater importance than those listed.

First of all he omitted areas of activities that are directed by him personally . Second he did not mention such important problems like Security Police, Relations with the Church, National Minorities etc.

These problems will be discussed in Part III, 1. the persons responsible for these respective fields of affairs.

In part III a summary will be included containing a list of key problems and top personalities responsible for these problems and exerting influence on policies and basic directives.

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1 Heavy Industry

Following men direct the heavy industry in Poland at present:

- a. Politbureau: Edward Gierek Secretary of the Central Committee and simultaneously secretary of the Voivodship Committee of Silesia. ^{latter is} This ~~rather is~~ his real function: The title: "Secretary of the Central Committee is rather nominal, he does not work as secretary of the Central Committee, but this gives him special authority. He also is member of the Politbureau
- b. Vicepremier. Juljan Tokarski Machine Industry; Piotr Jaroszewicz Chemistry and Mining and Energetics / ^{including} Electricity. Petroleum / However mining is under personal industry care of Gomulka, who devotes much of his time to the mining
- c. Central Committee. Jozef Olszewski head of the ~~industry~~ Economic Department of Central Committee.
- d. State Planning Commission: Eng Adam Wang, deputy Chairman of the State Planning ^{Commission} ~~Committee~~ Eng. Kiejstut Zemaitis limited to metallurgic / foundries/
- e. Minister of Heavy Industry Franciszek Waniolka. He is a "political Minister and exerts some influence on the basic policies.

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2. Cooperation with the Eastern Bloc.

- a. Politbureau Stefan Jedrychowski but mostly coordination of p l a n n i n g . In fact, each yearly and five-year plan is presented to the Russian "Gosplan" and Council of ^Mutual Assistance, before the Polish Cabinet approves the plans.
- b. ~~XXXX~~ Vicepremier Piotr Jaroszewicz. He will more and more concentrate on problems of cooperation within the Eastern bloc and will be relieved from other matters by Szyr and by Tokarski
- c. Central Committee. Jozef Olszewski mentioned before
- d. Chairman of the Committee for Cooperation with Foreign Countries Roman Fidelski
- e. State ⁿPlanning Commission Tadeusz Gede, First Deputy ~~former~~ Chairman , former ambassador in Moscow.
- f. In Moscow: Viceminister Slusarczyk delegate to the Secretariat of the ^{Mutual} Council of Cooperation & Assistance, Rozanski, ^{his deputy} and to a major extent Boleslaw Jaszczuk the new Polish ambassador. The Polish ambassador usually has not to much to say in political matters / these matters are handled on higher level , ⁿapacki, Gomulka/ therefore he concentrates widely on trade - and economical matters.

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3 Productivity, Wages and Operational Standards / Norms

- a. Politbureau Ignacy Loga ~~Suszman~~ - Sowinski
Gomulka's personal friend, Chairman of the Central Council of Labor Unions.
- b. Vicepremier Julian Tokarski , norms and wages of workers
Eugeniusz ~~Zzyr~~ Szyr , Salaries of white collar workers.
and premial systems / bonuses./
- c. Central Committee Franciszek Blinowski deputy head
of the Economic Department of the Central Committee.
- d. State Commission for Wages : Alojzy Firganek chairman
- e. Central ~~Committee~~ Council of Labor Unions, Secretary
of Economics / besides the head Loga-Sowinski mentioned before/ Edward Kulesza. This latter is the brain
and idea man of the Council in matters of wages and
productivity. He was elected recently to member of the
Central Committee , he is of the new generation and
propably will ^{in future} achieve ~~with the time~~ the highest positions
in Poland. He is also member of the Polish Parliament.
- f. State Plannig Commission . Since the problem of wages
and norms is now evaluated as the most important problem,
the Chairman of the State Plannig Commission Stefan Jedry
chowski takes care personally of this area.

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The problem of wages and norms is at present the most difficult ^{economic and political} internal question in Poland. It is connected with the price policy and the entire economical situation of the country. This is the reason that the highest level executives have been assigned to govern these matters. Jedrychowski, Loga-Sowinski and Gomulka personally / three ^{my} members of the Politbureau/ are in charge of this question. It includes not only wages and salaries but also ^{following objectives:} the ~~goal~~ of restitution of ^{discipline and} order in economical life; ~~have~~ fight with trespasses, falsifications, "long pencil", and finally, lowering of purchasing power and ^{endorsement of the new} austerity ~~program~~.

The same problem is now handled in the USSR. There is also attempted a revision of the operational standards. Even in the Soviet Union occurred several strikes and riots due to the action of new norms.

The political importance of this problem of revisions of norms might be illustrated by two quotations:

The New York Times Sunday April, 24 1960, " Soviet Labor Unrest Seen; Strike Reported in Siberia" pages 1 and 35.

" According to Kommunist , the " baseless high earnings" of some workers in the past were due to low production quotas. These, the magazine said, the workers could easily exceed, thus getting large bonuses. Moreover, it said, workers have been classified in pay grades higher than those to which their skills and performance entitled them"

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Conference of the representatives of the Workers' Councils
During the ~~meeting of the self-management~~ *Workers' Self-government*/

Dec. 11 1959 , Jedrychowski said:

In the day to day practice, of business numerous samples
can be found that ^{re-}present trespassings of the obligatory
codes of ^{job}qualification , samples of loosening the operation
standards / norms/ ^{of} application of easy set-up norms *
long time after the trial period is over, uncorrect application
of manhour rate and the so-called overpayment i.e. payment
for work not performed at all.....

.... For example in the ^{plants} ~~plants~~ of the Administration of the
and railroad cars
Wagon/Manufacturing industry the percentage of workers that
^{above 200%}
achieve a 200 % and ~~more~~ performance of job standards/ norms/
... increased from 45.1 % in 1957 , to 59.2% in 1958 and
74.5 % in 1959. In the Warsaw plant of transportation equipment
79 % of the workers are shown as performing 250 % and ~~more~~
above 250 % of norms. In numerous cases these workers have
very low qualifications. Many 18 - year old workers
with hardly finished apprenticeship are listed among these
receiving the highest earnings.

* special, facilitated norms to be applied ~~only~~ temporarily during three
months of the first trial production of a new factory, or shop.

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These two quotations are striking in their similarity of difficulty within the entire East Bloc in lowering the standard of earnings and purchasing ^{power} ~~power~~ and they show that low productivity is a general problem in the communistic countries.

It shows also how difficult it is to revise the operational standards and that unrest in Poland might be expected when the action of revision of norms will be continued and sharpened.

In my opinion this ~~probix~~ objective in Poland can not be ~~achieved~~ obtained by Gomulka unless he will reconstitute the security police and terror. Similarly Gomulka's new policy of agricultural circles as an interim to ^f farm collectivization also will be a source of unrest and will require terror.

Gomulka ^{hopes} ~~hopes~~ to achieve his goals without this ultimate terror but this is ~~an~~ an illusion. But it might be that he will content himself with some minor changes in norms to avoid unrest and dissatisfaction of the workers and to avoid reaching for means of terror.

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4. Engineering Scientific Progress

- a. Politbureau: Jedrychowski. He addressed the IV Plenum of the Central Committee in January 1960. ~~that was~~ This Plenum was devoted entirely ~~called in as the Plenum to discuss exclusively~~ engineering progress. This problem is now brought in the focus in connection with ~~xxx~~ the attempts to improve productivity. The aim is to mobilize the engineers and the intelligence for the same goal that is sharpening ^{norms} of productivity and operational standards.
- b. Vicepremier Eugeniusz Szyr.
- c. Central Committee Jerzy Niedzwiecki deputy head of the Economic
- d. There is a special State Council of Engineering Progress founded in 1957 with Chairman Prof Malecki. ^{Dpt of the Central Committee of the Party}
- However ~~this~~ is not a political personality. More influence on these matters have:
- Witold Nowacki General Secretary of the Polish Academy of Science,
- Wilhelm Billig Chairman of the Polish Academic Commission
- Atomic Committee Education
- Jerzy Golanski Minister of higher Education
- e. State Planning Commission Adam Wang and Kiejstut Zemaitis

||

5. Capital Expenditures and Construction

Politbureau: Jedrychowski . Construction and Communal

Economy is Jedrychowski's predilection.

Secretary of the Party Jerzy Albrecht

Vicepremier Eugeniusz Szyr

Party Apparatus Jerzy Bogusz deputy head of Economic department and secretary of a special commission within the Central Committee for Construction

Jerzy Skrzekot instructor in architecture

State Planning Commission Prof Kazimierz Secomski

/ not a party member /

Minister Stefan Pietrusiewicz

Viceminister in charge of building materials

Jerzy Grzymek

Viceminister in charge of housing in the ministry of Communal Economy Juljusz Gorynski

Stanislaw Tolwinski Viceminister of the Office

of Ministers in charge of cooperatives of housing and individual houses and rent policies.

Viceminister of Finance Zygmunt Trendoła . He is specially assigned the financial control of capital expenditures and he exerts a great influence although rather in a concealed way. Not known to the public.

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6. Territorial Administration and Local People's Councils.

The Local Authorities are elected. They are directly subordinated to the National Council/ National Assembly/ and to the Parliament. During the intervalls between the Sessions of the ~~Sejm~~ Sejm / Parliament/ the authority of the Sejm is delegated to the National Council / Rada Państwa /

According to the Polish Constitution the eligible authorities are not subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers, to the Executive Authority. But this self - management of the elected People's Councils is only a fictitious right. The Premier exerts the governing rights of course under the outlines and policies of the Party. However the handling of ^{affaires} ~~matters~~ of the elected authorities is always a " delicate " matter nad this is called in Poland of the problem of the " dual authority".

The office of Ministers has a special Department of People's Councils reporting to the Premier. Besides there is the National Council with its own large secretariat. The conflicts that are unavoidable in this dual authority are settled by the Party.

The deciding men in this area are:

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- a. Polit bureau. Alexander Zawadzki, Chairman of the National Assembly / a function corresponding nominally to the position of a President of the Nation./
In reality the power of this " President " is limited./
- b. Vicepremier Zenon Nowak who has a narrow field of activities in comparison to the other Vicepremiers and therefore concentrates on problems of the Local People's Councils.
- c. Chief of the Office of Ministers A. Wieczorek / He has the title of a Viceminister.
- d. Stanislaw Skrzyszewski, General Secretary of the National Council / former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland/

14.

7. Agriculture and Forest

- a. Politbureau former Ochab now Gomulka personally.
- b. Vicepremier. Stefan Ignar from the Peasants' party
he governs these matters more formally and ~~less~~ does not
~~effectively~~ have too much influence
- c. State Planning Commission Deputy Chairman /fnu/ Struzik,
a professor. However he has not too much influence
although he occupies the position of the planner of
agricultural developments in Poland.
- d. Central Committee Head of the Agricultural department
of the Central Committee, Edmund Pszczolkowski a very
influential man. He was former Minister of Agriculture,
later in 1955-1956, head of the Security Committee.
He will probably play an increasing role in the ~~fore~~ ^{enforcement of}
~~in enforcing~~ the agricultural circles and ⁱⁿ exercising
means of pressure on the farmers.
- e. Jagielski /fnu/ Minister of Agriculture former a ~~fun~~
fonctionnaire of the Central Committee, an ardent adherent
of collectivization.
- f. Jerzy Tepicht, member of the Central Committee, direc-
tor of the Institut for Agriculture, who elaborates the
theoretical foundations for the collectivization
and the tactics to be applied.
- g. Marian Jaworski former chairman of the Council of
Collective Farmers now Secretary of the Warsaw Void-
ship Party Committee. He is assigned to force the

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the collectivization in the Warsaw Voivodship
and to give an example of "successful" performing
the new program started by Gomulka.

Forests . Minister Dab-Kociński from the Peasants' party
an instrument in the hands of the Communistic Party
without decisive personal influence.

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8 Production and Supply of Consumer Goods

- a. Politbureau. It is characteristic that such an important problem has no special representant within the Politbureau. This also is a sign that the needs of the people are treated as a "second" hand and not as ^{first hand} first problem by the party.
- b. Vicepremier Eugeniusz Szyr (but among other assignments)
- c. State Planning Commission, first deputy, Tadeusz Gede
- c. Minister Mieczyslaw Lesz Minister of Internal Trade

Minster of Food processing Pisula

Viceminster in charge of ~~passes~~ state purchase of food from the farmers including contractation

Dr. Lindberg

~~xxxxStatePlanningCommissionxxxx~~

Minster of Light Industry Stawinski, ^mmember of the Central Committee very influencial.

Leon Kasman, member of the Central Committee former
entirely
Viceminister now shifted ~~exclusively~~ to party
work as head of the Department for Light Industry
and Consumer Goods in the apparatus of the Central
Committee.

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Stanislaw

Mieczyslaw Marzec, elected as member of the

Central Committee during the January-Plenum in 1960, a young man who is making a very fast career and probably will achieve the highest positions in Poland.

He is Viceminister of Light Industry.

He was former deputy head of the Department of Economics in the Central Committee.

Kutin Viceminister of Internal Trade very influential, in charge of imports of consumer goods.

Karol Struminski Head of the State Price Commission.

It might be noted that the problem of consumer goods is not treated with such an emphasis as it should be, no one of the Secretaries of the Party is appointed entirely to this problem.

The "idea man" in matters of consumer goods and supply and trade is Horowic, General director in the Ministry of Foreign Trade who prepared a new concept of internal trade in Poland. However only a part of this program was approved. Horowic was former attache in London and he suggested an reorganization, based on Western techniques. A certain improvement in supply of ^{industrial} consumer goods is due to his ideas. He is influential as the "brain" of the respective ministries and the State Planning Commission.

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9. Transportation and Communication

a. Politbureau No special assignment, mostly Jędrzychowski takes care of these matters.

b. Secretary of the Central Committee

Ryszard Strzelecki former Minister of Transportation, ~~appointed~~ ~~nominated~~ as secretary of the Party in January 1960 during the IV Plenum.

He is a former natolinist and the appointment to this responsible job proves that the positions of the pro-Russians becomes every day stronger.

c. Viceminster for Railways Stefan Popielas

Viceminster for Roads and Highways Olesinski

d. Minister of Communication Moskwa from the Democratic Party an instrument in the hands of the Communistic Party.

e. Ocean and Sea Transportation Viceminister of Navigation Jerzy Tomorowicz

19

10. Communal Economy

Politbureau Jedrychowski

Secretary of the Central Committee Jerzy Albrecht

He was former President of the City of
Warsaw and is familiar with Communal Economy

Vicepremier Zenon Nowak

Apparatus of the Central Committee ^{Mrs} Finder, the deputy
head of the Economic Department of the Central Committee

She is the widow of the first Secretary of the Polish
Worker's Party ^{Finder} who was killed in ~~1954~~ 1944.

Ministers: Vice minister of the Office of Ministers

Stanisław Tołwinski,

Minister of Communal Economy Stanisław Sroka

Great influence upon these matters has still Felix
Baranowski former Minister of Communal Economy, now
Secretary of the Committee of the Party of Bydgoszcz
member of the Central Committee.

20

11. Water problems

This is not such an important matter. Cyrankiewicz listed this item rather for propaganda purposes. In 1953 - 1959 there were several disasters in water supply and flood disasters.

People was embittered by the neglects of the government and several faults. ^{committed by state and local authorities.} Due to neglecting by the factories

the purification of processing waters there was poisoned drink water in Cracow / phenol from ^{the} Oswiecim factory/

The miners in Silesia are supplied with water only a couple of hours during the day. There is no sufficient water supply to wash themselves after work. In Otwock, near

Warsaw a recreation and medical center for tuberculosis the water is poisoned with tuberculosis ^{germs} bacteria because of lack of proper installations. Every year are ^{heavy} flood ^{disasters} disasters

because the program of flood protection is delayed from year to year. In 1957 a new factory of desintegrated

fiber was opened in the town Nida. The processing ^{waters} waters were discharged without purification and the beautiful

lakes in the county Mazury / where this factory is located / lost an immense amount of fish.

All these facts were heavily criticized by the population. Cyraniewicz wanted by his announcement calm down the bitterness of the people.

21

There is plenty of ~~disc~~ discussion and programs in this matter but the government does not spend money, except for melioration and irrigation. The handling of the water problems is rather "academic". The influential men are:

Balcerski

Professor Balcerski / Polytechnic of Gdansk , / member of the party , member of the Polish Parliament.

Viceminister Janusz Grocholski / Ministry of ~~Water~~ Navigation and Water Economy ~~Ways and Water Problems~~, whose father is the oldest living member of the prewar Polish Communist leadership. His son is on high positions and influential, although he is not to "bright"

Viceminister Jerzy Tomorowicz / ~~Foreign Trade~~ ^{Ministry of Navigation} / in He primarily governs the problems of marine, commercial ^{navigation} ships but also internal waterways

Although Cyraniewicz listed this problem as one of the ~~14~~ 13 "basic problems", there is no one Vicepremier or Secretary of the Party assigned to care on the water developments.

12. Organization of Business

This rather ~~very~~ indefinite ~~term~~ subject is one of the most important and difficult problems in Poland.

It includes the subject of rentability of enterprises, the price policy of industrial goods, the problem of the Worker's Councils, the extent of authority granted to the managers, etc. It includes also political problems connected with ^{the} form of ownership, the extent to which private trade or manufacturing will be allowed, the problems of cooperation between the three economic sectors / state, ^{co}operative and private ownership/

- a. Politbureau: Gomulka personally; he stopped several sound reforms initiated or suggested by the National Economic Council w/ vice-chairman Bobrowski a west orientated economist/
- b. Secretary of the Central Committee. Scattered assignments Zambrowski, Kliszko, Albrecht.
- c. Vicepremier Eugeniusz Szyr
- d. State planning Commission Tadeusz Gede
- e. Apparatus of the Central Committee Jerzy Niedzwiecki deputy head of the Economic ~~department~~ department.
- f. Oskar Lange ^{member} of the Central Committee professor chairman of the National Economic Council
- g. Viceminister of Finance ^{Juliusz} Kole
- h. Several theoretical economists: Professor Pohorylle, Brus, ^{Zawadzki} Zwadzki, etc.

23.

Zofia Tryblinska deputy chairman of the Council of Cooperatives in Poland, member of the Central Committee, wife of Viceminister of Finance Kole.

She was previously the head of the Department of Cadres in the Central Committee and worked closely to the Security Police. Although she was in 1956 transferred to the present lower position she is still very influential. ^{It is believed that she is} ~~She is~~ a Russian Agent.

Cyrankiewicz listed only those 12 problems .

But it is obvious that his list does not cover several other key problems many of them of greater importance than those listed.

These other problems will be discussed in part III of this report.

PREDICTIONS ON THE EFFECT THE CHANGES
IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES WILL HAVE ON
POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Responsibilities and Duties of Top Leaders
ASSIGNMENTS OF KEY PROBLEMS TO THE TOP PERSONALITIES

PART III

ASSIGNMENT OF KEY PROBLEMS TO TOP PERSONALITIES

PART III

In his expose November, 25, 1959 to the Polish Parliament Cyrankiewicz listed 12 key problems. Not all of them are of equal importance. On the other hand important problems were omitted.

It is characteristic that first of all Cyrankiewicz did not mention those key problems that are directed by him personally. Cyrankiewicz reserves for himself the management of such matters as:

Foreign Affairs

Demographic problems, especially connected with growth of population, transfer of people to the Western Territories / for political reasons, to prove the Polish character of these territories /

Relation to Church

~~Minorities and problems of Nationality~~
National Minorities

Health & Welfare
Administration of Justice

Cyrankiewicz for example directs the action of reduction of employees in the State Administration, but he avoids any indications that this ~~is his~~ action is directed by himself.

In this part of report the omitted key problems and assignments will be discussed starting from those directed by Cyrankiewicz personally. Since in Part II ^{other} twelve key problems already have been listed, part III begins with number 13.

13. FOREIGN AFFAIRES

POLIT BUREAU; PREMIER Józef Cyrankiewicz.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Adam Rapacki

The Foreign Policy - of course- is decided not in Poland but in Moscow. The "freedom" of handling these matters by the Polish leadership is very limited.

The man that watches all moves of the Foreign Policy of Poland is the ambassador Abrassimow and his spokesman within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is General Marian Naszkowski, Viceminister / former Polish ambassador in Moscow. Marian Naszkowski is member of the Central Committee and is high rated in the party hierarchy. He had some personal troubles because he divorced his wife and married ¹⁹⁵⁷ a young, pretty woman. This was sharply criticized in the Party circles. But he is still very influential because of the support by the Russians. Adam Rapacki is not trusted as much by the Russians.

Within the apparatus of the Central Committee some influence has the head of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee Józef Czesak ^{an alternate member of the Central Committee} ~~/ fm~~/. He is a new man, not too experienced but with increasing influence. The former head of this department Ostap - Dluski is now Chairman of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and still has great influence. Personal matters of the Foreign Ministry are directed by General Director Maria Wierna. It is believed that she is a Russian Agent. The former significant influence of Wierblowski now representant of Poland in the UNESCO is vanishing. The brains of the Rapacki Plan were Anfred Lachs, professor and Professor Julian Hochfeld. This latter was recently fired by Gomulka. Of the other Viceministers some influence / not too much/ has Winiewicz and Michalowski ^{he was in 1957 and is probably still} ~~he is now~~ delegate to the United Nations

14. DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE NATION. EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RELATIONS

Poland's population ^{is growing} grows at a rate of 500 000 per year but the opportunities ~~are~~ for jobs increase slowly.

While all the others, including Gomulka, are thinking only of an increase of productivity / without much success/ Cyrankiewicz worries what to do with the surplus ^{of} the ~~of~~ people, if really the productivity improves. He knows very well that in the State Administration there is a tremendous bureaucracy, ~~that~~ ^{for} at least 50 % could be reduced without any harm to running the business of State ^{Administration.} ~~Administration.~~

But he makes this reduction gradually, to avoid dissatisfaction and ~~tragedies.~~ ^{family} disasters.

In Poland ^{it is} ~~is~~ not easy to find a white-collar work for a woman. On the other hand the salary of the husband does not suffice to make a ^{living} ~~living~~ for the family. Instead a sharp reduction Cyrankiewicz agitates for stabilization of jobs and he started an action ~~of~~ against the fluctuation of jobs; people in Poland especially the physical workers ^{employment} change frequently the place of ~~job.~~ It shall be ~~not~~ ^{exists} noted that the latent and factual unemployment is ~~only~~

in the area of white collar workers and clerks ^{among} but not ~~among~~ the blue collar workers.

In this area is rather a shortage and physical workers are wanted. Several projects are delayed because of shortage of physical workers.

This might be illustrated by an quotation from Jedrychowski's address.

4

In his address to the Meeting of the Workers' Self-management (self government)

December 11, 1959 / see Trybuna Ludu Dec 12, 1959, p.3/

Dr. Stefan Jedrychowski, chairman of the State Planning

Commission and Member of the Polit bureau of the party, unveiled

the tremendous turnover ^{and} ~~and~~ fluctuation within the employment

of the Polish Industry. He stated:

there is a high
" ... While the absolute natural increase of population
we at present are living / are experiencing / a so-called
demographic "bottom" / depression / with respect to
the increase of those groups of ^upopulation that are
in the age of ability to work. In 1960 this group of
population will increase only by 35 000 people.

---~~...~~ Of 2 275 000 workers employed in the industry
in 1958, 783 000 left or changed their jobs i.e.
34.4 % and 781 000 workers i. e. 34.3 % were hired.

The government is going to restrict this excessive
fluctuation in labor force. This was the reason for
tightening and sharpening the requirements for obtaining
the "family supplement" * subsidies

* 100 to 120 zlotys per child per month.

5

Cyrankiewicz has a broader view on the human^{relation an industrial relation} problems
~~of the people~~ than the others, including Gomulka.

He directs the matters of "building up" the morale of the people
 of course in such a manner as outlined by the communists.

Actions directed personally by Cyrankiewicz were:

Fight with ~~Analphabetism i. e.~~ Illiteracy

"Trans-Qualification" of white collar workers in blue
 collar workers. This action remained without results

Fight against speculation and swindle

The anti-alcoholism bill

The Bill of Legal Abortion

The significant increase in pensions for retired people
 also was sponsored by Cyrankiewicz. But several other^{and}
 Since ~~several of these actions were~~ criticized Cyrankiewicz

keeps in concealment that he is the promotor or author of ^{many of the} ~~the majority~~
~~criticized~~
~~of these actions.~~

Cyrankiewicz's aids in these matters are:

Lucjan Motyka, Secretary of the Cracow Party Committee

Stanislaw Matwin Secretar of the Wroclaw Party Committee and
 Secretary of the Central Committee

^{Leon Chajin}
~~Juzx~~ Kochanowicz, Vice minister of Labor and Social Welfare

Eugeniusz Stawinski Minister of the Light Industry and member
 of the Central Committee

6

15. JUSTICE

The area of activity chosen by Cyrankiewicz involves legal problems. Cyrankiewicz has some education in this field / not completed studies / and a deep ^{predilection for} ~~inclination toward~~ these problems. He directs the administration of justice in Poland.

His aids are:

Marian Rybicki minister of justice

Mazur/ fnu/ Deputy Chief Attorney

Professor Jodlowski Vice Chairman of the Polish Sejm.

the Speaker of the Parliament is called in Poland Marshall of Sejm

Jodlowski is one of the Deputy-Marshalls

^{Leon}
Professor Rozmaryn, General Director in the Office of Ministers

his personal aide in matters of constitutional rights etc.

Cyrankiewicz sponsored the "Bill of the Attorneys" that forces all lawyers to join cooperative offices, and cancels the private practice of attorneys

7

16. RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

This is Cyrankiewicz's major field of activities.

Both the persecution of the Bishops^{and Priests} in Poland in 1951 - 1955

and later the truce with the Church were advised by Cyrankiewicz.

He changes his policies according to his ~~aims~~ actual aims

His aid is Minister of The Office of Confessions

Sztachelski

During 1956 - 1959 Cyrankiewicz listened to the advice of Minister of Education Bienkowski a former friend of Gomulka . Bienkowski supported a truce and peaceful policy in relations with the church. Bienkowski was released by Gomulka in 1959 . This is a sign that the relation with the church may become again strenuous.

Cyrankiewicz sponsored in 1957 the creation of the Association of Atheists^{and Free-Thinkers} and gave a lot of money to this institution

He directs also the action of the catholic group PAX, leaded by Piasecki .

Cyrankiewicz outlined the activity of the so called " Patriotic Priests " a group of priests sponsoring a National^{Polish} Polish Church

Cyrankiewicz is head of the Organization of the Former Political Prisoners / he was 4 years in the concentration camp in Oswiecim / Auschwitz/^{he} and uses his influence in this powerful organization for his aims.

17 NATIONAL MINORITIES

This problem is directed by Cyrankiewicz.

Several great errors have been made.

For example. The expulsion of all Germans even specialists ,

~~so that~~ After a couple of years some of them had to be
^{from Germany}
 hired back / for high salaries / to start production
^{glass}
 for example in the ~~Glass~~ and cristall factories

The transferring of all Ukrainians from the Eastern territories of the
 present Poland , ~~xxxxxx~~ to the Western territories. Now these
 Ukrainians are allowed to return ^{to} on the Voidvodships: Rzeszow
 and Lublin where after the removal of the Ukrainian farmers the
 entire farm culture deteriorated.

~~To this xxxxx~~

There were also great faults with respect to the former
 " Volks deutsch " and " Reichs deutsch " citizens. In the fervor of expulsion
 of all German speaking minorities thousands of citizens of Polish
 origine / descent / on whom the German citizenship was imposed during the
 war, were expelled.

Other problems within this area are:

Repatriation from the USSR

Repatriation from the Western Countries and relation to the Polish
 emigration.

The problem of emigration of Jews

The Greeks. After 1947- 10 000 Communists from Greece were brought
 to Poland.

The Korean children , now grown up , approximately 2000

9

Cyrankiewicz aids are:

Zygfryd Sznek Viceminister of Internal Affairs, Chief of Repatriation. It is believed that Sznek is a Russian Agent

Delegate for Repatriation of Poles from the USSR Mieczyslaw Popiel
He works more against these candidates
for repatriation than in behalf of them

He is an ardent Natolinist and also is probably a Russian agent

Cyrankiewicz cooperates in these matters with

two other members of the Politbureau Alexander Zawadzki and ~~xx~~

Roman Zambrowski. However the leading man is Cyrankiewicz

in problems of National Minorities .

Resume of Cyrankiewicz's assignments

Cyrankiewicz directs personally the a great amount of affairs
However he does not ~~publish or make~~ let it known to the people.

This allows him to avoid responsibility, if something goes wrong

He is very shrewd and smart. He has no character. He can make any policy
and change his policies as often as needed to pursue his own aims.

He is always prepared for any possibility. He has an agreement with
Rapacki that in case of any defeat or danger for Cyrankiewicz, Rapacki
will appoint him ambassador in Paris so that Cyrankiewicz can leave the
country for a while.

On the other hand Cyrankiewicz restrains himself from direct
action in economic matters. This gives him the advantage
of being "innocent" with respect to the economic failures in Poland

10

18 HEALTH AND WELFARE

Politbureau Jozef Cyrankiewicz . In second place Loga-Sowinski
Apparatus of the Party.

Secretary of the Gdansk-Voidship-Party-Committee Alexander
^{up to 1959}
Machno who is a physician of profession and ~~still~~ now is
assigned party work in the apparatus of the Central Committee. He
has much influence in ~~this~~ ^{the} area of health, and social welfare.

~~Walenty~~
Walery Titkow, head of the Organization Department
of the Central Committee a physician of profession,
very influential

Ministry and Administration

~~Alexander~~ Pacho
Dr. Stanislaw Bacho, Viceminister . He in fact directs
^{Professor Romuald} ^{rather a}
the ministry . The Minister, Baranski is ~~more~~ nominal
ruler

Stanislaw Zawadzki, minister of Labor and Social Wel
fare.

19 PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

Polit - Bureau Edward Ochab who also is secretary of the Central Committee. He became secretary of the Central Committee in 1959 after Jerzy Morawski was released from his post as member of the Politbureau and secretary of the Central Committee in charge of propaganda and agitation. Morawski followed a more liberal line, Ochab represents a rigid line of censorship.

Apparatus of the Central Committee.

- a. Press: Artur Starewicz . His deputy is Chaber.
Starewicz is head of the Press Department of the Central Committee he is a member of the Central Committee.
Starewicz directs the censorship in Poland.
- b. Agitation; Andrzej Werblan head of the department of Propaganda and Agitation, member of the Central Committee.
His deputies: Danilowicz and Mrs Feder.
- c. Litterature Zolkiewski member of the Central Committee.
Kruczkowski member of the Central Committee
- d. ^{Business} Show and Stage Cieslikowska
Zofia
- e. Education Mrs Zemanek deputy head of the department of education in the Central Committee.

Other influential men within administration and press:

Minister of Culture Galinski, Vice-minister Rusinick
Vice-minister of Education Zofia Dembinska member of the Central Committee
Minister of High Education Golanski (Henryk)
Preses of the Polish Committee for Broadcasting Adam Sokorski, member of CC
Preses of the Polish Press Agency Stasewski, member of the Central Committee
Chief redactor of the Party Monthly magazine 'Nowe Drogi' Roman Werfel
member of the Central Committee
Deputy chief redactor ~~of~~ / editor / of the ~~Party~~ Party weekly ~~press~~ paper
Romana Granas , member of the Central Committee.

Preses of the Office of Publication Show Business and Press Zawadko
and his deputy Friedman

12

20 PARTY ORGANIZATION

To the ruling ^{communists} men in Poland the problem of strengthening the authority of the party is a "first* class" problem.

Gomulka personally directs these matters, however he uses the experience of Roman Zambrowski who is the "oldest" / not by ^{age} years but ^{by years of} service in the Politbureau/ member of the Politbureau*.

Zambrowski is the expert in organizing "actions" meetings, ^{conferences, for example whether} scheduling of sequence of meetings ~~whether~~ to start from the bottom organizations or from the top organizations in carrying out a particular action.

Zambrowski is both member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the Party. As secretary of the Central Committee he is in charge of "Organizational matters" ^{broad} "this is a ~~vague~~ definition and he interferes in all affaires, since any problem can be ^{figured} ~~judged~~ as organizational problem."

Zambrowski has two aids; (1) Finkelsztain /fnu/ a member of the Central Committee who is the expert in "relations to international communism". This means that any action, to be started, is evaluated from the point of view if and to what ~~degree~~ ^{communitistic} extent it will affect the opinion of other parties and first of all what will be the opinion of the Russian Party.

Finkelsztain also is this man who checks any action from the criterion of conformity with the party theory. He is the theoretician of the problems of party organization.

13

He is not known to the public, He stays in the shadow. But he is very influential . For example : There is an institution called the " Seminars" These are closed meetings of the members of the Central Committee and Ministers ^{during} ~~on~~ which basic policies are discussed and theoretical problems brought up.

When Chruszczew announced that Communism can achieve world domination even " without bloody revolution", ^{This} ~~which~~ is ~~a~~ in striking contrast to Lenin and Stalin who emphasized " that in every country ~~the power can be~~ there will be a bloody revolution because the ruling class of the capitalists will not surrender without fight", - A special seminarium was called to explain this new position to the top man in Poland .

The ^{panelist} ~~chairman~~ of this seminarium was Finkelsztain.

[redacted]

The invitation to this meeting was sent to Minister of Construction ^{Czeslaw} Babinski, who at this time was in the town Nowa Huta . This letter / top secret / was submitted to [redacted] the Secretary of the Party Cell of the ministry [redacted]

[redacted] Minister Babinski was ^{not to happy} ~~uncontent~~ ^{him} ~~by~~ excuse himself saying that he is indispensable on the ~~const~~ construction site, ~~and~~ [redacted] to call Secretary Zambrowski

and to ask if Zambrowski will excuse him. [redacted]

Zambrowski answered : Tell Minister Babinski that he must be present personally and also tell him to prepare himself thoroughly ."

* These seminaria are called also "theoretical conferences"

14

When Babinski arrived in Warsaw he told ^{me:} "Again a waste of three day in such a strenuous period .

25X1

Another such seminarium was at the time when the new agricultural program in January 1957 was announced. The panelist was at this time Edward Ochab and the summary was made by Gomulka.

These seminars are " courses of indoctrination" for the Ministers and Members of the Central Committee.

The second aid of Zambrowski in these party organization matters is Walenty Titkow member of the Central Committee and head of the " Organizational Department" of the Central Committee. Titkow is in charge of technical matters of party organization. Because of this function he also has great influence.

The role of this organizational department under Bierut was even greater than now . Gomulka introduced a change by separating the subject of selecting the candidates for Secretaries of the ^{Voivodship} ~~Voivodship~~ Party Committees ^{from Zambrowski's organizational duties} . Zambrowski ^{can now} ~~could~~ decide only to the level of the second secretary of the Voivodship Committee.

15

The positions of the First Secretaries . were decided
by Gomulka himself ^{or in} ~~after~~ consultation with Kliszko .

16

21 PERSONAL MATTERS

In personal matters Gomulka could not trust anybody except his friend Zenon Kliszko. Kliszko was appointed ¹⁹⁵⁶ Secretary of the Central Committee. He has ^{3 major} ~~two~~ assignments:

1. Selecting of the Leaders of the Voivodship Committees. During 1957-1959 almost all 19 Secretaries of the Voivodships have been changed. Only after this operation was finished Gomulka called the ~~Second~~ Congress of the Party in March 1959. Kliszko also was responsible for preparing the Congress.

2. Choosing and screening candidatures for top positions, Ministers etc.

3. Dealing with the Polish Parliament and the other parties / the Peasants Party and the Democratic Party

Kliszko is Deputy Speaker of the Sejm / The Sejm always elects a chairman / Marszalek Sejmu / whose role can be compared to the Speaker of the Parliament in England.

The nominal "Marszalek Sejmu" is Wycech / Peasants' Party / but the ~~nominal~~ factual is Zenon Kliszko ~~his deputy and the~~ ^{Representatives of the Sejm from} ~~and head of the~~ "Club of the Communist Party, ~~delegates~~ Representatives

Kliszko also was responsible for organization of the elections to the Polish Sejm in 1957.

Kliszko works by himself alone, and reports directly to Gomulka who gives him personally the orders.

In 1959 Kliszko became member of the Politbureau

17

Kliszko is Gomulka's friend and has the greatest influence on Gomulka, who trusts him. But Kliszko is not liked by the Russians and Gomulka rather gradually and cautiously was building up Kliszko's position and authority.

Probably Gomulka would select Kliszko as his successor. However this would be refused by Chruszczew. Kliszko also has not the personality of a leader. He is not ^{of good health} ~~a healthy~~ the type of a and not a too good orator. He is ~~however a good~~ staff worker. Nevertheless his role will increase.

No appointment to top level positions in the party and to the position of Minister or Vicepremier can be made without Kliszko.

22 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY AND SEJM

Kliszko works through the heads of the other Parties. The General Secretary of the Party of the Democrats Leon Chain ^{Labor} who is Viceminister of ~~Justice~~ ^{Justice}. Chain is a prewar Communist who is the instrument of the Communistic Party within the Democratic Party. "Officially" he is not a member of the Communistic Party but of the "Democratic Party". He

^{shall} This party represents the intelligence, the handicraft and the private initiative. But Chain acts in behalf of the Communistic Party against the interest of the groups that he is nominally representing. He is a deceiver of these groups.

18

The ~~other~~ communistic agent within the Peasant's Party is Podedworny / fnu/ who is also Vice-Marshall~~ik~~ /Deputy-Speaker/ of the Sejm and Deputy Chairman of the Peasant's Party. He is Viceminister of Forests. He is an obedient instrument in Kliszko's hands. and also deceived his own party.

Nominally the Chairman of the ^{National} Council of Poland is Alexander Zawadzki, member of the Politbureau. Logically he should be in charge of the area of Relationship to the Parliament.

However Gomulka does not trust Zawadzki who is a hidden Nationalist and dislikes Gomulka. Therefore Gomulka assigned the problem of election to the Sejm and the dealing with the parliament to Kliszko.

This creates a complicated personal situation and tensions within the Politbureau and particularly between Zawadzki and Kliszko.

An influential person is Vice - Speaker Professor Jodlowski whose role seems to be increasing steadily under Gomulka's ruling.

19

23 INTERNAL SECURITY

This area of activities gave Gomulka the greatest trouble from beginning of his regime. The entire organization was under influence and direction of the Pro- Russians i.e. the Natolinists and Russian agents.

Even now Gomulka can count only on a few men within the organization of the ~~in~~ Ministry of ~~the~~ Internal Affairs, ^{within the Militia} ~~the Militia~~ / Police/ and the Organs of the Security Police. Officially the Ministry of Security Police has been dissolved in 1955, the Committee of Security in 1956. But the "Local & Offices of Security Police" were subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs / Minister Vicha and a reduced in number, but still powerful apparatus of security police exists.

Minister Vicha himself is not an adherent of Gomulka but he at least maintains a "neutral" or 'loyal' line. However the Viceministers Alster and Zygfryd S znek are doubtlessly Russian agents ~~cmxx~~ / from the 'Beria period' and the third Viceminister Antosiewicz also is a natolinist and pro-Russian. Gomulka was able only to introduce ~~one~~ ^{a few} men into this Ministry whom he can trust i. e. Moczar. ~~✱ ✱~~ Moczar is a friend of Gomulka. But Moczar a former partisan has a very difficult personality and he makes a lot of ~~mist~~ mistakes. Gomulka can also trust, at least for the present

20

time the Viceminister of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Chief of the Corps of Internal Security General Komar who during 1953 - 1956 was a prisoner of the Security Police.

The third man who is loyal to Gomulka now, is General Hibner Viceminster of Internal affairs and Chief of the Forces for Defense of the BorderLines.

Gomulka is aware, that he has no friends within the organization of security police and

Therefore he assigned Jerzy Albrecht the Secretary of the Central Committee to watch this field .

Jerzy Albrecht id by no means a personal friend of Gomulka. During the Congress of the Party when Gomulka was was accused in 1949, Albrecht attacked heavily Gomulka.

However in 1953 - 1956 Albrecht himself was under attack of the Security Police. His wife was arrested . She is now released but she is mentally ~~ill~~ ^{ill} . She is divorced from Albrecht. In 1956 materials were found and witnesses that there was a heavy accusation prepared against Albrecht . Only the October Revolutoon saved Albrecht from persecution.

This is the reason that Gomulka picked out Albrecht as supervisor of the Security Organs. Albrecht took this difficult job but he managed to keep secret this assign ment.

Albrecht directs the policies if the Security Organs.

25X1

21

[redacted] in 1957 Albrecht asked the Minister of Construction to find jobs for laid off former employees of the security police.X

25X1

25X1

Albrecht said that he has difficulties with finding jobs for the laid-off employees of the security organs [redacted] when such an employee applies for a job

25X1

in a factory, even as physical worker he is refused because the workers don't want to have a former security man among the crew.] Albrecht's proposition was to find jobs within the construction industry. [redacted] factory

25X1

workers are more disciplined than construction workers; a There is no reason to believe that the ^{less disciplined} construction workers will have another approach than the factory workers to ~~th~~ these men.

22

Albrecht referred to a project ^{started} ~~launched~~ by the Minister of Construction to create small private enterprises for production of building materials. The Minister of Construction had laid off ^{at this time} 1000 white-collar workers mostly in Warsaw and in order to help these people in getting a job offered them to ^{furnish them} ~~help~~ with facilities ^{& equipment,} ~~equipment~~ if they will create small cooperatives and produce bricks, cinders etc. This action was called trans-qualification i. e. ^{the} ~~to the~~ white collar workers had to learn physical work. Albrecht suggested that he will pay one years-salary for each ~~worker~~ employee for teaching him construction and building materials work. He said that he will cover all other costs, materials, facilities, etc needed for creating the working place for those men. He also explained that he is now in Szczecin incognito to solve ^{the problem} ~~the problem~~ of employment for the former security employees of Szczecin.

This project seemed ^{practicable} not quite ~~practicable~~, but Alb
Albrecht ~~only wanted to~~ said that he only wants ^{me} ~~me~~ to think
this, over to discuss this with the Minister of Construction

25X1

The discussion shifted later to other matters, to the problem of creating private enterprises for building of small houses, ^{adequate} rents for apartments, etc, and
Albrecht supports to a large extent the new economic model

25X1

that was at this time discussed in Poland i. e. more private industry, building and small trade.

23

A few weeks later [redacted] Albrecht presented 25X1
his ideas to Gomilka but Gomilka rejected the majority of them.
However some minor features were accepted and ^{since then} ~~from this time~~
there were introduced such practices, like selling small
houses to individual ^{dwellers} ~~inhabitants~~ / by the cities and the state/
more loans for private builders, etc.

- [redacted] 25X1
- 1 Albrecht is ~~th~~ in charge of security matters
 - 2 he really thinks about reduction of the number
of employees in the security police
 - 3 [redacted] he ^{more} ~~had~~ quite liberal economic ideas than the
other top Party leaders.

The problem of these former ^{security police men /} ~~employees~~ to be employed in the
construction industry, ~~later~~ was not continued. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] the
final decision in passport-matters and emigration lays in
Albrecht hands. [redacted] 25X1

people in Poland did not know that Albrecht is in charge of
passport matters. [redacted] Albrecht 25X1
also referred to a project of sending 5000 white-collar
workers to China in an organized ^{way.} ~~way~~ [redacted] such a 25X1
offer was made to the Chinese, but they refused.

Bogusz also suggested to send 1000 stone-and brick-
layers as workers to the Brussel Fair . At this time such workers

24

were urgently wanted by the organizers of the Brussel World Fair.

This project also was never carried out.

It might be expected that in 1960 Gomulka will assign the control of security affairs to another man. A strenghtening of the security police is to^{be} expected in Poland in connection with the new program of Agricultural Circles and ~~new lowered standard of living~~ and the austerity program. In this case ^{Albrecht} ~~Albrecht~~ ^{would not be} is not the "right man". ^{in Gomulka's opinion} ~~He~~ ^{Albrecht} does not support a supremacy of security police. He thinks rather in economic categories and also personally has not too much favor for the security police.

A shift in this assignment for example ~~secretary of the Central Committee with~~ appointing another ~~man~~ in charge of security matters ^{harder} would indicate that the ~~moment~~ of a new policy in this area is likely to be ~~launched~~. ^{started}

However such shifts in assignments are not ^{always} announced and only ^{after} a certain time it ^{becomes} known to the members of the Central Committee and ~~from~~ such an information sooner or later ^{this} spreads to other people.

* See Supplement
Part IV Summary p. 13

25

24 MILITAIRY AFFAIRES

Thee extent of self independence in this area is very limited.

The appointment of Spychalski as member of the Pol Politbureau in March 1959 is an attempt to give Spychalski more authority. Spychalski is rather a weak man. After he was released from jail in 1956 he was 6 months sick and had a nervous breakdown. Although all Polish officers ^{prefer} ~~are satisfied that they have~~ ^{having} a Polish chief and not a Russian as was Rokossowski nevertheless the material situation, salaries, privileges, for the commissioners are much lower than under Rokossowski. This latter introduced a system of high ~~priv~~ privileges for the officers special hospitals, cars to own disposition, recreation houses, etc. ~~Now under~~ special " socalled General ~~Department~~ stores etc. ~~Now under~~ Spychalski the officers have lesser salaries and privileges.

Spychalski is surrounded by pro-Russians who watch every his step/ Witaszewski Bordzilowski Szymanowski . Loyal to Spychalski is General Janusz ~~Zarz~~ Zarzycki the Chief of Political "ducation in the Militairy Forces, ^{Viceminister Gen Duszynski} and Frey Bielecki the chief of Air Forces. Spychalski is disliked by the Russians

~~He can not make his own policies. only in minor~~
~~matters he can decide.~~ and has no decision-making power
in major matters.

26.

Conclusion

Cyrankiewicz listed only 12 key problems. But there are other
 14 top men
 12 of equal importance. There are 10 members of the Politbureau
 and 7 Secretaries of the Central Committee in Poland

Members of the Politbureau	Secretaries of the Central Committee
----------------------------	--------------------------------------

Gomulka	Gomulka
Cyrankiewicz	
Jedrychowski	
Loga-Sowinski	
Spychalski	
Rapacki	
Ochab	Ochab
Zambrowski	Zambrowski
Kliszko	Kliszko
Gierek	Gierek
	Albrecht
	Strzelecki
	Jarosinski
	Matwin

The key problems are not distributed equally.
 Some leaders / not speaking of Gomulka himself/ have
 have a great load of assigned affairs for example
 Cyrankiewicz, Jedrychowski, Gierek and Kliszko.
 Others have a lesser area of assignments but still very
 important. Zambrowski, Albrecht, Ochab.

Some of these leaders have narrower assignments
 Zawadzki, Matwin, Jarosinski Loga-Sowinski

This analysis shows the extent of influence and power
 of each of these 14 party leaders.

In general however all are overburdened because of centralization
 of decisions.

The exact assignments are not known publicly. Frequent shifts
 within the delegated authority and assigned jobs ~~serve to the~~
 are made by Gomulka. The members of the Central Committee learn
 quickly about such shifts and make their conclusions with respect
 to changes in influence of the particular person.
 From these members of the Central Committee the information
 spreads to the country and people guesses what result will
 changes in policies will occur result from these changes in
 personal assignments.

The present development shows generally an increase of power
 of the Pro-Russians and the former Natolinist and a decline
 of power of the Polish communists, the so-called "Patriotic Communists"
 among them many of the ardent defenders of Gomulka in 1956
 / Morawski, Bienkowski, Hochfeld Gomulka's best adherents have been
 dropped by Gomulka in the last months and replaced by pro-Russians/

and Natolinists. These personal changes ~~conform~~ and affirm the changes in policies made by Gomulka in an accelerated pace / tempo / after the Congress in March 1959 and the Plenum in October 1959.

PREDICTIONS ON THE EFFECT THE CHANGES
IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES WILL HAVE ON
POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS


ASSIGNMENTS OF KEY PROBLEMS TO THE TOP PERSONALITIES

Responsibilities and Duties of Top Leaders
PART II. SUMMARY

TOP ASSIGNMENTS

SUMMARY
Of Part I , II , and III

Abbreviations:

- a.) P.B. Polit Bureau-Member
- b.) S.P. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.
- c.) P.F. Functionnaire of the Party Apparatus of the Central Committee of the Party
- d.) M.CC. Member of the Central Committee
- e.) Min. Minister
- f.) V.M. Vice Minister
- g.) R. S. Representative of the Parliament / Sejm/
- h.) M. S. Marshall of the Sejm this means: Speaker
- j.) V.M.S Deputy Speaker of the Sejm
- k.) V.P. Vice Premier

Note: Other top positions not included in these abbreviations will be spelled out in the text.

Asterisk -

Asterisk Numbers are given to key problems not listed by Cyrankiewicz in his address to the Polish Sejm.

No.	Key Problem	Assigned to or influenced by	
		Position	Name
1.	2.	3.	4.
1.	Heavy Industry	P.B. and S.P.	Edward Gierek Secretary of the Party Committee of Silesia
		V.P & M.CC.	Julian Tokarski
		V.P. & MCC.	Piotr Jaroszewicz.
		P.F. & MCC.	Józef Olszewski Head of the Economic Dept of the Central Committee.

2

TOP ASSIGNMENTS
SUMMARY/ CONTINUED/

1.	2.	3.	4.
1. /cont./	Heavy Industry	Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission	Adam Wang
		dtto	Kiejstut Zemaitis
		Min. & MCC.	Franciszek Waniolka
2.	Cooperation with the Eastern Bloc	P.B	Stefan Jedrychowski
		V.P & MCC	Piotr Jaroszewicz
		P.F. & MCC	Jozef Olszewski
		First Deputy- Chairman of the State Planning Commission & MCC.	Tadeusz Gede
		Chairmen of The Committee of Coopera- tion with Foreign Countries & MCC.	Roman Fidelski
		Delegate in Mos- cōw , Vice- minister	Slusarczyk /fnu/
		Deputy Delegate in Moscow ,	Różanski /fnu/
		ambassador & MCC	Boleslaw Jaszczuk

TOP ASSIGNMENTS
/CONTINUED/
SUMMARY

1.	2.	3.	4.
3.	Productivity, Operational Standards/ Norms/ Wages.	P.B. P.B. PB & S.P. V.P. & MCC V.P. & MCC P.F. & MCC, A (Deputy Head of Economical Dpt. of the Cen- tral Committee)	Ignacy Loga- Sowinski Stefan Jedrychowski Gomulka / partially/ Julian Tokarski Eugeniusz Szyr Franciszek Blinowski Secretary of Edward Kulesza the Central Council of Labor Unions & MCC and R.S. Chairman of Alojzy Firganek the State Com- mission for Wages & Vice Minister of Labor & Social Welfare
4.	Engineering- Scientific Advancement	P.B. V.P. P.F. Deputy Head of the Economic Dpt. of the -Central Committee Chairman of the Atomic Committee & MCC, Minister Minister of High Education Deputy of the State Planning Commission **** General Secretary of the Polish Academy of Science	Stefan Jedrychowski Eugeniusz Szyr Engineer Jerzy Niedzwiecki Wilhelm Billig Jerzy Golanski Adam Wang Kiejstut Lemaitis Witold Nowacki

4

TOP ASSIGNMENTS

SUMMARY /Continued/

1	2	3	4
5.	Capital Expendi- tures, Construction and Building Materials	P.B. S.P. V.P. & MCC P.F. deputy head of the Economical Dpt. of the Central Com- mittee P.F. Instruc- tor of the Central Committee Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Min. of Construc- tion Vice Minister of Constr Vice Minister of Communal Economy Deputy Chief of the Office of Ministers Vice Minister of Finance	Stefan Jedrychowski Jerzy Albrecht Eugeniusz Szyr Jerzy Bogusz Jerzy Skrzekot Prof. Kazi- mierz Secomski Stefan Pietrusiewicz Jerzy Grzymek Juljusz Goryński Stanislaw Tolwinski Zygmunt Trendota
6.	Territorial Administration and People's Councils	P.B. V.P. & MCC Chief of the Office of Mini- sters, alternate MCC. General Secre- tary of the National Assem- bly & MCC.	Alexander Zawadzki Zenon Nowak A. Adam Wleczorek Stanislaw Skrzyszewski

5

TOP ASSIGNMENTS
SUMMARY / continued/

1	2	3	4
7.	Agriculture and Forests.	<p>P.B.</p> <p>F.P. Head of the Agricultural Dpt of the Central Committee & M.CC.</p> <p>Minister of Agriculture and MCC.</p> <p>Secretary of the Warsaw Voidship Committee, and MCC.</p> <p>Director of the Agricultural Institute, & MCC.</p> <p>V.P .</p> <p>Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission</p> <p>Minster of Forests</p>	<p>Gomulka personally</p> <p>Edmund Pszczolowski</p> <p>Jagielski /fnu/</p> <p>Marian Jaworski</p> <p>Jerzy Tepicht</p> <p>Stefan Ignar</p> <p>Prof Struzik</p> <p>Dab- Kociol</p>
8.	Production and Supply of Consumer Goods	<p>P.B. & S. P.</p> <p>V.P. & MCC</p> <p>First Deputy of the State Planning Commission & MCC</p> <p>Minister of Light Industry & MCC</p> <p>Viceminister of Light Industry & MCC</p> <p>Minister of Internal Trade</p> <p>Viceminister of Food Processing and State Purchase of Farmers' goods</p> <p>Head of the Dpt of Light Industry & MCC</p> <p>Viceminister of Foreign Trade</p> <p>Chairman of the State Price Commission</p> <p>General director in Foreign Trade</p> <p>Minister of Food Processing Industry</p>	<p>none / characteristic/</p> <p>Eugeniusz Szyr</p> <p>Tadeusz Gede</p> <p>Eugeniusz Stawinski</p> <p>Stanislaw Marzec</p> <p>Mieczyslaw Lesz</p> <p>Dr. Lindberg /fnu/</p> <p>Leon Kasman</p> <p>Kutin /fnu/</p> <p>Karol Struminski</p> <p>Horowic /fnu/</p> <p>/fno/</p>

TOP ASSIGNMENTS
SUMMARY /continued/

1	2	3	4
9. Transportation & Communication	Politbureau P.S. Viceminister of Railways Viceminister of Roads Minister of Com- munication Viceminister of Navigation	Stefan Jedrychowski Ryszard Strzelecki Stefan Popielas Olesinski /fnu/ Moskwa /fnu/ Jerzy Tomorowicz	
10 Communal Economy	P.B. P.S. S.P. V.P. & MCC P.F. Deputy Head of the Econo- mic Dpt of the Central Committee and M.C.C. Deputy Head of the Office of Ministers, Viceminister Secretary of the Party Committee of Voivodship Bydgoszcz, MCC Minister of Communal Economy	Jedrychowski Jerzy Albrecht Zenon Nowak Mrs. Finder /fnu/ Stanislaw Tolwinski Felix Baranowski Stanislaw Sroka	

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TOP ASSIGNMENTS

SUMMARY /continued/

1.	2	3	4
11.	Water Problems	Viceminister of Navigation and Water Economy	Janusz Grochulski
		dtto.	Jerzy Tomorowicz
		Representative of the Polish Sejm, Professor and head of the Committee of Water Economics	Professor Balcerski /fnu/
12.	Organization of Business	P.B.	Gomulka/partially /
		V.P. & MCC.	Eugeniusz Szys
		State Planning Commission First deputy Chairman and MCC	Tadeusz Gede.
		P.F. deputy head of Economic Dpt of the Central Committee	Jerzy Niedzwiecki
		Head of Economic Council of Poland, MCC	Professor Oscar Lange
		His deputy	Prof Czeslaw Bobrowski
		Viceminister of Finance, MCC	Juljusz Kople
	Deputy	Head of Council of Trade Cooperatives & MCC	Zofia Tryblinska
		Theoretical Economists, Party Members	Pohorylle /fnu/ Leon Brus Zawadzki/fnu/

TOP ASSIGNMENTS / continued/

1.	2.	3.	4.
13.* Foreign Affairs	P.B. P.B.		Józef Cyrankiewicz Adam Rapacki
	MCC. Viceminister of Foreign Affaires , General		Marian Naszkowski
	P.F. Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee, Alternate MCC		Józef Czesak / fnu/
	MCC. Director of the Institute for Foreign Affairs, Head of the Polish Branch of the " Defensors of Peace"		Ostap - Dluski
	General Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of personnel matters		Maria Wierna
	Professor and staff adviser		Manfred Lechs
	Viceministerx of F reigh Affaires		Winiewicz
14.* Demographic Problems Social Structure	P.B. S. P. and Secretary of the Wrocław Party Committee		Jozef Cyramkiewicz Stanisław Matwin
	Secretary of the Cracow Party Committee, MCC		Lucjan Hgtyka
	MCC Minister of Light Industry Eugeniusz Stawinski		Eugeniusz Stawinski
	Viceminister of Labor and Social Welfare		Leon Chajm
15.* Administration of Justice	P.B. Minister of Justice		Jozef Cyrankiewicz Marian Rybicki
	Mazur Deputy Chief Attorney		Mazur/ fnu/
	Vice-Speaker of the Polish Sejm professor of law		Jodlowski /fnu/
	General director of the Office of Ministers , prof		Leon Rozmaryn

TOP ASSIGNMENTS
SUMMARY (continued/

1	2	3	4
16.* Relationship to Church	P.B.	Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ	
	MCC. Minister of the Office of Confessions	Sztachelski /fnu/	
17. National Minorities	P.B.	Jozef Cyrankiewicz	
	P.B. in second place	Alexander Zawadzki	
	P.B. in third place	Roman Zambrowski	
	Viceminister of Internal Affairs	Zygfryd Sznek	
	Delegate for Repatriation from the USSR MCC	Mieczyslaw Popiel	
18* Health and Social Welfare	P.B.	Jozef Cyrankiewicz	
	P.B. In second place	Ignacy Loga- Sowiński	
	P. F. Head of the Organizatio Department of the Central Committee MCC	Walenty Titkow	
	Secretary of the Gdansk Committee of the Party up to 1959 now in the apparatus of the Central Committee. MCC.	Alexander Machno	
	Viceminister of Health	Alexander Pachon	
	Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. M.C.C.	Stanislaw Zawadzki	

TOP ASSIGNMENTS
SUMMARY /continued/

1	2	3	4
19.*	Propaganda and Agitation	P.B. and S.P. P.F. Head of Press Department of the Central Committee MCC P.F. Deputy head of this department P.F. Head of department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee MCC P.F. Deputy head of this depart- ment for propaganda P.F. Deputy head of this depart- ment for agitation MCC P.F. Head of department of Culture and Education of the Central Committee MCC P.F. deputy of this department for education P.F. deputy head of this depart- ment for stage and show activities	Edward Ochab Artur Starewicz Chaber /fnu/ Andrzej Werblan Danilowicz /fnu/ Mrs. Feder /fnu/ Zolkiewski /fnu/ Mrs Zofia Zemanek Mrs Cieslikowska
		Members of the Central Committee Editor of "Nowe Dni" /deputy/ Editor of Polityka /deputy/ Preses of P.A.P. Polish Press Agency Preses of the Broadcasting Committee Viceminister of Education Director of the Institute of Economics /Professor /Science)	Roman Werfel Romana Granas Henryk Staszewski Adam Sokorski Zofia Dembinska Adam Schaff
		Administration: Minister of Culture Viceminister Preses of the Office of Publications and Press his deputy	Galinski Rusinek Zawadko Friedman

W

TOP ASSIGNMENTS
SUMMARY/continued/

1.	2.	3.	4.
<hr/>			
20.*	Party Organization	P.B. and S.P.	Roman Zembrowski
		F. P. Head of Organization / Department of the Central Committee, MCC	Walenty Titkow
		MCC P.F.	Finkelsztain /fnu/
<hr/>			
21.*	Personal Matters	P.B. and S.P.	Zenon Kliszko
<hr/>			
22.*	Relationship between Party and Sejm	P.B. and S.P.	Zenon Kliszko
		General Secretary of the Democratic Party Viceminister of Labor and Social Welfare	Leon Chajn
		Deputy Chairman of the Peasants Party and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, Viceminister of Forests	Podedworny /fnu/
		Deputy Speaker of Sejm Professor, Vicepreses of the Polish Academy of Science, member of the Party	Jodlowski /fnu/
<hr/>			
23.*	Internal Security	S.P.	Jerzy Albrect
		MCC Viceminister of Internal Affaires	Alster
		MCC Viceminister of Internal Affaires	Moczar
		MCC Minister of Internal Affaires interior Vicha	
		Viceminster of Internal Affaires, Chief of Corps of Internal Security Forces	General Komar
		Chief of Forces for Defense of Borderlines	General Hibner
		Viceminister of Internal Affaires	Zygfryd Sznek

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TOP ASSIGNMENTS
SUMMARY /continued/

1.	2.	3.	4.
24.*	Military Affaires	P.B. Minster of Defense	General Marian Spychalski
		Chief of Staff , Vice- minister of Defense, MCC General	Bordzilowski
		Chief of Army Intelligence MCC , General	Krzysztof Witaszewski
		Chief of Engineering Forces	General Jan Szymonowski
		Viceminister of Defense for Political Education	General Janusz Terzycki
		Viceminister of Defense	General Duszynski
		Chief of Air Forces	General Frey - Bielecki

13

SUPPLEMENT

25X1

May ~~1960~~ 9, 1960 [] Jerzy Albrecht resigned from his position as Secretary of the Central Committee.

25X1

As reason his ailing and poor health was given.

25X1

[] Albrecht's assignments, the most important of which was the control of the apparatus of the Security Police.

[] due to a tendency of strengthening the security police, supported at present by Gomulka, Albrecht sooner or later will be replaced in this job by a "stronger" man.

25X1

[] the change in Albrecht's position / resignation or shifting to another job / will indicate that the new course of "more power for the security police" has been started.

25X1

[] of the now employed It is hard to say whether another secretary will occupy this assignment / control of security police / for example Zambrowski or Strzelecki, or a new man will be brought in, to replace Albrecht.

25X1

But doubtlessly ~~increasing~~ a strengthening of the security police is under way and Albrecht's resignation proves this with great ^{emphasis} significance.

25X1

PREDICTIONS ON THE EFFECT THE CHANGES
IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES WILL HAVE IN
POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRES

✱

THE BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN THE
LEADERSHIP

Part V

THE BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP

In October 1956 there was an open conflict between Gomulka and Chruszczew. At this time Chruszczew did not use force. He ~~had~~ was in a difficult situation at this time and he preferred to make concessions for a limited time.

Soon it became clear that Gomulka is ready to far ~~reaching~~ concessions to avoid any further conflict. ~~More~~ He was willing to cancel the majority of factors that did cause the tensions between him and the Russian Party. Already in Novemebr Gomulka visibed Moscow and offered:

- momentally immediately Suppressing all anti- Russian attitudes and utterances.
- Restituting as soon as possible the recognition of the supremacy of the Russian party ~~upon~~ in basic matters
- Maintaining the Red Army in Poland
- Subordinating the Foreign Policy under Russian directives
- Suppressing of 'revisionistic' tendencies in Poland
- Stopping all investigations started that would gave evidence of the responsibility of the Russian advisers for the former terror in Poland
- Forgiveness and good jobs for all Natolinists that is for all Russian-adherents acting on orders from the Russian Party.
- Restitution as soon as possible the power and authority of the party as the supreme ~~level~~ above all managers and administrators. In other ~~the~~ words, restitution of the supremacy and dictatorship of the party. Simultaneously he acknowledged the leading role of the Russian party above the Polish party. Both aspects together mean a restitution of the supremacy of the Russian party indirectly through the Polish party upon all ~~affairs~~ in Poland.

-2-

The subordination in foreign policies was extended as far as condemnation publicly by Gomulka of the Hungarian Revolution as soon as possible / this was made later April 1957 by Gomulka/ Approval of the Russian suppression of the Hungaria Revolution as a sad but justified necessity / This statement Gomilka made already after return from Moscow/ ~~Written~~ Conformity of relations with Tito . These relations between Chruszczew and Tito at this time ~~were~~ not bad yet , but already some tensions were in the initial development.

This package of concessions offered by Gomilka three weeks after the revolution was convenient for Chruszczew.

Chruszczew accepted this . Despite his personal , bad feelings against Gomulka he needed him at this time, especially for restitution in Poland the Russian hegemony. From ~~the~~ Chruszczew's point of view there could hardly be found at this time a man who would be able to extremily inflamed then to overcome the Polish hatred against the USSR . Only a leader like Gomulka to whom the Polish people had at this time very much confidence could be able to find and apply concealed methods leading Poland back under the Russian supremacy, to calm down the blast of ~~asleep~~ the inflamed anti-Russian attitudes to deceive and outwit the Polish people (at least for the most critical time) in this matter.

For this price Chruszczew was ready to make some concessions on his side such as : Tolerance of Gomulka's departure from the orthodox party line in economics , agriculture, religious matters, personal freedom , relative press freedom, etc. and certain ~~Some~~ financial concessions .

Chruszczew did not agree with Gomulka's new ideas but he was ^{later a} sure that there will be a ~~a~~ better opportunity to force Gomulka

-3-

into a retreat from ~~these~~ policies. Chruszczew only conceded one thing. i. e. He did not insist on clarifying these conflicting matters at once but later and gradually in proper time. He accepted Gomulka's interpretation that things went so far in Poland that certain ~~x~~ freedoms ^{and} for a certain time must be granted. Chruszczew accepted this viewpoint of Gomulka as a tactical necessity but not as a permanent situation.

In result of this mutual compromise Chruszczew accepted Gomulka's role as a fact. ^{In Chruszczew's opinion Gomulka was} even as a convenient person for a certain time, may be even for a few years. As long as Gomulka keeps these the obligations of this compromise there is no reason for Chruszczew to fight Gomulka; in contrary Chruszczew even is interested in supporting Gomulka for the period that is necessary to "reeducate" the Polish people.

The development 1956 - 1959 shows that Gomulka followed the all these outlined agreements and Chruszczew has all reason to be satisfied.

This is the basis of the Chruszczew- Gomulka cooperation. But as said before Chruszczew only delayed the final account and he did not resign from active control of ^{all affaires including} internal affairs in Poland ^{through several channels}. This control in internal affairs is exercised ~~in two ways:~~ and methods.

-4-

1. Control and Watching how Gomulka is performing his job as defined in the agreement and during several meetings later.

2. Urging Gomulka to accelerate some developments of leading Poland back to the wanted by Chruszczew conditions.

This explains some vehement moves in this determined by Chruszczew direction especially after the Third Congress of Party in Poland March 1959.

3. Forcing Gomulka to employ these men who are selected or approved by Chruszczew. First of all to keep on key positions the same Russian adherents almost 'agents' who were before / under Bierut on these high positions/ Gomulka must keep them regardless to the resent of the Polish people and frequently ^{among them, there} these are his former personal enemies and adversaries in a bitter fight. But Gomulka must employ these men on Moscow's order.

4. Control and forcing Gomulka to extend the list of these men i. e. to place more and more such "Russian" followe/rs and agents at top positions.

5. Grouping around Gomulka more and more top personalities who follow the Russian instructions not only ~~as expressed by~~ when given by Gomulka and through Gomulka, but who directly are instructed by Moscow. In other words Gomulka will be surrounded more and more by such men who in case of a conflict between Gomulka and Chruszczew would obey Chruszczews orders and not Gomulka's orders.

-4-

There are no signs at present for such a conflict.

As long as Gomulka himself follows Chruszczew's directives these pro-Russian men do not face the problem to choose between

~~for~~ obedience to Chruszczew and loyalty to Gomulka.

But there is no doubt that Witaszewski for example works first at all for Chruszczew and in second place for Gomulka and sometimes works a g a i n s t Spychalski/ / There are bitter enemies /
~~Several~~ other men around Gomulka ^{serving} are in first place ~~serving~~ the Russian Party, and in second place the Polish party and in third ~~place~~ Gomulka.

6. ~~In this way~~ Gomulka does not fight with Chruszczew, he is obedient. But after October 1959 Gomulka even could not think of any controversy with Chruszczew. In his own crew he would find men who in the hypothetical case of a controversy would take Chruszczew's side a g a i n s t Gomulka.

7. At present Chruszczew evidently accelerated the course and is demanding that Gomulka ~~establishes~~ goes further and establishes ^{conform, orthodox order,} the ^{Now} Chruszczew is not more satisfied with a equilibrium of power between his men and Gomulka's men, now he demands a clear supremacy of his men among the leading personalities.

This development is inevitable. For Gomulka is only one alternative i.e. to join by himself the group of Chruszczew's men and to depart from the group of his own men. Any original, discerning features of ruling
 In other words: The Pro-Russians are taking over and Gomulka goes with them, and also Gomulka's followers are going with him to the Pro-Russian group. There is no alternative more to choose another way because i n s i d e the leadership already the Pro-Russian group has become

- 5 -

too powerful.

Hypothetically Gomulka could in case of a controversy again appeal to the people like in October 1956 but this would mean a bloody revolution without chance of success,

But Gomulka does not think of such a hypothetical case.

Gomulka already is going with the ^{Pro}Pro-Russian wing.

There are still differences in several points / for example; whether or not to re^{police}stitute the security ~~organs~~ / how fast to go with collectivization, how rigidly and ruthlessly to lower standard of living, etc, when to start ^{a sharp course against} ~~open fight~~ with the Church etc./ There is still the personality of Gomulka himself and his certain popularity, but in general the course of development is obvious. The ProRussians are taking over.

THE GROUPS WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP

There is by no means "Unity" within the party, although the propaganda always emphasizes this 'unity'.

The following groups can be distinguished within the top party level.

a. Stalinists. These are Pro- Russians in this sense that ~~they~~

they will obey the directives of the Russian Party in first place. In case of differences between the Russian Party and the Polish Party / there are not likely to occur, but if such a thing happens/ they will follow the Russian directives against the Polish Party directives.

However this group does not identify its aims with the Chruszczew policies. This group still can not forget the harm that Chruszczew ^{caused} made by his sensational speech during the XX Congress in 1956. They believe that Chruszczew for his personal carrier sacrificed the power of international communism, and weakened the strenght of the Italian and French Communistic Party and accelerated the

defeat of the English and American Communistic Parties, and produced heavy trouble for the satellite parties. This group was strong in 1956 and 1957 but it ^{power} declines due to some successes of Chruszczew's policies and his increasing

authority. This group lost influence after repulsion of

Molotow, Malenkow, Kaganowicz, Szepilow . / Bulganin and Zukow also ^{expelled} represent another position , for example Zukow was an anti-stalinist /

The leaders of this group in Poland are :

Dworakowski, Lapot , Mijal , Klosiewicz, Mazur.

they call themselves "Leninists"

b. Ideologists. These are followers of the Russian Party

They believe that personalities appear and disappear, but the collective " mind" of the Russian Party as the first party that embodied the communistic ideology in practical remains and is the permanent form ~~is the~~ greatest authority. They are called also

" Hegemonists" they believe in the invincible power of the collective leadership of the Russian Party. Blind obedience toward the Central Committee of the Party of the USSR is their outline. They openly affirm that the highest party level in Poland, the Polish Politbureau must be subordinated directly under the Russian Politbureau.

But they admit that individuals can commit errors. They are against the " Cult of the Leader". Stalin made errors, Chruszczew might make errors, ~~only~~ Marx and Engels also could not provide exactly the future in all details so they also could make mistakes , only Lenin ^{was} infallible.

Infallible also is the Party as a collective i.e. the Central Committee of the Russian Party the heirs of the "Bolszewiki" of Lenins party.

They support Chruszczew as the I Secretary of the Party not as an individuality. As long as Chruszczew is the speaker for the 'collective party mind' he is supported by this group , but

all his steps are viewed by this group from the point of Leninistic criterias.

The moral power of this group is remarkable.

Chruszczew always emphasizes that he follows Lenin's doctrines. He goes his own way. He does not. He pretends only. This is necessary to get the support of these party ideologists.

In the USSR Suslow represents this wing. In Poland Finkelsztajn a member of the Central Committee / not known to the public, but still influential / and partially Zambrowski. To this group also belong the majority of the Party theoreticians, Daniszewski, Tepicht, Professor Schaff, Zawadzki, and others.

c. Internationalists.

These are followers of the former Komintern. They believe in the supremacy of the 'World Communists', in the collective mind as represented by a representation of all communistic parties throughout the World. They acknowledge the leading role of the Russian Party as a "Primus under Pares" but they demand participation and acknowledgment of ideas developed by other parties, too for example ^{by} the Chinese Party the Spain Party, the French, and Italian Party, etc. Mexican Party etc. It is characteristic that Chruszczew does not want to reconstitute officially the Komintern. Chruszczew prefers to have all other parties as single partners. He does not want to meet a 'federation' of the other communist parties, because all these parties together might represent a great power, and even, hypothetically, vote

differently to his suggestions.

These internationalists does not criticize the text of Chruszczew's speech during the XX Congress but they believe that he had not the right to decide by himself alone, individually, matters that are vital to the other parties throughout the world.

They acknowledge the leading position of the Russian party but they demand some " democracy" within the assembly of all communistic parties. They claim that they are the true " Marxists"

They believe that Chruszczew's present policy impoverishes the concepts of the World Communism . They say that there is no basic discussion on World Communism affaires . Although the Russian party is the wisest ^{-they say-} and should be doubtlessly the leading party, nevertheless a forum of exchange of experience and new ideas and concepts should be created to avoid narrow mindness that is inevitable when only one party makes decision for all parties.

To this group belong in Poland Komar, Hibner, Werfel, Wicha partially Gierek, Wierblowski, Staszewski. These are names not of the highest administrative posts, nevertheless these men have great influence among the old communists in Poland and within the Central Committee. In the USSR this group is weak and without power. It is believed that Edward Ochab ^{who belongs to another wing} supports this group.
(unofficially)

This group ~~claims~~ that Chruszczew ^{almost} ~~shows~~ a better understanding with the capitalists than with the world communists, and that Chruszczew does not follow properly the ~~Marx~~ philosophy. Despite the fact that this group has not much power nevertheless the potential and latent chances of this group are not neglectable.

d. Polish communists . Within the Central Committee and the older communists there is a remarkable group of prewar communists that deny the ideological supremacy of the Russian party. They acknowledge that the Russian party as representant of the most powerful ^{communistic country} party should have a leading voice in all decisions involving world communism, but they deny the ideological or moral supremacy of this party.

They hate Stalin because he ~~murdered~~ the prewar Polish Politbureau the members of the Central Committee of the prewar K.P.P.

/ Kommunistyczna Partia Polski, The Communistic Party of Poland⁷
Besides Stalin ^{issued} ~~accused~~ in 1936 ^{a statement} that the Polish Central Committee consists of provocateurs and ^{according to the belief of this group} ~~disframed~~ slandered the good name of the Polish party.

They also accuse Chruszczew that he dislikes Poland and that in his speech at the XX Congress he listed all crimes of Stalin but did not say any word about Stalins crimes against the Polish people and the Polish Communistic Party.

They also accuse the Russian Central Committee of neglecting the other communistic parties . They say that dictatorship of the ^{party} ~~party and~~ proletariat and leadership of the party does not mean

dictature of one party upon the other communistic parties. They demand " equal rights " for each party in ideological matters, regardless whether this part represents a powerful or less powerful country. They also say that the Russian party after Lenin's death committed many errors and that the Stalin period was a defeat for the ideological development of World Communism. They say that if not Stalin, the World Communism would be much better off. They accuse the Russian party of "Byzantinism" of complete lack of knowledge of the psychological features of other countries, of poor leadership

They also disagree with Chruszczew's methods.

The leaders of this wing are:

Burgin, Kuryluk, Sztachelski, ^{and others} Dembinska ~~are the leading~~
~~representants of this group.~~

In October 1956 this group supported unanimously Gomulka against Chruszczew although they differ in several matters from Gomulka's viewpoint.

e. Patriotic Communists

This are also Polish Communists . They differ from the former group in this point that they are not ~~con~~cerned too much with ideological, ^{so}philosophical and basic theoretical matters. They are "pragmatists", focusing their activities on current, tactical problems. They acknowledge the merits of the Russian party but they do not want this Russian party to middle in Polish

~~affairs~~affairs. They even are ready to acknowledge the ideological leadership of the Russian Party but they treat the Russian party as "teachers" but not as superiors. They say that the ruling party is a party of its country and must regard the specific features and conditions of this country^{and} of the people.

They say: Ideological matters are most important, but ^{only} as a future goal. At present the tactical forms must be adjusted to the Polish people.

~~For example:~~ The party leads Poland ^{in existing conditions} now. This can not be done permanently against the will of the people only by terror. For example:

Communists are atheists. But if the Polish people in ^{their} masses are catholic the communists must acknowledge this fact and govern

a catholic country. Compromises are necessary and allowed. They say: "This is not a departure from the ideology this is a flexible tactic."

The patriotic communists emphasize that they are Poles of a communist ideology. But first of all Poles. As communists they believe that Poland's future will be the best under communism

/ The Polish communists described in paragraph d. say that they are first communists and later Poles/

They say that being a communist is a patriotic, constructive duty ~~feature~~ of a good Pole. Therefore terror should be avoided

because a patriot does not suppress his own people. He loves his people and his country, even with all its defects.

A patriot can demand sacrifices for his country and for his people but not against his fellow-countrymen.

The leaders of this group are Gomulka, Bienkowski, Spychalski, Kliszko, Loga- Sowinski, Hochfeld.

Within the Central Committee this group is not large. ^{its} The strength ~~of this group~~ ^{founded} is based on the low rank members of the 'commoners' not on the leaders.

It might be noted that Chruszczew is also not too much concerned with basic ideological matters, he also is a so-called pragmatist.

Despite fundamental contrasts these ~~pragmatists~~ on both sides (Poland & USSR) are able to develop some compromises and "modus vivendi" and even cooperate temporarily by delaying the basic ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{into the} debates and arguments ~~for a future time.~~

f Chruszczew-ists This is not a correct title. There are no ~~real~~ Chruszczewists in the sense that they are his ~~personal~~ admirers of his personality. As a matter of fact Chruszczew himself has a bad reputation in Poland because of persecution of the Polish people during the war when Chruszczew was Stalins plenipotentiary for Ukraine.

The group cited here, there are adherents of the actual secretary of the Russian Party, whoever it would be. Not only of the party leadership but ^{primarily they are} adherents of the ~~Russian~~ Chief of the USSR.

Their subordination is not only ideological not only within party matters but also administrative. They treat Poland ~~as~~ already as 17 -th republic of the USSR. They see in the Russian ambassador in Warsaw the real representant of government. They treat the Polish chief only as a deputy of the real leader, that is ^{of} the Russian

Chief of the USSR. Under Stalin they were Stalinists
under Chruszczew they are Chruszczewists. During the short period
of Malenkov's ruling they were Malenkovists.

These men have no patriotic feelings and they also have no
ties to a sort of world communism / like the internationalist /
they are not " Polish " communists not " World communists".
they have no ideology, only blind obedience to the actual
Russian leader. The Polish people treat them as Russian agents
The leaders of this group are

Nowak, Witaszewski, Tokarski, Sznek, Alster,
Pawlak, Kruczek, Pryma, Ruminski, Galinski, Matuszewski and others.

In 1956 this numerous within the party functionaires group
made an alliance with the groups

a/ Stalinists

b/ Ideologists

and together established the alliance of the Natolinists
to take over the power in Poland and to rule Poland almost as a
17-th republic of the USSR or at least as the most obedient
satellite.

g. Centrists. This is a group of flexible status

Since they are not tied to a rigid doctrine they often play a decisive role in the balance of power within the leadership. There are not Patriotic Communists and not Russian Agents. Nevertheless they are Pro-Russian. They agree to Poland's role as satellite but they want to have ^{some} ~~a little~~ elbow-room in ruling Poland.

Frequently these are the top administrators and top managers in Poland. First of all, they are Pro-Russian but they acknowledge that Russian methods applied to Polish people are often fallacious. They are for pressure but not for drastic ~~pre~~ terror methods.

The leaders of this group are Cyrankiewicz, Rapacki, Ochab, Jedrychowski, Jaroszewicz.

This group is numerous within the Central Committee but it is in itself not a precisely defined group; the members of this group represent scattered viewpoints but usually they join for a common goal.

They are mostly interested in keeping their positions and their strength is based not on ideological factors but on the instinct to join in the right moment this group that is likely to win the battle. Therefore the position of these group is shifting frequently. During the October revolution this group ~~shifted~~ supported Gomulka against Chruszczew. Now this group is shifting more and more to the positions of the

blind obedience to the Russians i. e. to the positions of the Natolinists.

h. Revisionists. This group consist of rather younger people. They are communists who does not acknowledge the old dogmas. They figure that the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin ~~now~~ have become obsolete and should be revised. This revision shall be extended on all parties including the Russian party. In this aspect there can not be any supremacy of any party. To find ^athe new tactics and ^anew strategy, a review of all rules and theories is necessary and a free critical unhampered dispute ~~is necessary.~~ shall be allowed.

This is the wing that is most disliked by the Russian Party. The revisionists deny not only ~~They not only deny~~ the supremacy and the ultimate wisdom of Chruszczew, and of the Russian Party as ^{the} "collective" mind, they also deny the wisdom of the "World Communism Mind" of the Komintern and finally they say that the classic theories are obsolete.

This is not a difference in tactics only but in basic principles. They are also convinced communists but the Russian Party sees ⁱⁿ them as the greatest ~~xxx~~ enemy.

The revisionists not only deny the supremacy of the Russian party, they go further. They demand a great discussion and after this the Russian party is supposed to obey the results of this discussion. The leaders of this group are now concealed because this group is suppressed. In 1956 the leaders were Kuzinski / he is shifting now

to Pro-Russian positions as a member of the Polish parliament]
Goździk, Kolaczowski, Andrzejewski / a writer who departed
demonstratively from the party in 1958 / and the editors of
the former "Poprostu" periodic. Morawski and Matwin were
sympathics of this group but to a certain extent only.
The power of this group is now small and they concentrate their
activity on ~~minor questions~~ cultural and social affairs.
In 1956 this group supported Gomulka and represented the most
"revolutionaire" wing.

Summary.

The various groups within the party higher levels
are, listed below in a little different sequence:

1. Stalinists
2. Ideologists socalled / Leninists/
3. Chruszczewists / the core of the Natolinists/
4. Revisionists
5. Patriotic Communists
6. Polish Communists
7. Centrists
8. Internationalists

In Poland the first three groups are called Reactionaire
communists, the groups 4,5,6 Progressive Communists
or liberal communists the group 7 and 8 Centrists

However such a breakdown ^{in three large groups wings} does not illustrate the differences within each of these ~~groups wings~~ groups.

In 1956 the first wing was Pro- Russian and Pro- Chruszczew the second wing was Pro- Gomulka and anti-Chruszczew, the third wing shifted after some consideration on Gomulka's side.

In 1959 already ^{of eight} ~~all 7~~ groups are Pro-Russian but to different extents; only the revisionists are still antiRussian and simultaneously the revisionists are now against Gomulka.

RUSSIAN AGENTS ON KEY POSITIONS

In October 1956 Gomulka won the battle against Chruszczew and against Chruszczew's supporters within the Polish party that is the ~~Natolinists~~ ^{primarily} because of two reasons

First: Chruszczew was weak at this time, it was a special situation after the XX Congress ; Chruszczew had many adversaries in his own party, in his own country, and within all communistic parties in the noncommunistic countries and also within the Eastern bloc, Hungary, Poland , ~~some other countries~~ ^{Mao-tse-tung's attitudes were uncertain, etc.}

Second: Gomulka was backed by the centrists, revisionists Polish communists, Patriotic Communists, and interantionalists. and by the people

After October 1956 Gomulka made a compromise with Chruszczew. This cleared to some degree the relation to the Russian party however Gomulka had to pay a price for this . He lost the support of the revisionists and of the intelligence .

This process developed further and in 1959 Gomulka lost already the support of the 'Polish communists' / besides the revisionists/ the 'Patriotic Communists' / He also lost the support of the farm population and now he is loosing popularity among the workers. But in exchange he gained the support of the Natolinists

Now Gomulka already is surrounded by Natolinists and by the ~~bi~~ large group of centrists. But these centrists are changing their position ; they are shifting to the Natolinists. This means that Gomulka now ^{is surrounded by a majority that is tied} ~~has a majority of more or less~~

^{Pro -}
tied with the Russian groups.

In a hypothetical controversy with Chruszczew Gomulka would have behind him only the following men of the leadership

Loga- Sowiński	member of the Politbureau
Kłyszko	Secretary of the Central Committee
Bieńkowski	member of the Central Committee
Spychalski	member of the Politbureau
Komar, Hibner Moczar	members of the Central Committee. and in key positions within the Ministry of Interior Affairs

Openly against Gomulka would fight

Nowak, ~~Witaszewski~~ Tokarski, Szyr, Vicepremiers.
Zambrowski and Zawadzki, members of Politbureau.
Dworakowski, ~~Łopot~~, Kłosiewicz, Mijał, Ruminski, Matuszewski,
Witaszewski, Mazur, Pawlak, Kruczek, Naszkowski, Sznek,
Alster, Jarosiński
all former stalinists, leninists, ^{or} natolinists

The decisive power, the "centrists" would ^{no more} ~~now~~ defend Gomulka;
they are already shifting to the ~~advocates of Gomulka~~
followers of the Russians, ^{the Pro-Russian} ~~and~~ because ~~this~~ group already
has the majority within the top ~~po~~ leadership

This includes : ~~Cyranki~~ The leaders of this centrum are
Cyrankiewicz
Rapacki
Jedrychowski members of the Politbureau

Albrecht
~~Jatoński~~
Matwin
Gierek Secretaries of the Central Committee

To the centrum also belongs a great part of
~~and the majority of~~ the membership of the Central Committee.

The low rank party members, among them many hidden revisionists,
would also hesitate in defending Gomulka and the question
how much support Gomulka would get now from the masses
depends how far he would go in fighting the Russian influence.
The masses can be easily moved by ^{an} anti-Russian program.

This is of course only a hypothetical consideration
for the purpose ~~only~~ to show that Gomulka already has no other
way than join the majority and to ^{become} ~~be~~ by himself entirely
Pro-Russian without any reservations,

This dictates the further development of events in Poland

Already in November 1956 Gomulka agreed to keep on top positions
the Pro-Russian agents and gradually in 1957 - 1959 the number
of these men increased.

Within all vital agencies there are on powerful positions
these Pro-Russian agents that is men who will obey Russian orders
even if Gomulka would give another order.

These are the key positions held by top Pro-Russian agents:

Ministry of defense. Chief of Staff Viceminister of Defense /

General Bordzilowski

Chief of the Army Intelligence

General Witaszewski

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

General Marian Naszkowski Vice minister

Ministry of Internal Affairs

Viceminister Zygfryd Sznek

Viceminister /fhu/ Alster
Jakub?

Vicepremiers

Julian Tokarski

Zenon Nowak

Eugeniusz Szyr

Ministry of Finance /fnu/ Kole Vice-Minister

Kazimierz Mijal President of Investment Bank

Ministry of Food Processing

Stanislaw Ruminski Viceminister

Ministry of Chemistry /fnu/ Taban Viceminister

Ministry of Mining ^{Franciszek}
Waniolka, Minister

Ministry of Agriculture

Jagielski, Minister

Ministry of Labor

Wiktor Klosiewicz, Viceminister

Chief of Atomic Committee	Wilhelm Billig / rank of minister/
Chief of Committee for Foreign Cooperation	
	Roman Fidelski / Viceminister/
Ministry of Heavy Industry	Leon Rubinsztejn / Viceminister/
Ministry of Culture	/fnu/ Galinski, Minister
Minister of High Education	Golanski, Minister
State Planning Commission	Tadeusz Gede, First Deputy Chairman
Minister of Light Industry	Leon Stawinski
Ministry of Foreign Trade	Kakietek, and Marzec, Viceministers, fnu/ Kropczyński Viceminister

Apparatus of Central Committee

	Press and Publications
Head of department of Propaganda	Artur Starewicz
" " " Propaganda	Andrzej Werblan Werblan
Deputy Heads of Departments	Leon Niedzwiedzki Franciszek Blinowski Danilowicz /fnu/ Porucha /Jerzy/ Jerzy Bogusz Chabier Ziemankowa .
Head of Economic Department	Jerzy Olszewski
Head of Foreign Department	fnu Czesak
Head of Agricultural Department	Edmund Pszczolkowski
Head of Organization Department	Zygmunt Misiaszek
Head of Welfare Department	Walery Titkow
Head of Cultural Department	Stefan Zolkowski

Politbureau

Roman Zambrowski

Alexander Zawadzki

Gierek

Secretaries of Central Committee

Jarosinski

Members of Central Committee

Tryblinska, Kasman, Finkelsztajn, Tepicht,
Schaff, Daniszewski, and others

This list is not complete. There might be others who were able to hide better that they are Russian agents.

These above listed are known ~~at least~~ among the Warsaw well informed people as Russian agents. This might be conceived in this sense that they will obey Russian orders first than Gomulka's orders.

This list shows that all vital offices, party agencies and the ^{key} leading positions are occupied by Russian agents in case Pro-Russian emissaries, so that any thought of resistance the Russians can act easily inside the Polish against Russia, ~~is without chance.~~ party and government.

It might be noted that the primary step that was demanded by the people during the October revolution was cleaning the key positions from the Russian agents. But Gomulka stopped the initiated development and later brought back several of the expelled in the first moment men, so that now the key positions again

~~held by~~ ^{filled with} the Pro-Russians.

This factual situation requires Gomulka to follow exactly the Russian command. This is aggravated by Gomulka's new policy of austerity, hardship, low standard of living, collectivization and centralization. All these goals require means of pressure. There is no room for the so-called liberal communists. These objectives require methods of pressure and men ^{endorse} that will ~~exercise~~ these methods. Such men are mostly among the ProRussians and the reactionnaire wing of the top leadership.

The new course back to pressure is already decided. The influence of the reactionnaire group will increase continuously. The centrists and the moderate groups will become gradually more reactionnaire and completely Pro-Russian.

This development grows both ~~politically and economically~~ within the political and economical system.

Gomulka will try to make this inevitable development ~~less~~ as painless as possible but this attempt has no much chance.

Gomulka himself left the position of a 'Patriotic Communist' and shifted to positions of a "Chruszczew-ist." With him, as his followers go the other 'Patriotic Communists' / Kliszko, Loga-Sowinski, Spychalski/ and the large influential group of centrists.

A new "unity" of the part is built up, ^{this is} but an unity of conformity, and obedience to the Russians. This is an unity of a Pro-Russian Polish party. The ~~hope~~ of the Polish communists ^{in October 1956} to have a Polish

communistic party ~~xxxxxxxx~~ that will regard the ~~xxxx~~ specific conditions of Poland and negotiate ~~and~~ cooperate with the Russian Party on an equal or almost ^{vanished} equal basis ~~is gone~~ already.

After October 1959 the Polish Party is again ~~under~~ *direct* complete dictatorship of the Russian Party.

Certain differences in this dependence as compared with the Bierut period are due not to more sovereignty of the Polish party and Polish government, but ~~to~~ certain changes in tactics and methods of ruling applied by Chruszczew who changed the old stalinistic methods not ^{as} ~~too~~ much in their sense and aims, ^{as} ~~but~~ rather in the manner of handling matters and exerting influence.

Still Gomulka resists again restitution of the security police. This allows Gomulka to explain to Chruszczew some slow developments on the way back to collectivization ^{to} or low standards *of living*. As long as there is no ~~the~~ resituted security police there will be still more freedom in the life of Poland as compared with the ^{other} satellites. As long as there is no security police / to the former extent as under Bierut/ Gomulka always can explain and apologize to the Russian Party if some things in Poland are different than in the other countries. However, the nature of the present development in Poland is such that Gomulka will have to face the decision of restitution ^{of} the security police sooner or later or resign completely from collectivization. But this latter alternative will not be permitted by Chruszczew. An increase in means pressure is to be expected in Poland.



PREDICTIONS OF THE EFFECT THE CHANGES
IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES WILL HAVE IN
POLAND'S INTERNAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRES



POLAND'S POSITION WITHIN THE EASTERN
BLOC

Part VII

POLAND'S POSITION WITHIN THE EASTERN BLOC

I POLAND'S POSITION AFTER OCTOBER 1956.

The October revolution brought an increase in Poland's position within the Eastern Bloc with respect to the political role among the satellite countries. , This might sound strange at the first glance, since Poland became in October 1956 a sort of a "deviator" or in other words of a ~~"satellite"~~ a type of an "apostate country" within the family of communistic countries.

The first fact that impressed all other satellites was the victory, at least a temporary victory, upon the supremacy of the Russian party and of Chruszczew's dictatorship. Regardless to the appraisal of Gomulka's new policies even the fanatic communistic leaders of the satellite countries had to admit that here was the first case in the history of the communistic bloc that a satellite took an opposite position with respect to certain substantial matters to the doctrines of the Russian party.

Tito also had to courage to oppose Stalin ; but this brought open conflict.

However Gomulka contradicted Chruszczew and this latter was forced to make concessions. In October 1956 Gomulka simply

-2-

rejected Chruszczew's intervention in Polish affaires, expelled Rokossowski, asked the Russian advisers to go home, and also asked Chruszczew himself to ~~k~~ return to Moscow. Chruszczew and the majority of the Russian Politbureau were in Warsaw at the time when the VII Plenum was in session but they were not admitted ~~xxx~~ by Gomulka to enter the building where this Plenum took place.

And all these deeds remained unpunished. Nothing happened to Gomulka. Gomulka won and Chruszczew lost, at least for the time being.

This result could not remain without deep impression and impact on the other satellite leaders.

In Hungary also was a revolution but it was suppressed in bloody fight. The leaders of the revolution were executed. In Poland the leader of the uprising ruled and negotiated with Chruszczew as an almost equal partner.

This gave Poland a specific position within the East bloc. Of course the satellite leaders condemned unanimously Gomulka's 'deviations' but deeply inside they noted in their mind this Polish lesson as a characteristic event in the relationship between the USSR and the satellites.

A rebel who is not punished and not liquidated is always an important man. There is no doubt that in 1956 the eyes of all satellites were directed toward Poland.

The communistic leaders looked at Poland with condemnation, next with curiosity,

-3-

the people of the satellite countries with hope and admiration. Even the Russian people read about the Polish events with a mixture of feelings. In 1957 each Pole who visited the USSR was ^{asked} ~~spilled~~ with numerous questions. This was not a matter of sympathy with Poland but there was undeniably a "malicious joy" that somebody was able to resist the "allmighty" dictator. It is true that the Russians evaluated the victory of Gomulka only as a temporary result and they expected a quick punishment of Gomulka by Chruszczew. Nevertheless in 1956 and 1957 Poland became the most interesting country within the East-bloc, a country that ^{is to be} ~~has been~~ taken in account in all considerations, a country that created a sort of new relationship between ^a ~~the~~ satellite and the "Master Country".

Among the people of the East-bloc Poland had a great esteem at this time. There was a lot of criticism but the prevalent feeling was a sort of admiration and esteem combined with an deep interest as to the further development of the situation.

~~Gradually this interest declined.~~

For a Polish newspaper especially for ^{the} ~~copy~~ of the Polish economic and literary magazines one could get in the USSR 25 rubles, in Bulgaria 100 ley / I don't remember the name of the Bulgarian currency; it was 100-fold the price of the magazine in Poland./

Gradually this interest declined in result of Gomulka's retreats, compromises and resignation of the "Polish Way to Socialism"

When Gomulka condemned the Hungarian Revolution / April 1957/ and started to fight the own "Revisionists", when Gomulka started to curb the Polish press July 1957, to suppress the movement of "Workers' Councils to prolong the stay of a part of Russian advisers, to praise

4

the Russian Party and the "Boss" Chruszczew, the people of the satellites realized pretty soon that the "New Deal" was only a short range ~~starx~~ straw fire and that the old order is being restored.

The opinion among the people in the satellite countries was that Poland would not ~~be~~ ^{have been} able to demonstrate its self government unless having some secret support from China.

But when in January and February 1957 Czou En Lai traveled through all East-Bloc countries carrying 'pro-Chruszczew' messages, the people of the satellite countries and the leaders of these countries realized that the "Unity of communistic parties" is being restored under the old supremacy of the Russian party.

The disappointment within the satellite countries ^{people of} ~~within the people~~ with this development of events was very great. To these peoples this development meant burying again all hope and adjusting to the sad reality. 1957 is the year of gradual disappointment.

Still the people of the satellite ^{countries} ~~envied~~ the Polish people for certain liberties. freedoms. Freedom to speak without fear, / not to print, but to talk/ religious freedom to a certain extent, availability of Western magazines, jazz music, modern art of painting more visits abroad, the American loan, private farming etc, these were conditions that up to 1959 distinguished still the Polish life from life in the other satellite countries.

The economic position within the East bloc ~~d e c l i -~~
 ~~n e d~~ from the first days of the October revolution.

Under Bierut Poland the first satellite with respect to economic power among the countries of the Council of ~~the~~ ^{each of} Mutual Assistance. Poland has twice / or more / as much population as ^{the} other European satellites and was regarded up to 1955 / 56 as the second industrial power behind Russia. It shall be noted that up to 1956 the production of China ~~of~~ steel, coal, and machinery was

behind the Polish production. This picture changed in 1957 and now China is overpassing Poland at a fast rate.

Gomulka's hesitations to supply East Germany, Czechoslovakia ~~and~~ with the requested amount of coal created tensions among the the Council of Mutual Assistance.

With respect to foreign affaires and militairy affaires Gomulka never ~~tried to~~ attempted to pursue an independent policy. He readily sign signed a new treaty of maintaining the Red Army in Poland . The Rapacki Plan was a rather tactival maneuver . It never was a conflicting matter It was sold under Rapacki's name for follwing reasons:

- In 1957 Poland's position on the international area was more favorable than of Russia or another satellites. Selling a new ~~concept~~ under Polish name was therefore more attractive.
- The USSR expected that this Rapacki plan will not bring remarkable results. But as a propaganda maneuver it was a profitable step. If, however, surprisingly , it would produce some r e a l echo and negotiations with the West World, in this case the USSR would say : "This is not our plan this is Rapacki's Plan . We do not support Rapacki's ideas. "

But there was no need for such a retreat . The Rapacki Plan never exceeded theblimits of a propaganda maneuver and this plan was rejected by the Western powers.

Within the East bloc the situation resulting from the October revolution can be ~~p~~characterized briefly:

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1. Increase of political role among the satellite countries.
a mixture of dissatisfaction and of acknowledging of importance of the Polish experiment among the satellite communistic leaders, admiration and esteem among the people of the satellite countries. Interest and certain esteem among the people of USSR.
2. Decline in economical role among the Council of Mutual Assistance
3. ~~Nothing~~ No major change in Poland's role with respect to foreign affairs.

Note:

In 1956-1957 the authority of Poland within the satellite countries was so great that the Polish economists developed a plan of "Cooperation of Three Countries", i.e. Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. These two neighbors of Poland need the Polish coal and Poland need machinery from these two ^{industrially well} ~~highly~~ developed in the industrial area countries. But with the decline of the Polish influence due to Gomulka's retreats from his former policy, only a part of this ~~substantial~~ plan was carried out. The Czechoslovakia ~~finances the~~ gave Poland a loan to develop the recently in 1956 discovered resources of Sulphur and East Germany gave a loan for developing brown-coal mines at the boarder line and for construction of the largest power station in Turów, 1200 Megawat, that will supply East Germany with electric power.

Both of these loans were agreed upon with the Council of Mutual Assistance but rather "ex post" Moscow approved, but was not to happy with the three-country-cooperation. The ^{other parts of the} plan ~~were stopped~~.

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POLAND'S POSITION WITHIN EASTERN BLOC AFTER OCTOBER 1959.

~~Due to Gomulka's retreat from his October 1956 policies, Poland~~
~~policies announced in 1956 Poland is now~~

Due to Gomulka's retreat from his own promises, the position of Poland at present i.e. after October 1959 within the Eastern Bloc is very weak.

As representant of a 'new way to socialism' Gomulka ~~exercised~~ evoked great interest and the satellite parties had to take in account his influence, whether they liked or not.

As a conformist and "Yes - Man" as a follower of the Russian Party Gomulka has not much to offer. He can not compete in blind obedience to the Russians with Ulbricht, Nowotny, Kadar, and the others.

~~As an orthodox~~ As an orthodox communist he does not represent the ~~most fanatic orthodox~~ ^{most favored fanatical communist}. In other words there are more fanatic and orthodox communists in the other parties. Whatever Gomulka does to demonstrate his obedience to the Russian party, now, he still wears to stigma of the "former rebel and partially revisionist". Of course he is useful to Chruszczew. The specific character of the Polish people and the specific Polish conditions require specific leaders and Gomulka is needed now, temporarily.

But the damages that he did to the Party Unity and Russian ^{and the troubles he had brought to the} Supremacy in 1956 are not forgotten. As a 'rebel' he had to be treated in a particular way. But now, when he demonstrated complete return to the orthodox party-doctrines he can be judged by 'old party standards'. From the viewpoint of the Party doctrine he had damaged the Polish party and the Polish communistic system, especially

the
in following areas.

1. He pushed back the " Socialization of the Agriculture"

at least 5-6 years back. Even with the strongest pressure it will take two or three years to have in Poland again 10 000 " colchoses" as they were in 1956.

Among the satellites Poland is the most backstanding from the point of view of communistic doctrine, country in development of the colchos-system. As a matter of fact if the development of collectivization had not be disrupted by the October revolution there would be probably in 1960 already 45 - 50 % of the farm system organized in colchoses, (or a bloody revolution).

Even under great pressure it will take 8 years to achieve in Poland 50 % of land to be organized in colchoses, not speaking that there might be several " surprises" even uprisings etc. This means that the stage expected for 1960 will be achieved in 1968. From Chruszczew's point of view Gomulka is guilty of a loss of 8 years in the field of " collectivization".

2. Gomulka stopped the forced increase of coal production.

In 1956 in spring 1956 Jaroszewicz the " boss of coal industry" agreed upon with the Russian advisers that Poland will produce in 1960 110 million ton of coal. The Council of Mutual Assistance demanded 120 million tons, but because of the difficulties of the Polish coal industry they agreed finally to a figure of 110 million tons. /Jaroszewicz explained that all German prisoners must be released and this restrict from faster increase of coal production/ Under Gomulka the production of coal during 1956 - 1958

remained at the same level. There was no increase in this production.

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The first increase in this production under Gomulka was noted in 1959.

The plan for 1960 is 103 million tons. This means a loss to the satellites supplied with Polish coal of 7 million tons.

East-Germany, Czechoslovakia and the USSR had to modify substantially their plans during the period 1956 - 1962 to overcome the deficiency of Polish coal as compared with the initially planned and expected supply.

3. Gomulka forced Chruszczew to return the difference in coal prices and a part of transit fares. This costed the USSR approximately 216 million dollars as discussed in chapter : " Profit and Losses of Gomulka's Program, p. 16 "

In addition some aid in grain was delivered to Poland from Russia because of the fatal food situation.

On the other hand it might be noted that during 1956 - 1959 the USSR did not grant much help to Poland and one might feel that there was a sort of " malicious joy" with ^{the Russians} the respect to the difficulties of the Polish economy.

4. In 1959 Gomulka increased food prices. This is always an unpleasant thing for the communistic propaganda, especially for propaganda among workers of the non-communistic countries.
5. Gomulka allowed the income of people to increase in Poland at a faster rate than in the other countries. This causes some " excitement", dissatisfaction and unpleasant comparisons between own living standard in Russia or in the other satellite countries and the ^{personal} increase of income in Poland.

-10-

6. Gomulka is forced to lower the ~~st~~andard of living in Poland.

This will produce intern troubles in Poland. But such troubles tend to spread outside the country. Chruszczew rather avoids demonstrating terror, he pretends to be a more 'liberal' dictator than for example Stalin. But there might be expected that in Poland will be a comeback of certain terror measures especially within the villages among the farmers, but also in the cities. This does not "fit" in Chruszczew's present propaganda.

In Chruszczew's opinion this complicated situation is Gomilka's personal fault. Why did he permit to grow the income of people so fast? Why did he create a situation in which people in Poland must be forced back? In the feeling of people usually not the "absolute" level of living standards plays the decisive role, rather the "relative" change is important.

Under Chruszczew people in the USSR rather feel an improvement in living standards not because these standards are satisfactory but because they are better than under Stalin.

In Poland people will say in 1960-1961. It is worse than before. Such a situation is unpleasant not only for Poland itself but for the communistic propaganda as a whole.

7. Gomulka will be forced to reduce religious freedom. This will produce new tensions with the Vatican and within the area of World policies. These tensions will develop not at once, rather in 1961/62/

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but " Collectivization is impossible unless the Church is suppressed. The Polish Church restrains itself from direct political activity. But the influence of the Parish priests of the villages is great. There is a moral and social appraisal by the community of a man who enters the party or the colchos. He feels the disapprobation of the ~~inhabitants of the~~ catholic inhabitants of the village. His ^{wife} ~~wife~~ resists his ^{entry} ~~entry~~ in the colchos, so does his father or brother. In a city the ties of community are looser, the influence of the factory, ^{of the} workers organization is strong. But in the village the community ^{is} ~~is~~ grouped still around the Church and the Priest exercises great influence.

The communists know that to force farmers in colchoses requires fight with the Church.

8. Damage to Chruszczew's personal authority in October 1956 also can not be forgotten or forgiven. The revenge only is delayed. Besides this personal offense there is also the ^{psychological} damage done to the Russian party and the Russian Red Army / in result of expelling of Rokossowski/ Although all these effects have been finally overcome especially after launching the first Sputnik and the ^{Loyalty} ~~declaration~~ of the 11 party leaders ^{in Moscow} in November 1957, nevertheless the memory of troubles caused by Gomulka to the Russian leadership is still alive.

9. Weakening the organization of the 'Polish - Russian friendship.'

This organization created in 1946 was brought under Bierut to a nationwide association of 7 million members in 1955. Now there are no more than 2 million. It is true, that this membership was only a formality that the statistical figure represented only 7 million ^{of} names not real minds and friendship. Nevertheless a tremendous effort

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was put in developing this organization under Bierut.

In 1956 this vanished. Instead "friendship" there was a hatred in 1956 - 1957 and an open anti-Russian attitude. This hatred ^{existed previously} ~~was~~ before too. But it could not be demonstrated. Officially there was "friendship".

The demonstration of open hatred ^{of the} ~~the~~ returning of the membership-tickets of the Polish-Russian Friendship Organization was a big defeat of the communistic propaganda.

The restitution of the 7 million membership figure will require time and efforts. The Russian party needs this membership even only the statistical number. They don't believe that ^{is} this ^{is} true friendship. But the need this to show that people belongs to this organization, for propaganda purposes.

10. One of the greatest objection and charge against Gomulka is that he indirectly weakened the authority of the party. Although Gomulka himself always emphasizes the supremacy of the party, nevertheless the internal ^{and} struggles within the party facilitated the eruption of an open despi~~se~~ of the party in Poland. The hidden hatred became an openly expressed ^{by the people} condemnation of the party.

Gomulka made all possible efforts to reconstitute the authority of the party but it should be stated firmly: Gomulka was unable to reconstitute the authority of the party. The party functionaries and the party cells have lost their authority. This is true not only during 1956 - 1959 but now, at present.. The party has all power, all ~~rights~~ dictator - rights but it has no ideologic or spiritual influence. Even the workers neglect and despise the party cells.

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The greatest complement a party functionaire can expect in Poland is at present, is a ^{opinion} statement from the workers: "Although he is a party man, he is not a bad fellow"

Gomulka is a devoted communist. He ^{long years of} sacrificed his life to the ^{fight for communism} communistic ideas. But he sees that he is unable to ~~the~~ retribute respect for the party even among the workers. This might be a personal tragedy of Gomulka. Gomulka always wanted to defend, to fight for the communistic party, but he must be aware that in the eyes of the Russian party he brought defeat to the ideology of the party. In his own country Gomulka recognizes that his ruling had not brought a strengthening of the role of the party, but a weakening.

This is true ^{also} with respect to the affiliated to the party organizations to the "Youth Communists" to the dominated by party men Trade and Labor Unions, to the ~~academic~~ ^{to the} League of Women etc., to the "League of Defenders of World Peace" etc.

11. Damage to the Communistic Theory.

The wave of criticism of the communistic system spread in Poland through several publications extends outside the country. This criticism existed before and not only in Poland. But the first time there was a forum to print and to discuss the communistic theory in a critical way. During 1956-1957 the press had relative freedom in Poland. The theory of the party was criticized openly. ^{with} Through sharp wit, jokes satire, some basic features of the communistic theory have become ridiculous in the mind of people. This is hard to cancel, to ^{turn} twist back.

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Some features of communistic doctrines such as the "Socialistic Realism" in arts and literature have become ridiculous for ever in Poland. This stream of criticism spread to the other countries. Of course Chruszczew by himself destroyed the image of the "perfect communistic doctrine" in February 1956 in his secret speech during the XX Congress of the party. This secret speech was printed in Poland and read on all party cells / 70 pages / during long sessions. In no other country this speech of Chruszczew was so widely colportated. This booklet was classified as "Secret", but the majority of non-party members had copies of this booklet. It shall be noted that the Polish people knew already a lot about the cruel methods of the Stalin and Beria - regime through the radio Free Europe during the Swiatlo affaire, 1954.

But ^{there is a basic} ~~the~~ difference ^{Polish} between the criticism of the Stalin period and the ~~critic~~ ^{critic} spelled out by Chruszczew:

Chruszczew criticized the 'cult of the individual', the methods used by Stalin and interpreted all faults as a mistake and guilt of individuals who distorted the beautiful ideas of communism.

The Polish writers criticised the principles of the communism, the basic theories, they attacked the dogmas of Marx, Lenin, Stalin they demanded a complete revision of the doctrines.

On vehement request of Chruszczew Gomulka stopped this wave of printed criticism. Already in summer 1957 the policy of censorship was restituted. But even after limitations of the freedom of press there ~~are~~ were still critical articles in the magazines. The writers were forced to

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use a concealed language but the Polish readers can read between lines.

There was also in Poland in 1956-1957 a relative freedom in listening to Western Broadcasting and foreign press was available.

~~Gradually Gomulka restricted freedom~~

Now there is in Poland again censorship to full extent, The Association of Polish writers is again headed by "Soc-Realists" the "brainwashing" is restituted.

But the period of 1956-1957 with ^{its} relative freedom of press and even the period 1958 - 1959 with more and more restriction but still with some "holes" in the curtain of censorship produced criticism that goes through all walks of life in Poland. Several revisionistic theories, well formulated in Poland, spread to the other satellite countries.

EVALUATION OF POLAND'S POSITION BY THE PARTY FUNCTIONAIRES

~~Major trends in the development of the Polish situation~~

Summary :

Gomulka retreated definitely from his revolutionary ~~and revisionist~~ concepts. He returned back as a 'repentant sinner' to the Russian Party.

In this way he lost his position as a 'creator of a new way to socialism'. Instead he became again a regular member of the family of the communistic parties. And he is judged and evaluated as this regular member, by regular standards of party discipline, of fight against deviations

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As this repentant, obedient instrument in the hands of Chruszczew he is needed and his assignment is to bring Poland back to the former blind dependence from the Russian party not only in political and economical matters which already is done, but also in ideological matters and social matters.

But in this role as the obedient member of the "family" he is not the favorite son.

Politically the position of Poland within the Eastern bloc is a low rank position. There is no full confidence to the ability and capability of the Polish party from the side of the Russian party. The Polish party is a weak party.

The first place among the satellites now is occupied definitely by Czechoslovakia. The second satellite playing an important role as the most reliable satellite is Bulgaria praised by Chruszczew for its 90% collectivization. Later Rumania, Hungaria and Albania, Later Poland. East Germany occupies a special position in the political configuration. The leaders under Ulbricht can be trusted more than the Polish leadership but the entire political situation of East Germany is a complicated one and requires special treatment.

Economically Poland fell from its first place under Bierut to the third. The first place ^{is held now by} ~~has now~~ Czechoslovakia, the second ^{by} East Germany, the third by Poland. In negotiations within the Mutual Assistance Poland ~~loses~~ ~~all bargains~~, must make concessions to the other partners.

After the changes in Gomulka's policies made in October 1959 Poland has lost his "specific" position as the country of new ideas and has become a low ranked member of the bloc.

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The party doctrinaires in Poland, the former Stalinists will say:

"Under Bierut Poland was at the first place in the family of the satellites both politically and economically. Now Poland is politically in the last place, economically on the third place. This loss of position is the result of Gomulka's policies and errors. Now Gomulka and the Polish party must make all possible efforts to overcome ^{its} ~~the economic and political~~ political and economical backwardness within the communistic camp. Now the goal is restitution of order, discipline, reeducation and brain-washing of people, recontinuation of the disrupted collectivization, regaining the economic position, and gradually regaining the political position. In this aspect the Gomulka regime was to the doctrinaires a time of losses.

Some undeniable gains of the Gomulka period, such as better standard of living, increased housing, the American loan, increase of industrial production / probably not less than it would be under a Bierut - type regime / improvement in cultural standards, care of old people / pensions / more contacts with the West World - all these values and assets are not highly appreciated by the party functionaries. By no means these assets can equal in the opinion of these party doctrinaires the losses of the period 1956 - 1959.

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OUTLOOK

Poland will not regain its political position within the Eastern bloc during a long period. To become a ~~full~~ politically equal partner with the other satellites Poland has to go a long way. The restitution of the old conditions in Poland will be difficult and several drawbacks are to be expected during this way back to austerity, fear and ~~ruleless~~ discipline.

The economical role of Poland within the Eastern Bloc can be improved in a couple of years. ~~This is~~ Due to the natural resources, the relatively large population of the country, ~~Normally~~ Poland is predestinated to be the first satellite. However, Poland is behind Czechoslovakia ~~in~~ and East Germany in production per capita. This backlog is hard to overcome. East Germany is supported by Russian aid, Czechoslovakia is a ~~truly~~ industrially and high developed country.

Poland can not expect much help from the USSR. The country will be left alone with its difficulties. All difficulties will be ascribed to the country's own errors. In order to demonstrate good will and repentance, Gomulka will make concessions, ^{force increase of the unprofitable} ~~boost the delicate~~ production of coal for supply of the satellites, yield in negotiations with the satellite partners, subordinate completely the objectives of the Polish economy under the requirements and objectives of the Council of Mutual Assistance. Within the plan of "Specialization and Cooperation of Production" Poland will receive the harder, less profitable assignments. All this will add to the hardship of the Polish people.

PREDICTIONS ~~ON~~ THE EFFECTS ~~THE~~ CHANCES
~~OF~~ *Changes* *ON*
~~IN~~ GOMULKA'S POLICIES WILL ~~HAVE~~ IN
Domestic
POLAND'S ~~INTERNAL~~ AFFAIRS

III
ROAD
GOMULKA'S ~~WAY~~ BACK TO CENTRALIZATION

Part VII

ROAD
GOMULKA'S ~~WAY~~ BACK TO CENTRALIZATION

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ROAD

GOMULKA'S ~~WAY TO BACK~~ POLICY OF CENTRALIZATION

I.

Recent
I. Partial ~~The last~~ moves and changes in Gomulka's policies demonstrate
Decentrali- zation a radical, drastic switch from his former promises to decentralize
1956-1958 authority both in political and *economic* business administration.

With the Third Plenum, October, 1959 Gomulka initiated a new trend of centralization of power that is in striking contrast to his former promises of ~~a~~ decentralized management and administration. Although only *some* ~~part of~~ these promises *were not realized* had been turned to reality, during 1956 - 1959, nevertheless the entire policy of Gomulka during *those years* ~~this period had been always labeled and "advertised"~~ *carried the party label of decentralization.* by the party as a policy of ~~decentralization.~~

independence Decentralization and delegation of authority and broad *management* selfgovernment of county and township administration and *unrestricted* ~~self~~ management of factories and enterprises were *These were the* major features of the "Polish Way to Socialism" *Proclamation by Gomulka* announced in October 1956. by Gomulka. It is true that *a some* the broad conceived series of reforms directed toward decentralization *and* ~~initiated in October 1956~~ *were partially out.* ~~was~~ carried out only partially, ~~and~~ Several promising developments were stopped *and that some freedom of action was given* pretty soon, nevertheless a certain amount of freedom in management was granted to the chief executives of enterprises, *plant and workers'* to the Councils of Workers and to the National Councils of cities, towns, counties and voivodships.

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However,

Several concessions made by Gomulka in the early days of ~~many his regime~~ taking over the leadership of Poland, were later withdrawn. ~~The elbowroom granted during the first~~ ^{fervor of the revolution} ~~to the managers was later~~ narrowed again, some limitations and restrictions reestablished, but still a ^{relative} large scope of decisions ^{survived} still outlasted up to October 1959. This scope of "liberties" in ^{and} management ^{of} administration never was ^{very} ~~truly~~ large but in comparison with the period 1945 - 1956 ^{to} ~~the reforms established by Gomulka in this area represented~~ ^{and reforms} ~~undeniably~~ ^{had led to} limited progress toward better management and self government. ^{Then came the Third Plenum in October 1959 and Gomulka's} In this aspect Gomulka's program of centralization ^{about brutally announced program of centralization} presented officially and almost brutally during the Third Plenum in October 1959 ~~certainly~~ doubtlessly was felt as a painful, disappointing step that pushed the Polish administrative system ^{period of Bierut's} ~~back to the abyss of the despised and hated~~ ^{right} bureaucratic and overcentralized period of Bierut's regime.

Admittedly

It is true that the "little freedom" granted by Gomulka in 1956-1957 ^{and} continued in a rather crippled form through 1958 and 1959 ^{failed to give expected results.} ~~did not produce the expected results.~~

In 1956 Gomulka figured that ^{more authority, to} ~~by giving the managers more authority~~ ^{help them to more effectively} ~~will promote them to use their increased power of decision~~ ^{fatal} ~~to run better the business.~~ ^{Bierut's} The results of the overcentralization ^{were evident to} ~~clearly exposed~~ under Bierut were clear to everybody in Poland. ^{People knew that} ~~These results were~~ deplorable. ^{greater independence} ~~The hopes that more selfmanagement and more authority for the~~

-3-

directors of ~~the~~ factories and enterprises ~~will create better management~~ *would improve*
seemed ~~fully~~ justified.

~~But the~~ *negative, however* results were quite reverse. *So* Therefore Gomulka
revised began a revision of this his policy. *He* Now under influence of the
side doctrines and the orthodox wing of the party he *shifted* is shifting to a
the *i.e.* ~~an extremely~~ reverse policy to centralization.

II. BASIC CONTROVERSY

IN AP*
PRAISAL

OF POL*

OF WOR-

KERS' COUN-

CILS'

There *arose* *Orthodox* *liberal* *regarding*
There was already in 1957 a basic controversy between the
party doctrinaires and the liberal economists of Poland with respect to
the extent and the tactic of decentralization.

may
This ~~might~~ be illustrated as follows:

1. Gomulka allowed the workers to elect their own representatives

and to establish Workers' Councils. *To take a real interest in the operation of their plant?*
He expected them to become ~~in the outlooks and results of the business~~
interested and devoted to the welfare of the factory, to "their"

~~factory.~~ *However, the Workers' Councils*
~~But what did the workers councils?~~ They were ~~only~~ *only* interested in

establishing "easier" norms / ~~operation standards~~ / for
the workers, *in* to increase *and showing* their wages, to show fictitious profits

in order to distribute ~~a part~~ *a certain share* of this profit among the ~~employees~~ *workers*

a Distribution of a part of surplus profit
as bonus. ~~This~~ *is* provided by the 'Bill of the Fund of Enterprises'
at discretion of the Workers'
~~and distributed by the Council.~~

In order to counter this activity, Gomulka
~~That did Gomulka? He subordinated the Workers' Councils under~~ *to*
~~the chairmanship of the party cell.~~ *a Polish Suisse* From 1958 the foreman of the
~~Council is the secretary of the factory's party cell.~~ *because*

Workers' Councils as such were subordinated to the
~~The Councils itself as an institution were placed under the~~
Unions
~~jurisdiction and the dependence of the Labor Unions. These latter~~
hardly
are the most bureaucratic, ~~hated and despised~~, and ineffective

-4-

Consequently, workers'
organization in Poland. Under such circumstances the Councils *begin to concern*
lost the interest in the management of the factory and are paying
themselves with attention *only* to minor problems, *i.e.* of bonuses, *sickness allowances* subsidies for sick employ-
ees, etc. The Worker's Councils have no *real* authority. Their only *all they can do*
is *to make the plant director* one power is to "give the director of the factory the hell".

to request reports, apologies, explanations etc. To the chief management
They do not benefit plant operation and are merely another
the councils are no help at all they are one institution more
source of nuisance to the management, not burden
that overburdens the management with reports, statistics and intri-
call for reports, statistics.

Polish The liberal economists *think otherwise* have another viewpoint. They wanted to
like see the workers councils as a type of board of shareholders, not
to be of trustees like a board
which which not interfering with plant operation,
disturbing the director with detailed reports every day, not
checks it once or twice a year, replacing management
overburdening him with unnecessary statistics etc. but exercising
if this should prove necessary.
once or twice a year a general control and equipped with the power
to draw out consequences, for example to change the director if
violation necessary. The Workers Councils in Yugoslavia for example have.

certain special rights. They are not subordinated to the Labor
are represented Unions. They have their Representation on the highest level, *i.e.*
by a so-called it is called the "Workers Parliament"

under Gomulka
The Polish Workers councils are a crippled institution. In this form
that is established by Gomulka they are more a burden than an
advantage.

But their inefficiency is due *to* In the opinion of the Polish

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Their inefficiency is due
economists to the crippled form and not to the concept itself.
call for state but
These economists demand a Yugoslavian type of worker's councils.
opposed it.
Gomulka rejected this. His viewpoint might be formulated as follows:

"They have (now) limited freedom and limited authority, but they abuse it. And
and already misused it. If they had more freedom
they would bring the Polish finances to a complete
collapse.
defeat, to an inflation"

pusant
Gomulka's policy *now* is to reduce the authority of the councils.
workers
As long as they exist (and it would be hard to dissolve them
entirely
completely), Gomulka *will expect them to expose them* tries to place the councils more and more under
increased party control.
the influence of the party cell.

workers
The Polish economists predicted from the first moment that
would
the first councils elected will do more harm than good. But these
They believed
however
economists *would* hoped that gradually better men will be elected,
but in the time
the institution of the councils will gain experience, the members
that their
would drop their petty notions and can become
of the councils will shift from the minor matters to basic pro-
experience and finally raise plant output for the
blems of the business and finally the productivity will improve.

benefit of all concerned.
At this stage when the councils were crippled before
However, deprived of the chance to develop along these lines,
they could develop new ideas and methods (it is hard to say who is
made a mistake
right or wrong. Gomulka did a bad think. He established / or rather
tolerated the
existence of the
permitted to exist the workers councils but stopped from the
gave them no
chance to develop.
So they became stagnant
first moment their development. Therefore now there are

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Non-entities, administered even by the workers
 undeveloped, crippled councils, ~~led by the party cell, disliked by~~
~~the workers themselves, and condemned to a poor vegetation without the future~~
and allowed to vegetate without a hope for
 future. An additional bureaucratic, annoying institution within the

factory, this is the present picture of the worker's councils as shaped by the party.

III.

III.
 "LITTLE
 FREEDOM"
 FOR MANA-
 GERS.

The Council went to the party cell in charge at the factory
The Workers Council is now known as the
 In 1956 and 1957 there were certain bills issued ^{that} ~~granted the directors~~ *bureaucratic posts.*
~~Granting freedom of action was granted to managers of enterprises in 1956 and 1957.~~
~~of the enterprises more authority. In 1958 one unnecessary layer~~
~~was added. The~~ *top-heavy*
~~the so-called "Central Administrations", a heavy and unproductive~~
~~bureaucratic agency above the enterprise and above the Branch~~ *ordering it order Industry Branch Association and*
~~Association of the particular industries.~~ *various* ~~was abolished in 1958.~~

~~The chain of superior layers, The so-called 'ladder of bureaucratic~~
~~layers' was reduced in this way by one stratum. This is doubtlessly~~ *was a good thing.*
~~a sound reform.~~ *managers*
~~The directors, however, abused their new authority.~~

~~But the directors used their increased authority primarily~~
~~to adjust the monthly plans to their convenience, to increase~~ *padding the payroll*
~~the fund of payroll, to start sometimes unnecessary or luxurious~~ *make wasteful expenditure*
~~capital expenditures to change norms (making the operations~~
~~standards easier) to reject orders that were vital to the Nation's~~ *always in one direction i.e.*
~~economy but not convenient for the factory, to pay bonuses at~~ *national*
~~own discretion, to lower quality, which can be done easily in an~~ *arbitrarily*
~~economic system of scarcity / any product better or worse quality~~
~~can be sold easily~~ *of*

party
 The ~~constituted~~ leadership of the party realized that the
~~expenses for capital expenditures and for the fund of wages~~ *outlays wage*
~~were~~ *increasing*
~~are increasing at a tremendous rate of the purchasing power of the~~
~~employees could not be covered by increased supply, and finally~~ *not*

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looked active and reversed this policy As early as
 Gomulka ~~twisted~~ the policy in a reverse direction. Already
 in 1957, Vicepremier Jaroszewicz ^{worked} issued a confidential letter to the
 State Bank ^{which} ~~s i.e.~~ (the National Bank ~~that~~ pays the payroll
 and the current expenses) and to the Investment Bank ^{(which covers} ~~that~~ pays the capi-
 tal expenditures) ^{in which he ordered them} to restrict payments, ^{payments to the extent of the} (to limit strictly the allowable
 payroll fund. For example the payrolls in construction ^{the} ~~blue-collar~~ workers
 and white collar workers ^{together} ~~were then~~ ^{not} was limited to 18 % of the value of
 performed construction.

Once more the managers had
 Under these circumstances the granted "liberties" remain
 only on the paper. The director again had tied both hands. *their hands tied.*

The party doctrinaires lamented:

Managers wanted more authority and freedom of
 "We gave the directors certain authority and freedom of action.
they got it
 acting. And was is the result? Inflation."

So Let's go back to tight control."

The Polish economists took another position: They said:

"After 10 years of overcentralized economy 1945 - 1956

the managers must learn ^{how} to manage. It is not a surprise
 that they start ~~from~~ using their "authority" ^{by taking things} for the easy way
 is no surprise. Give them a chance to show their ability.
 easy way of management. But let them develop their ability.

Make
 Let them be responsible for profit. Judge them according

to the end result. Let them compete. The ^{bad} managers will
 be sooner or later eliminated by "natural selection" ^{sooner or later.}

Give
~~Let us~~ must allow the "economic" laws and rules to
a chance and do away with
 work not the "administrative rules".

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These "liberal" economists ^{said!} commented as follows:
 "The first results are bad because the "freedoms" granted are ~~too small~~. ^{Price are still too high and they are} There are still stiff prices, frequently deficit prices.

This means, for example, that ^{for} on each ton of produced coal the mine ^{produces} a loss of 120 zlotys. The ^{sales} selling price established by the Price ^{set} Commission is lower than ^{cost} cost of production. The more the mine produces the higher the losses. This can not stimulate to more production.

Let the enterprise regulate the ^{sales} selling prices. After a period of disturbance, ^{take like himself} the economic laws will work and the better mines will show greater profits. The other mines will have to adjust their methods ^{to arrive at an} to an equally competitive level. The economy will develop on a sound basis. It will become a sound economy not an "administered" economy."

Again there is no ^{proof} ~~prove~~ whose viewpoint is right.

Before ^{even} the managers could develop their capability, their competitive power, their rights were crippled. ^{they loaded} They ^{are burdened} Again, are burdened

with ^{by} statistics and reports that must be falsified in order to get an adequate ^{payroll} fund for the payroll every two weeks. This payroll is always higher than the allowable fund. Therefore the factory

^{claims} presents an ~~fictitious~~ over-fulfillment of the monthly plan ^{said} so that the allowable rate for wages (for example the 18% in

of value of construction) ^{cost} makes in absolute figures a higher ^{sum} sum. Again the managers ^{must find a way to overcome} concentrate their abilities on overcoming

artificial, administered rules, instead of running the business on a sound basis.

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Within these zigzag lines of ~~certain~~ ^{limited} freedom and promptly following restrictions the Polish economy lived during 1957-1959. But ~~as a program, as a "label and title" still~~ this period was called ~~the~~ ^{the} period of decentralization.

IV. The discussed above in No 1 and 2 ^{the} decentralization reforms ^{described under same} ~~decentralization~~ ^{above} were designed to streamline with delegation of authority from the ~~central~~ ^{higher} (higher) levels to down to the level at the bottom. In ^{practice} business this bottom level is the

factory or the construction firm (enterprise), etc. ^{The proclamation of these reforms was accompanied by heavy} This decentralization was advertised with big noise but it really ^{propaganda, but in practice they never had a chance.} never was incorporated to a valuable extent. This was always only

^{It was} one step forward and promptly one step back. ^{In addition to decentralization from top to bottom, a lateral} Besides there exist a parallel stream of decentralization i. e.

decentralization within the upper levels, ^{we effected.} This applied to the ^{This a bargain within the "family" of top executive and top planning}

levels. ^{This decentralization roughly corresponds to that} This is this type of decentralization that was for example ^{introduced by Khrushchev in the USSR in 1957.} initiated by Chruszczew in 1957 in the USSR.

^{Although loudly proclaimed as} This type of decentralization is "advertised" noisily as "decentralization and liberalization" but it has nothing to do with

~~the~~ delegation of authority to the bottom level. i. e. to the productive level.

In 1957 ^{Khrushchev found himself at odds with the bulk of} Chruszczew had many troubles with the Russian Managers concentrated in Moscow. This group of ^{the} ^{area} ^{140 000} 140 - 150 000 top officers ^{element, women} ^{executive}

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Concentrated was a major political power base only in Moscow, represented a big political power, tied to Malenkov and Kaganowich. ~~The~~ tensions between the party ^{business} functionaries ^{officials} and the Managers can be traced back to 1936. ^{They} It became ^{arrest} ardent and vehement after Stalin's death ^{force} ^{descent}

The managers despise ~~the~~ ^{officials} party functionaries who have no sense for economical laws, ^{and} ~~for a~~ sound business management, and who are ^{guided by} ~~promoted by~~ "political" irrational approach to economical problems. These party functionaries ^{officials} will appoint an unqualified worker ^{never in assigning unqualified men to plant executive jobs,} to the top manager of a huge factory because he is a workers son or, ^{for merely because of their workers background or special merit} because he has some merits for the party. The Manager Group ^{the USSR want}

in Russia demands that capable, experienced engineers economists, specialists and professional managers ^{to run industry,} should govern the business in the USSR.

^{liked} They were adherents of Malenkov, who is himself an electrical engineer, ^{because he tried to limit party rule over the managers class,} and who tried to reduce the supremacy of the party functionaries upon the class of managers.

^{Khrushchev gave full support to the party officials} Khrushczew ^{staked} ~~staked~~ on the party functionaries ^{(Sooner or} later the managers will win the fight in the USSR but it ^{may} ~~might~~ take

years) because Khrushczew reversed the developing trend at least ^{for a certain time} ~~for a certain time~~ ^{Chruschkes} a great many chief executives in Moscow ^{removed} ~~removed~~ the Moscow top officers,

^{and} reduced the number of Federal Ministries from 36 to 6. He sent thousands of ^{top} ~~top~~ managers to Siberia and ^{other distant} ~~to the remote~~ provinces of the USSR.

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Put the managers did not yield without fight. They prepared
 an attack, ~~led~~ ^{which was led} by Kaganowich, Molotov, Malenkov. At the Plenum ^{July 1957}
 July 1957 this group lost the battle mostly because of ^{mainly due to} ~~Zukov's~~ ^{ZHUKOV's} support
 of ~~Khrushchev~~. ^{of KHRUSHCHEV}. Later ~~Khrushchev~~ demoted Zukov and Bulganin.
 Secret

The republics and provinces of the USSR supported ~~Khrushchev~~ ^{KHRUSHCHEV} against
 the Muscovites, ^{hoping they would gain greater authority in the end.} Provinces always dislike the metropole. The provinces

were content that ~~Khrushchev~~ gives them ~~self~~ ^{self} government.

~~Khrushchev~~ ^{put the salt in} established the 64 economically self-sufficient districts,
 throughout the country. He became the "father of decentralization"

^{However} It should be however be born in mind that this is a decentraliza-
 tion that goes from the top ministerial level ^{down} ~~only~~ to the top
 level of the republic or autonomous district.

The National council of a township or city or county did not gain
 any self government. ^{of} ~~any~~ ^{autonomy} ~~self~~ ^{of} ~~administration~~ ^{and business} now are

subordinated to the republican ministries. A new ~~body~~ ^{by} organization, i.e.
 the Republican Planning Commissions ^{was} ~~was~~ created. The number of high-offi-
 cers ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ within the country is now greater than before the reorgani-
 zation. The only ~~one~~ difference is that these top administrators
 are no ~~more~~ ^{spread all over the country} concentrated in Moscow but deconcentrated in a ^{bigger}
~~amount~~ ^{plant} in the capital towns of the provinces, districts, and republics.

The chief manager of a factory ^{now} ~~for example~~ has to fight
 more red tape than before. The ^{ability} ~~quality~~ of the Moscow bureaucracy
 was higher than that ^{was} ~~of~~ (intellectual level) of the provincial bureaucrats,
^{in the first place}

* and because ~~Khrushchev~~ ^{Khrushchev} managed in the last moment to get the provin-
 cial party Secretaries to Moscow for this critical session.

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As a matter of fact since there is still in Moscow the Federal State Planning Commission with its ^{power to say the last word,} "last authority" the director of a factory has now one layer more above himself within the ladder of command, than before this reorganization.

V.

V.
TOP
LEVEL
DECEN-
TRALI-
ZATION

In Poland the parallel stream of decentralization within the ~~sole~~ "clan" of top managers also is visible although in a modified form as compared with the Chruszczew reorganization.

Gomulka dissolved the institution of numerous / 7 / Vicepremiers, ^{and} reduced the number of ministries (but only by 6, there are still 26 ministries in Poland). This provided more authority for the Ministers.

~~But the Ministers exercised this increased power~~

He changed (In 1956) the character of the State Planning Commission. Prior to Gomulka this Commission was the most powerful economical institution in Poland.

The Ministers, the Vicepremiers and the Premier represent the executive power. With respect to industry and business the industrial Ministers and the Ministers of Trade * represent the executive power, the State Planning Commission represents the planning authority i. e. the legislative power in business. Between the two powers there are always tensions and the ~~situation~~ relationship of power is subjected to changes in various periods. The period 1947 - 1956 is the period of supremacy of the planning authorities. The period 1956 - 1959 is the period of supremacy of the executive power. Gomulka officially

- * (1) Ministry of Internal Trade. (2) Ministry of Foreign Trade
(3) Ministry of Food Processing and Farm Products Contracting /
/ Purchasing

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subordinated the State Planning Commission ^{to} ~~under~~ the Council of Ministers. He even changed ^{its} ~~the~~ name : Since 1956 ^{it is} ~~the name is~~ : Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers.

The power of the Planning Commission was reduced, ^{merely} the duties narrowed to ~~pure~~ planning and ~~other~~ advisory staff functions.

But the Ministers used their new power to increase wages and to pursue narrow ministerial, partisan goals. They were more concerned with their ministerial targets than with ~~the~~ National ^{Objectives} ~~Aims~~.

Gomulka became more and more disappointed by the "misuse" of power - in Gomulka's opinion - exercised by the ministers.

~~He started an action of reducing~~ ^{He proceeded to reduce} the power of the ministers. In 1957 he established the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers. ^{It is composed of} ~~This consists of~~ the industrial and Trade Ministers only.

The ^{major} ~~major~~ economic problems were decided / after ^{the} ~~decisions~~ ^{based on} ~~by~~ the Politbureau ^{which takes precedence over} ~~that~~ always ~~is above~~ all administrative authorities,

both executive and planning) ~~(involvement in administration/)~~ by the small group of ~~the~~ Ministers of ~~within the small group of~~ ~~Ministry of~~ ~~Electric Power~~

- 2 Chemical Industry
- 3 Heavy Industry
- 4 Light Industry
- 5 Internal Trade
- 6 Foreign Trade
- 7 Food Processing and Purchase of Farm Products
- 8 Construction and Building Materials

and the Vicepremier in Charge of Industry/ Jaroszewicz/ as chairman of this Committee. Also the Minister of Finance ^{is always present at the sessions, but he is not a member.} ~~is member of this Committee. The chairman of the State Planning Commission~~ If necessary the Minister of Agriculture is invited, or the Ministers of Transportation and of Communication. (i.e. the ministries of transportation and communication are: (1) Ministry of Transportation (2) Ministry of Communications (3) Ministry of Navigation).

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Economist (of the Council of Ministers)

This ~~Committee~~ ^{the} created in 1957 with Eugeniusz Szyr as General Secretary was already a step in ^{the} direction of centralization and concentration of administrative power in the hands of a smaller group of ministers. The other Ministers protested against this arrangement ^{and called} saying that it ~~is~~ ^{is} unconstitutional. The Polish Constitution ^{defines} mentions the rights of the Assembly of Ministers (or Council of Ministers) and these rights cannot be transferred to a small group of the Assembly. ^{Nevertheless,} ~~However~~ this Committee was established. It ^{may} ~~might~~ be noted that during 1947 - 1956 such a committee already existed ^{between 1947-1956} and was abolished ^{by Bierut} during the October Revolution ^{as a member of the} by Gomulka himself. ^{It had been} But in 1957 Gomulka changed his mind and reestablished this committee.

This measure caused some Ministers to lose authority,
This step of Gomulka reduced the authority of a part of Ministers ^{while others were able to maintain it,} but still left the rights of the remaining part. Still, ^{the} Ministers ^{had more authority} (under Gomulka) were ^{they had} more powerful than under Bierut. This was true up to October 1959.

VI.

VI.
RESTITUTION OF
THE OFFICE
OF
VICE-PREMIERS

... A radical course toward centralization was ^{introduced} ~~started~~ by Gomulka in October 1959. The major features of this ~~new~~ new course are:

- a. Restitution of the office ~~/institution/~~ of several Vicepremiers.
- b. Appointing ^{most of the post of} Vicepremiers, former Stalinists
- c. Increasing ^{e of} the role and authority of the Planning Commission.

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Restitution of the Office of Vicepremiers.

There are now 5 Vicepremiers. ^{They} Together with the Prime - Minister, they represent the 'real' Cabinet. The Ministers are subordinated to the Vicepremiers and ^{of course} obviously to the Prime-Minister.

In the administrative ladder they ^{occupy} are at the third place. ^{At first glance it may appear that there has only been a} One might figure that only a change in quantity ^{change in numbers.} has taken place. There were 3 Vice-premiers previously, and now ^{there are 5 now.} there are 5. ^{While there}

^{however,} But previously, there were three Vicepremiers of which ^{of whom} two were rather "nominal, representative" Vicepremiers without ^{merely} influence. Nowak, a former Natolinist, who immediately after the ^{early} October Revolution ^{once he supported it} declared loyalty for Gomulka, is kept on his position ^{the job} only for tactical reasons, ^{only} to demonstrate that Gomulka

^{bas} is willing to make peace with the Natolinists ^{what} (and he really did) ^{about to the Soviets in Poland} to prove before the Russian party that such a

pro-Russian Natolinist ^{the} (the friend of Russian ambassador Ponomarenko) ^{is friend can still hold a top job} is at top position in Poland; to ^{have} be a mediator

between the Natolinists and Gomulka. The comeback of Witaszewski, Tokarski, Mazur, ^{and} Ruminski was settled by Nowak ^{sub an intermediary.} as mediator, and ^{intermediary} /

Vicepremier Ignar the chairman of the 'Peasants Party' holds his post due ^{to} an agreement between the Communist Party and the United Peasants' Party. In all satellite countries there is

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always one Vicepremier and three or two ^{who are} ministers ^{members of} ~~from~~ the allied ~~party of the 'Peasants'~~. The satellite leaders like to show that there is a multi-party system in the country. But the Vicepremier Ignar is only a puppet, ^{however} ~~in fact,~~

Actually only Vicepremier Jaroszewicz was a real Vicepremier up to October 1959 under Gomulka. He represented Poland ⁱⁿ ~~within~~ the Council of Mutual Assistance (the members of the Board of the Council are Vicepremiers of their ^{respective} countries). He exercised the executive leadership in the Polish industry, he was the chairman of the ~~Soviet~~ Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers, he was the deputy / proxy / during the absence of Prime-minister Cyrankiewicz's ^{deputy} ~~Polish~~. The majority of workers and employees ^{do not even} ~~in Poland even~~ does not realize ^{about the existence of} that there were three Vicepremiers. They always knew ~~that there is~~ Premier Cyrankiewicz and Vice-premier Jaroszewicz.

^{a/} The Ministers treated Jaroszewicz as deputy of Cyrankiewicz, as Vicepremier acting in the name of the Premier, as the economic chief of the cabinet. They did not see in Jaroszewicz a separate administrative layer between the Ministers and the ~~Vicepremier~~. Premier

Now, after October 1959, there are three economic ^{of them} ~~really~~ powerful Vicepremiers. All three are ^{engaged in} ~~concentrated~~ on the same ^{field} ~~area~~ of activities ~~that was~~ previously covered by ~~one~~ Jaroszewicz only. They do not deal with Welfare, Health, Culture, Education etc. These matters are (as they were) under Cyrankiewicz's personal ^{care} ~~patronage~~.

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Problems of agriculture are/as they were/ under Gomulka's personal and Ignar's formal leadership. *

Nowak ^{is now charged with} ~~has assigned the affairs of~~ National Councils ^{again} and of ~~the problems of the~~ Western Territories. ^{problems} ~~This same assignment~~ ^{he had} before. The authority in matters of National Councils and Internal Affairs is factually in the hands of the Politbureau (Zambrowski) and partially of Zawadzki the Polish "President". Nowak has no ^{economic} ~~no~~ ^{local} authority.

Therefore ^{run the field} ~~all~~ the three ~~new~~ Vicepremiers Jaroszewicz, Szyr, Tokarski ^{mentioned} ~~govern the area of~~ industry, trade and business.

As ~~said~~ before, (see page 13) there are ^{major} ~~five~~ Industrial Ministries (Mining, Heavy, Light, Chemistry, and Building Materials), ~~three~~ and three Trade Ministries (see p/ 13). *

These 8 Ministries are directed now by three Vicepremiers. ^{on the average,} This means that, ~~averagely~~ each Vicepremier deals with two-three Ministers.

But this creates a direct relationship of superior and subordinate. For example, Tokarski is mostly concerned with the Machine Industry, and, ^{is charged with} besides, he ~~has assigned~~ the general problem ^{of norms} ~~of revisions~~. of norms. He is "sitting on the shoulders" of the Minister of Heavy Industry. He has nothing more to do. ^{he is} ~~He is in~~ fact the Minister of Heavy Industry, and the present Minister of Heavy Industry must ^{request} ~~ask~~ Tokarski's ^{approval} ~~decision~~ ^{even the best decision} on the smallest ^{minor} matters.

In other words, the Minister of Heavy Industry has become in fact a "Viceminister" although he still has his title "Minister". ~~But he has~~ ^{an}

* The ministry of "Food Processing and Farm Products Purchase" is a ^{mixed} ~~part~~ ministry, half industrial and half commercial

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~~direct, immediate superior, so he lost his previous power.~~

~~It is an obvious fact:~~ The top ~~of~~ ^{of} leadership i.e. Gomulka, ^{any of the} the Politbureau, the Central Committee, has not yielded ~~anything~~ of his authority. The Premier has the same rights as before.

Between the Ministers and the Premier a new "layer" of authority has been ^{shoved in}. This ^{new} layer can draw ~~its~~ power only at the cost of the authority of the Ministers. The losers in this whole play ^{are} ~~is~~ the Ministers.

Szyr has, among other duties, the control of the Ministry of Construction ^{& Building Materials.} This means, that the minister of Construction, Pietrusiewicz has now only a limited authority, he can not make decisions without Szyr's approval. Szyr also has the Trade Ministries under ^{his} control. The Minister ^{of Internal Trade,} Lesz, an energetic man who ~~terribly~~ dislikes and despises Szyr must be very unhappy now having to ask for approval of ~~any~~ decisions.

Summarizing it ~~might~~ be said:

The adding of ^{government} a new layer at the top of ^{administration} caused a substantial ^{decline} ~~reducing~~ of authority of the ministers and ^{rank of} of all administrative layers below the Minister. It is ^{obvious} ~~clear~~ that when the Minister has less authority, also his directors of departments and of ^{the} subordinated Business Administrations down to the Enterprise level have less authority. They can draw their power only ^{to such a degree to which} ~~insofar as~~ the Minister delegates to them a part of his ministerial authority.

In this way the ^{ultimate} ~~executive~~ power in business has been concentrated

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among the Vicepremiers on the cost of the levels below.

VII. THE PLANNING SUPREMACY

VII. There exists in the centrally planned economy another power, ^{namely} that is the planning authority. This power can be compared to a type of

business legislative power. The Poles call this the Planning and Normative Power. This authority issues the codes, the 'norms' i.e the operations standards, the goals, targets, objectives. The basic policies are established by the party but the technical methods, procedures, plans are made by the Planning Authority.

~~Gomulka~~ ^{Gomulka reestablished} ~~restituted~~ In October 1959 the supreme authority of the Planning Authority. ^{power} The ministries receive ^{Beginning from 1960} precise objectives ^{and} nothing is left to their ~~own~~ discretion.

^{may} This ~~might~~ be illustrated as follows.

The Minister receives an obligatory plan consisting of:

- 1) Quantity Plan; for example the Minister of Heavy Industry ~~must~~ is responsible for production of 6 million tons iron in 1960
- 2) Assortment Plan. He also receives a detailed specification of each sort of products for which ^{he} is responsible. Sometimes such a list in the heavy industry contains 300 items.
- 3) Plan of Labor Force and Payroll. He gets a limit of the Payroll Fund and of number of employees that he can not exceed. The number of employees is strictly determined in a breakdown of qualified workers, unqualified, white collar workers, apprenticeships etc. Each group has assigned its separate pay roll fund. Shifting from one fund to the other is not permitted.
- 4) Plan of Technical Progress / Engineering Plan / Detailed list of improvements, new methods and savings to be achieved through these innovations. Frequently the savings are discounted "a priori" before the return of these progressive methods is proved.

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- 5) Financial Plan / called also Plan of production costs /
This plan determines the allowable costs of production the sums that the ministry has to transfer to ~~the~~ Finance ~~in~~ at Minister or the sum that the Minister will get as ~~dotation~~ allocation to cover deficits if this is deficit-production, etc.

6) Plan of supply.

Usually 390 items of centrally distributed materials are listed in quantities that will be allotted in the current year to the ministry.

7) Capital Outlays.

~~allotted~~ allocated A list of projects to be carried out, amount of money ~~allotted~~, increase of production to be obtained by putting to work the new/built plants.
Imported machinery to be delivered. ~~from~~ domestic
This plan also includes purchase of machinery etc.
A part of this plan is the 'Plan of Repair and Spare Parts.'

Each Minister, each 'Business Administration' and each factory receives such a plan. The lower the level, the more detailed is the plan, the shorter the periods of time breakdown, (planning intervals).
The enterprise receives a breakdown in months, i.e. 'monthly plans'.

It is impossible to fulfill all 7 parts of the plan.
They are so ^{rigidly} bound and tied together that ^{a plant director has} there is no room left for managerial initiative and free decision, ~~of the director~~. The easiest part is the Quantity Plan.
" " next "
The most neglected part is the Financial Plan, and later the Engineering Progress- Plan.

But the 'Labor and Payroll Plan' and the 'Supply Plan' are real nightmares to the ^{plant} Management, of the factory. The first is always exceeded, the latter is never ^{achieved} completed. ~~Less~~ Supply of material is less than it should be, less than the factory really should get according to the plan; the expenses for payroll are ^{expenses} ~~planned~~ ^{inadequately} ~~un~~sufficiently, the factual payroll is much higher.
than it should be

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Experienced by managers
The greatest relief was when Gomulka, in 1956 and 1957, *permitted them to freely determine* allowed the managers to determine by themselves the amount of pay-funds *amount* as long as the financial plan as a whole, was kept in its limits.

However But the managers used this right too *widely* extensively or, in the opinion of the party "abused" it, so that the earnings of the workers increased substantially and the country faced *inflation*.

During 1957 - 1958 Gomulka *reestablished* reestablished the Payroll-Plan but the control was *soft* and *still* there were excessive pay-roll expenses.

Keep on emphasizing
Now, after October 1959, Gomulka repeats at each occasion that *will be exercised over* the control of the Payroll Plan will be strict tight, and that *that persons found* there will be punishment for trespassing the payroll fund. The first *trial* trial

took place was in December 1959. The director of the Cement factory "Rejowiec" *most productive* one of the best cement factories in Poland was indicted *for paying* that he had paid a premium to workers above the allowable fund. The Viceminister of Construction, Professor Grzynek, testified that he personally had approved this premium and that the director was right. The district judge *dismissed* case.

Under party acquitted the *dispensed* the defendants. *But the party* But under the pressure of the party the General Attorney *reopened* case, *however* trial will be *open* now in Warsaw in Spring 1960. Other show-trials will follow.

As new The present policy is to frighten the managers *so they will restrain* making arbitrary decisions of premiums and bonuses.

Reestablishment The reestablishment of the planning supremacy has *on* immediate impact of the economic life. It *affects* directly the monthly budget of the employers. *Less* soft control and a little freedom for the directors *workers*

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is equivalent to
 means better salaries ^{and} wages. Tight control, trials, pressure
~~frightening~~ *Against* the directors, means that ~~only~~ the nominal wages and
^{only} salaries will be paid, ~~and~~ this means ^{less} lower income *for the workers.*
Reestablishment

The restitution of the Vicepremier-office is painful to
 the managers from the minister down to the ^{plant director} director of the factory.
~~But the employees~~ *small* ~~is not to much interested in~~ *the little fellow the workers, however, knows and sees little* these manoeuvres. *about*
Reestablishment
 But the restitution of tight planning and control, ~~of~~ legislative
 business codes, and restrictions ~~the~~ supremacy of the ~~planning~~ authorities -
all this affects each employee personally, ^{and} this will be felt as a painful
~~step that affects the entire masses of employees.~~ *burden by all*

VIII: Outlook

Return
 The way back to centralization can not be ^{accomplished} made without restitution of a large
 tremendous control apparatus. ^{This extension of control agencies is} ~~Gomulka~~ started from the top. *If* The new Vice-
 premier ~~can do the assigned job of frightening the managers and tightening~~ *want to carry out his assignment to keep the managers in line*
~~the control, only by creating a control apparatus;~~ *he can do so only by means of a large* ^{high} ~~the~~ controllers ⁱⁿ inside
 the Ministries and Administrations will not do ^{the} this job. They are too close
 to production and ~~they~~ are subordinated to the minister who by himself
^{Champion} usually defends ~~the~~ "production" and ^{hardly} ~~can not fight~~ *he expected to* his own workers and
 employees. This control apparatus must be created outside the ministries.

Under Bierut, the Finance-Minister, the Minister of Control, ^{and} the Security
 Police, and the Office of the ^{e.} Central Attorney did this job. *This apparatus was* ~~Gomulka dissolved~~
~~in 1956 a big part of this apparatus.~~ *largely broken up by Gomulka in 1956* ^{it.} Now he must rebuild the appa-
 tus.

Extension of control and enforcement of the many codes and restrictions may be implemented by the following means:

The sequence of extension of means of control and persecution of violation of the numerous codes & restrictions might be predicted as follows:

1. Extension of the Planning Commission ~~that~~ ^{the appointment of} has its own control apparatus.

This is indicated by appointing the former Vicepremier, Tadeusz Gede, as First deputy ~~to~~ the Chairman of the State Planning Commission. Gede, a former director of the Department of control (before he became Minister and later Vicepremier) is well known ^{for} his ruthless and merciless control measures.

It ^{may} be also noted that Gomulka reconstituted the Office of the First Deputy Chairman with the title 'Minister'. The superior of this first deputy, ^{himself} the Chairman, will probably receive the title of Vicepremier. ^{then may be} a sixth Vicepremier might be therefore ^{within a few} be expected in a couple of months.

^{effect of} The first deputy is ^{ranked a little higher than that of a} figured as little higher position than a Minister.

This means that, besides the economic Vicepremiers, the Ministers have also other indirect superiors, i. e. the Chairman of the Planning Commission, his first deputy, the Finance Minister who ^{was} ^{ranked as a} ^{superior} held the position of a "Above Minister"

2. The Vicepremiers also have their own small apparatus of control. This control agency will increase ^{in force}.
3. The control agencies of the Minister of Finance, ^{and} the State Banks will enlarge their control apparatus to ^{meet} ~~not~~ the needs for tight control of pay-roll and capital outlays.
4. The Chamber of Control ^{is} already growing at a ^{fast} ~~high~~ rate.

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5. The old Stalinist methods of so-called "Social Voluntary Control"

are ~~under restoration~~ being restored.

There are "~~Social Teams~~" Teams ^{for} fighting Speculation,

"Youth Brigades", ~~the~~ "Teams of Voluntary Inspectors" and other organizations, all of them directed by the party.

These forms of control are dangerous because the controllers act emotionally without thorough studies, ^{in an} onesided manner. ^{Periodically} Usually these teams, ^{which are made up} consisting of workers, ^{Corrupt themselves and are} become after a short period ^{replaced.} corrupted, ^{craves recognition for} the members are changed. Each new team ^{call for demonstration} like to demonstrate outstanding activity. This produces ~~denouncing~~ spying, intrigues and ~~chaos~~.

6. ^{Extension of} Enlarging the apparatus of the General Attorney and of the "Bench People's Judges" i. e. workers elected as judges.

^{on prosecution for} Concentration on ~~cases of~~ speculation, ^{overdrawing} on ~~overexpenditure~~ of pay funds etc, ~~Trials~~ in order to deter and to frighten the managers.

7. ^{Extension of the police apparatus of} Enlarging the apparatus of police. Shifting its attention to ^{Violation from prosecution of real crime, homicide,} economic trespasses and neglecting the wave of real crimes, ^{robbery} murders, ^{hedlums} etc.

8. ^{a of} Increasing the control functions of the party cells

9. ^{Restoration of} Restitution of large 'Personal' Departments ^{with emphasis on} that control behavior, ^{employee, personal, private etc.} standard of living, expenses of the employees.

All these ~~steps are already in the phase of starting and developing.~~ ^{measures have been taken and are being developed} ~~but really tight control will never be achieved.~~
 However this will not assure a real tight control,

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The managers and employees in Poland are experienced in bypassing ~~new~~ codes and restrictions, in overcoming ^{new} additional difficulties. ^{managers}
 The ~~above listed~~ methods will make the ^{life of the managers much} harder but they will ^{not suppose things,} ~~at change the situation.~~

IX.

IX. THE
 PROBLEM
 OF RESTI-
 TUTION OF
 THE SECU-
 RITY PO-
 LICE. *Revival.*

The basic problem is, Whether or not Gomulka will ^{revive} ~~restitute~~ the ~~apparatus of the~~ security police.

Gomulka tries to avoid this last step ^{going that far.}
~~he is opposed to such a measure.~~
 He personally is certainly against such a decision. ^{machine} But the party apparatus ^{however, are for it and will fund it,}
 and the new Vicepremiers, ~~will insist.~~ Gomulka must face this problem.
~~If he will not restitute the security police,~~ ^{Without} ~~the policy of discipline,~~ ^{a course}
 tight control, ^{and} ~~austerity and hardship~~ ^{cannot be enforced in Poland.} will not be embodied in reality.

~~This policy will remain on the "paper"~~ "paper"

If Gomulka ^{he revokes} ~~restitutes~~ the security police, ^{Gomulka} ~~he~~ will lose his popularity and ^{the} support of ~~large~~ the workers. ^{even}

Gomulka constantly emphasizes that he ~~does not take in consi-~~ ^{claiming} ~~deration~~ ^{reviving} the alternative of ~~the~~ ^{it} ~~restitution~~ of the security police.

There is ^{Re-} ~~no~~ doubt ^{to responsible positions} that he means ^{large} at present. But ~~by~~ appointing the Stali-
 nists ^{means that he has yielded already, however,} he already yielded to a certain extent. It might be that ^{Possibly}
 circumstances such as ^{stricter} continuing danger of inflation, ^{the} passive resistance
 against ^{new sharper} norms, ^{of farm production} lowering of quality and ^{output} productivity,
 decline in agriculture ^{and} resistance of ~~the~~ peasants against the
 new farm policy will lead Gomulka to desperate decisions.

The ^{continue to exist.} tensions within the party and leadership ~~are still~~
^{considerably} going on. In October 1959 Gomulka yielded ^{doctrinaire} remarkably. The ~~party~~
^{party faction} doctrinaires and the adherents ^{to} ~~the Russian party~~ ^{lost line} did gained
 a victory.

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Gomulka is willing to make ^{important} ~~great~~ concessions ^{To achieve} ~~in order to reconstitute~~ discipline and deflation. He does not care ^{and a better living standard} ~~that he is forced to reappoint~~ ^{men whom} ~~recall people that~~ he personally ^{hate} dislikes, his former ^{enemies} adversaries.

He ~~hopes that these ruthless, and feared men might be able to~~ stop inflation and increase ~~in~~ wages. He knows ~~that~~ they will use ruthless methods. But ^{can} ~~As long as~~ this austerity program ^{to revise} ~~will be~~ pursued without the need ~~of restitution~~ of the security police,

Gomulka does not object.

^{This} But Gomulka's hopes to master the situation without the last desperate step i. e. ^{revival} ~~restitution of~~ security police, ^{may be a failure} ~~might be a failure~~.

^{True} It would not be the first. He had several basic failures. He misjudged ⁱⁿ ~~the situation several times~~ ^{on occasions and proved naive to be naive on others}. He showed sometimes "naive" ideas. ^{from personal} ~~On the basis of knowledge of the character of the leading at present~~ ^{present leaders, i. e.}

^{as well as} ~~men, Szyr, Tokarski, Gede, Witaszewski, and Gomulka's advisers within the~~ apparatus of the Central Committee Blinowski, Niedzwiedzki, Olszewski, I predict that ^{sure I know} ~~they will~~ ^{gradually} lead Gomulka to desperate steps.

^{methods} ~~On the basis of knowledge~~ how the Cabinet of Vicepremiers used to work and how the State Planning Commission works when ~~its~~ ultimate planning authority is granted to this Commission, I predict that ~~means of terror are inevitable~~ will be reestablished by these top authorities.

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The struggle within the party leadership ^{may} be ^{appraised} evaluated as follows:

^{Believe} Gomulka ~~thinks~~ that he yielded with respect to

theory

ideas

persons

goals

relations ^{with} and obedience to the ^{Prolet} Russian Party

but not with respect to Methods.

He hopes that the changes in policies he made in 1959 ^{will} ~~should~~ suffice to ^{reestablish} ~~restitute~~ discipline and authority of a party and government ^{a well as to} ~~and~~ limit freedom of managers to such a degree that ~~the~~ financial equilibrium ^{he can} ~~will~~ be ^{restored} ~~restituted~~.

this is an illusion. Without ^{overt challenge} ~~open~~ fight, as represented by ^{the machine} ~~a~~ terror apparatus ^{vis-a-vis} fighting the people, it will be impossible to maintain the discipline ^{and sacrifices} ~~that is~~ ^{and sacrifices called for by} Gomulka needs ^{he} ~~to develop~~ his new program of lowering standard of living ^{cannot be obtained}. Without terror and fear the Polish people will not go back to the standard of living of the Bierut period.

People can be forced back by terror, but terror can also ^{invite} ~~produce~~ open resistance.

This is the dilemma Gomulka faces now. He will try to get the desired results without ^{extreme methods} ~~ultimate means~~. But ^{however, his time will run out and} in 1961/1962 he will be forced to make ~~a~~ final decision.

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X. DECENTRALIZATION
OF STATE AUTHORITY
/ Supplement/

The process of decentralization of ~~the~~ state authority down to the National Councils was started in 1956. But the delegation of authority ~~did not go further than~~ ^{stopped at the Voivodship level} to the National Councils ^{level} of the Voivodships. The National Councils of these Voivodships ^{were authorized} received the right to use a part of the ~~collected taxes from the~~ ^{And they paid} ~~entire~~ real estate ^{Authority} taxes, communal taxes ~~etc~~ for repair, capital outlays and other expenses. This ~~right~~ was advertised as a "self-government" but the part of ~~the~~ income left to the discretion of the National Councils was ^{indeed} very small. The National Councils ^{were authorized to exercise} ~~got~~ also ~~the right to~~ control the ^{over} state enterprises located within their territory. This control is an additional burden to the factory management but it ~~does not bring~~ ^{renders no} positive results. The ^{Administration} Administrations of Workers Settlements were also ^{transferred} under the local administrations. The National Councils ^{were authorized} received the right to sell individual houses to private ^{people} people. Several other rights, mostly of minor nature, were granted to ~~the~~ Voivodship Councils, ^{rights}

However all these minor ~~changes~~ ^{rights} did not change the complete dependence of the National Councils from the State Government, from the Ministers.

There is ^{true} no self-government of National Councils in Poland. ^{made no} In this area Gomulka ~~did not~~ ^{and concessions} make major changes. The rights granted were rather ^{in order to cheat} only of a formal nature only for the purpose to pretend that ^{had taken place} there is decentralization of state power.

Even these minor rights did not go further down. They never ^{reached} arrived to the National Councils of the townships and counties. The voivodships use their new rights to ^{expand} develop their own bureaucracy. Several townships think that the situation has become after this "decentralization" worse than before.

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There is no need for Gomulka to go back in this area of de-
centralization because there never was a ^{step forward} notable change in this field.

As a matter of fact the centralization of state power is the same or almost the same under Gomulka as it was under Bierut.

In this field no major changes ^{may} after ~~October 1959~~ might be expected. ^{After October 1959} Only on the villages there will be an increased propaganda for agricultural circles. ^{This agitation is} directed centrally from the Central Committee of the Party in Warsaw

^{pseudo-} The certain rights of self government or rather of a ~~imitation~~ of selfgovernment that were granted by Gomulka in 1956-1957 will be preserved. ^{They} are so ^{limited} small that there is no need for Gomulka to develop a special action of "going back". ^{Revert this process.}

In this aspect the situation differs from the Business Selfmanagement. In this ^{field} ~~later area~~ the "freedoms" granted in 1956 and 1957 were more substantial and therefore the ^{way} ~~course~~ back is ^{without} ~~vehement~~ and radical.

PREDICTIONS ON THE EFFECT ~~THE~~ CHANGES
~~OF~~ ^{y CHANGES ON}
~~IN~~ GOMULKA'S POLICES ~~WILL HAVE~~ IN POLAND'S
~~DOMESTIC~~ ^{FOREIGN}
~~INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS~~

~~A~~

GOMULKA'S EXPORT POLICY

Part VIII

GOMULKA'S EXPORT POLICY

POLICY ON I. GOMULKA'S ~~POLICY OF~~ FOREIGN TRADE *PO*

THE MAIN LINES OF GOMULKA'S EXPORT POLICY *WERE* *NOT* *DIFFERENT* *ON*

Gomulka made remarkable efforts to establish a new policy of export based on the following principles:

1. Increase of foreign trade as a whole *a balance*
2. Strict maintainance of an equilibrium between import and export.
3. Increase of the share of foreign trade with the West World *Free World Trade is related to* within the total foreign trade.
4. *MORE* Increase of export to the underdeveloped countries
5. *MORE* Increased export of manufactured goods, especially machinery and complete plants. Preference of export of goods that incorporate skilled labor of Polish workers instead export of merely raw materials *And other products made by skilled Polish labor. Reduction of raw material exports.*
6. Increase of engineering information exchange with the West *exchange* World. Purchase of progressive Western licenses. *Increased technical/engineering exchange with the West and up-to-date equipment license procurement from the West.*

As a whole Gomulka's program of foreign trade *was* represents an improvement as compared with the *over* *shortighted and* ~~limited, restricted,~~ bureaucratic methods *applied between* of the period 1945 - 1956.

however
~~But~~ Gomulka's program failed at least partially. *in part.*
This failure is *only* partially Gomulka's fault. The true reason for this failure is the change in the World Market, especially the *changes* ~~the~~ *reduced* ~~pression~~ of coal export and ~~decline~~ of coal prices, *however, was the basic reason for its failure.*

Under Bierut the export policy was *bad* but the ~~conjunction~~ *market conditions* ~~was~~ excellent. Under Gomulka, the policy is better, but the *conditions* ~~of the~~ World market *are much worse.* *bad, but the*

This is the reason that ^{Why} under Gomulka the balance / equilibrium / ^{balance has turned to} between export and import ~~changed~~ to Poland's disadvantage.

During the III Plenum October 17, 1959, Gomulka said:

" ^{basis} The cardinal rule of our economic policy should be ^{to} maintaining ~~of~~ a positive balance ~~of~~ foreign trade ^{in the past} In the history of our relations within foreign trade this principle ^{has been abandoned} suffered a defeat for the first time in 1956 - 1957. In 1957 the result of our foreign trade was ^{not shown a deficit} negative by an amount of 103 million dollars.

In 1959 again we have large deficit / negative balance, ^{our 1959 deficit is very large} negative "saldo" / ^{our move}.

The value of ^{coal} exported in 1955 to the capitalist ~~countries~~ ^{Countries} market was 137 million dollars. In 1959 we received ^{our coal} for exported ^{these countries} to this market ^{coal} only 83.6 million dollars, ^{this is} ~~is~~ 30 % less, although the ^{amount} quantity of exported coal represents 101% of the amount of 1955. Due to decline of coal prices ^{COME REPORT} our losses, within the export of coal to ^{alone, therefore} the capitalist market ^{only}, amount to 55 million dollars"

This is, generally speaking, a true picture of the Polish export difficulties. It ^{shows} demonstrates that (under Bierut 1945 - 1956)

Poland had a ^{great} wonderful chance to improve its economy due to the high price of coal on the World Market. At ^{but} that time ^{long} especially from 1951 - 1954, the price for one large ton of coal was 24 dollars.

Despite this ~~advantageous~~ ^{the population} situation Poland's people suffered
a tremendous ~~lowering of~~ ^{reduction in} living standards. This was caused
by the former policy of building up ^{the} an armament industry,
and spending ample resources for unnecessary capital expendi-
tures of armament factories that ~~now~~ ^{these} are idle, as well, as
various military equipment. Now most of these
plants are idle.
It might be said that (since 1956-1957, Gomulka entered
with a difficult a truly difficult world market situation. The deficit / negative
balance / of foreign trade is caused by 'objective', independent ^{he himself}
from Gomulka's policy, reasons. ^{could do about it.}

However there are also other reasons, namely mistakes and
^{However} unsound trends in Gomulka's export policies. ^{also are based on}
^{Wong and Muscard Principles.}

A very debatable trend is for example Gomulka's persistent,
almost stubborn ^{to} policy of export of Polish machinery at any
^{at Obsolete} price, mostly connected with huge losses.

II. EXPORT OF MACHINERY

The increase in debts for foreign loans in 1959 requires the Polish economy to reduce import and increase export of goods in 1960. There is however the question ^{of} what can Poland export. Poland ^{was a great exporter of coal} ~~was a great exporter of coal~~ but at present the market ^{is dull} ~~of~~ coal is characterized ^{by} ~~by~~ greater supply ^{and} ~~than demand~~ ^{excess demand}. Poland also used to export ^{large} ~~remarkable~~ quantities of eggs, bacon etc. ^{in large amount} Shortage of meat ^{on domestic market prevents substantial increase in the commodity} ~~within the domestic market restricts from a substantial~~ increase of this export, although ~~regardless to the catastrophic~~ ^{inspite of the desperate meat supply situation in 1959} ~~situation of meat supply in the country~~ Poland maintained and even increased ^{it} ~~the~~ exported quantities of bacon ^{during that year} in 1959. Therefore ~~Feverish~~ ^{and} almost desperate attempts are made to export machinery. This concept ^{is promising} ~~may have some~~ prospects with respect to the satellite countries, China, Vietnam, Korea ^{in small amounts} (in small quantities) to these two latter countries ^{is an outlet for} ~~and~~ a market for Polish machinery ^{may} ~~might~~ be found within the underdeveloped countries ^{of} Asia and Africa. ^{Such exports can only cover losses, however, but no profits} ~~however there is no profit only losses~~ in result of this export. Polish machinery must be sold ^{at} ~~to~~ incredibly low prices because of competition ~~both~~ of Western countries and even ~~of~~ East Germany and Czechoslovakia, & Hungary. ^{Polish} The machine industry in Poland is ^{fairly new} ~~not an old branch~~. Cost of production ^{is} ~~is~~ high and quality ^{is} ~~is~~ low. Especially the materials used are of low quality because of lack of high quality steel, and ^{LIGHT} ~~socalled~~ colored metal / copper, brass, tin, nickel, etc. / ^{are} The only ~~one~~ competitive factor ^{is} the low wages of the Polish workers, but this advantage ^{is offset} ~~is reduced~~ by low productivity. ^{nevertheless} ~~But~~ Poland must export machinery regardless ^{of} ~~to~~ price and losses. The small quantities of

high quality steel and 'red' or 'white' metal that is available in Poland is used for exported machinery that must be ~~shipped~~ (delivered) with two complete sets of spare parts. Machinery for domestic use is manufactured of lower quality material and sold without spare parts on the domestic market. ^{There is} producing a tremendous shortage of spare parts. ^{One kind of the used} ~~92%~~ of equipment in the construction industry is idle because of shortage of spare parts. The ~~same~~ picture is in other industries. *NO DIFFERENT*

The ^D direct losses of the machinery export business are very large, but ~~the~~ indirect losses for the entire industrial development and exploitation of existing plant and equipment in Poland are ~~manyfold bigger~~. *Larger yet.*

Export of machinery became a great factor ^{FOR} ~~of the~~ Polish export. While the share of machinery export in ~~the~~ total export ^{Polish} of Poland ^{amounted to} in 1949 was 2.4 %, ⁱⁿ the share ^{is} ~~is now~~ 1959 - 26.5 %

This is presented as a success of the Polish economy by the party.

However the export of machinery gives no profit only losses. The only ^{benefit to} ~~one profit is that~~ Poland receives ^{prices that is the foreign exchange placed thereby} some (dollars, or other Western currency) ^{had}

Studies made by the ^{in 1957 in the} There were made studies in 1957 within the Planning Commission ~~that show~~ that one dollar costs the Polish

economy through ~~the~~ export business 50 to 80 zlotys. Poland is ^{not} prepared to be a real exporter ^{for} of machinery. There is no tradition, experience, proved quality and trade ~~capability~~ ^{known but} yet for this export business. ^{The 1957} For example Poland ^{ICLP Brazil 300 cars to} delivered 300 cars to Brazil, ^{of car} 1957

Since the type of the Polish car Warszawa (an imitation of the Russian ¹⁹⁴⁸ car Pobieda from 1948) is obsolete, the ^{in the} selling price was ^{kept} very low

Besides, the cars were delivered with two sets of spare parts ^{accompanying the shipment} / this as in 1957 / . ~~As a result of this the domestic production~~

~~of cars had to be reduced by 600 cars~~ ^{as a result of this order} After this the Brasil

~~client made a recalamation that the quality of the spare parts~~
~~cars and spare parts because of their inferior quality,~~
~~and also of the cars itself is unsatisfactory.~~ The Polish

~~industry had to change and to replace both the most expensive~~
~~subassemblies of the cars as well as the spare parts.~~ These

300 cars made for the Polish car industry a loss of almost

1200 - 1500 car within the domestic production.

~~Several quantities of equipment was delivered to Turkey in the period~~

1953- 1956. The Turkey government did not pay anything up to

1957, the Turks had paid nothing on these deliveries.

This whole business of export of machinery to ~~the~~ "neutral"

and underdeveloped countries is ~~financially~~ ^{is a} a great failure. ~~It is~~ ^{financially} ~~nevertheless~~ ^{it is} it is the only way to get dollars (or other ~~valuable~~ ^{hard} ~~currency~~ ^{currency} dollars). Therefore this business is continued against

~~profit considerations against any principle of real business.~~
~~Therefore, profits and other considerations are~~
~~not counted.~~ ^{do not count.}

Within the satellite countries the export ^{to other satellites} is more profitable,

~~the~~ quality standards are not ~~so~~ ^{be the other hand it brings us} high, the price is better.

But this export does not give dollars only, rubles. ^{well} And for rubles Poland

can buy ~~only~~ ^{only which} from the Eastern bloc that means - also obsolete machinery

~~and also without spare parts.~~

Many of the leading Polish economists expressed deep
doubt if there is any sense in boosting at any price ~~at~~ against
any reasonable considerations this machinery export business.

-6-
Many leading Polish economists have serious reservations
regarding the ~~amount~~ ^{amount} of benefits to be drawn from
this machinery export business.
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Government, however keep pushing the drive for
~~but the party insist on this type of export policies and~~
~~export of machinery and it is only on this basis that it has~~
~~in this way Poland became an exporter of machinery and equipment.~~
~~may also~~
~~It might be also noted that several subassemblies of these~~
~~exported machinery is purchased from East Germany or Czechoslovakia.~~
~~and this aggravates the losses.~~ Poland is unable to produce
some sub-assemblies, especially the more complicated and most
expensive parts. The trend of export of machinery developed in
Poland when the coal export ~~and~~ ^{world} coal prices began to decline.

Despite all these disadvantages the export of machinery will
be continued and attempts will be made to increase this export
regardless to losses. *heavy ship exports to the USSR*

For example: Poland exports to the USSR ships. *Polish* This industry
~~industry, also, has been materially developed.~~
shipbuilding ^{indeed increased very much in Poland} But of these ships, *however,*
~~primarily only the thick steel sheets are~~ ^{While sheet metal work is} ~~produced~~
~~engines~~ Diesels are purchased from East Germany or even for ~~dollars~~
from the Western countries. These engines and the various apparatus &
~~devices, the entire apparatuses furnishings, fixtures, are not pro-~~
duced in Poland. ^{appliances} ~~The first Diesel engine for ships was made in~~
Poland in 1959, and this is ~~still~~ ^{only an initial}, "pilot" production. *built*
This whole ship business produces more losses than profits for
Poland. *Export of ships, as well as machinery, is a loss to Poland.*

*Are have only
few Polish
components
parts.*

Vice-minister Zygmunt Keh ~~is~~ who is responsible for the
the export of heavy machinery / he is Viceminister in the ministry
of heavy industry/ is a prewar, mechanical engineer and he ^{told me once} informed

deficit
~~me~~ that this ~~whole~~ export business is imposed on the Minister of ~~Heavy industry~~
 Industry by the Minister of Foreign Trade and the Party. The Minister
 of Foreign Trade and the Finance Minister are interested primarily
 in getting dollars / in Poland this is called "devises" ^{i. e.} which means
 dollars or ~~any hard~~ ^{any hard} ~~another~~ ^{acknowledged} valuable currency ~~recognized within the World market~~
 But ^{to} the Heavy Industry itself this business ~~means only losses and~~
 difficulties.

~~It might be noted in connection with the problem of the~~
~~backwardness of the Polish industry and lack of competitive~~
~~power within the World market that this is not a problem of~~ ^{IS NOT DUE TO INFERIOR TECHNICAL} ~~it's ability.~~
~~of low engineering capability. This backwardness is due to~~
~~the influence of the party directed toward "political" aims~~ ^{TO PARTY INTERFERENCE WITH INDUSTRY, THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRY}
~~and neglecting economical factors and principles of sound business.~~ ^{BY ITS EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL INSTEAD OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES,}
~~The Polish engineers are burdened with an incredible "red tape" and~~ ^{CONTINUOUSLY HANDICAPPED BY}
 bureaucratic management.

There are ^{Scientific} in Poland 75 Research institutes subordinated
 to the Polish Academy of Science, ^{The majority of them are} devoted to engineering and basic
 research. There are also 75 Research and Development Institutes subor-
 dinated to the ^{various} Industrial Ministries. On the Universities ^{there} are
 2400 ^{professorial} chairs of ^{at Polish universities, each} which 731 are directly connected with engineering
 science. ^{of which} On these institutes and chairs are employed 43 700
 research and scientific workers, ^{of which} 5,500 are professors or doctors
 of science. / These data ^{are} ^{quoted from} Stefan Jedrychowski, ~~Address~~
 during the IV Plenum of the ^{Polish CP} Party, January 20, 1960

Besides there are 49 000 engineering and technical workers in the State Design Offices subordinated to the factories and Central Administrations. ^{There are now in Poland} 96 500 engineers and 165 000 technicians employed in Poland, as compared with 7 000 engineers and 12 000 technicians in 1945 immediately after the war.

^{However, restricted} But the restrictions in exchange and cooperation of technical engineering and scientific experience with the West World ^{has led to} stagnation in the development of engineering science in Poland.

Under Gomulka, the doors to the West World were opened, at least to a certain extent, ^{to that} but even when the Polish engineers have the opportunity to compare the progress in the Western World with the situation in Poland, they have no possibility to purchase modern machinery, licenses, consultations and methods, advice etc. It is, however, true that 1957-1959 ^{some} Western licenses have been bought during 1947-59.

^{Exchange of technical experience with the West also improved during this period} and doubtlessly the regulations with the West World in the area of exchange of engineering experience are much better than during the period 1945-1956.

In his address to the IV Plenum Jan 20, 1960, Jedrychowski ^{stated} informed that during the last three years 18 Western licenses had been purchased ^{from the West} 3 years.

^{East bloc} The mutual exchange within the East bloc is quite vividly developed, but some of the designs and informations are ^{to Poland are} of low quality or obsolete. ^{Also stated at the IV Plenum that}

According to Jedrychowski / IV Plenum, Jan 20, 1960/ during 1955-1959 Poland ^{received} from the USSR 800 designs /project documentations/ and another 500 from Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary. Poland delivered 700 project designs to the

with getting alone
East bloc countries of ~~the~~ China received 180 documentations.

in 1957-1959
During 1957-1959 5000 Polish engineers were sent for practice, studies and experience to the East bloc countries. Poland 2100 engineers and specialists from the East bloc countries came to Poland during 1957-1959 for studies and practice.

I know accidentally very well these relations within the

"Agreement of Mutual Exchange of engineering and Scientific

Exchange" *Ro Sub-* ..I was a member of the Committee of "Engineering

Information Exchange and Scientific Cooperation" in the area

from source we learned with the
Construction during 1953 - 1957. The profit of this cooperation is ~~very small~~ *very small*. *an excellent engineer, for example* *for the USSR with a good* is sent to Russia to practice on a metallurgical plant. After

but frequently he
6 months he returns and is assigned a job in a completely different

for making *about Soviet*
area. Or he makes a critical remark related to the Russian methods.

Also, he maybe
and is transferred to another job. According to an investigation

revealed that
made in 1957 50 percent of the construction engineers sent

to the USSR for specialization in a certain field during

here employed in a different field
1951 - 1957 did not work in this area of specialization in Poland.

They got other jobs not related to this area for which they were

sent to specialize. This is the result of the tremendous turnover

and fluctuation. (This turnover problem is discussed in another chapter.)

to the
The value of the mutual exchange within the East bloc

There is a large turnover *is low*
is low. The quantity is high but not the quality. This is known in the

is a part of the fact *is a part of the fact*
The State Planning Commission. The Polish economists insist on more frequent

contacts with the West World. Jedrychowski himself also is convin-

pled for greater and so ^{doe} Vice premier Jaroszewicz.
became evident even an adherent of more exchange with the West World. This trend is
was even in the USSR ^{Soviet} after 1956. nxx Several Russian ministers
and specialists visited the Western Countries after 1956. ^{While} ~~xx~~
They did not say ^{Although greatly surprised} too much abroad, they do not show how much
they failed to show on their ^{house} they were impressed. But after return they admitted that having had
however sharply their "eyes opened" and they criticized ~~very sharp~~ the level
of engineering development in the USSR ^{and} in the other satellite countries.
also prevail This opinion is dominant in Poland. The mentioned before Viceminister
source Keh told me that machinery that he saw in England, France and West
to be Germany is ^{than} twice or three times lighter than the Russian models. *of the same type*
/ In other words that the Russian machines are twice or three times
heavier than a Western Machine of a similar type./
He also stated that He also told me that the project of the metallurgical plant
metallurgical plant ^{rated the} Nowa Huta that always was evaluated as the best and most
advanced Soviet progressive Russian project ^{supplied to} furnished to Poland, is ^{was} already obsolete
when compared with the ^{to} present level of modern foundry construction.
Told He told me that a similar project made by ^{British} English designers
and with English equipment would give 35 % higher productivity.
The gap in other industries is much greater especially in the
field chemical industry. This is the most backward industrial branch
of heavy industry in the East bloc. *The chemical industry is*
the most backward of all in the East bloc

III Gomulka's policy of export of complete plants. *Export policy*

The trend to export complete plants is a part of a huge program initiated and sponsored by the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. *Sometimes the Soviet prefer to let one of the satellites penetrate a foreign market instead of doing it on their own*

It is sometimes more convenient for the USSR to support the entry onto a foreign market by a satellite country, especially Poland, than to try by itself to enter this market. *Then again, the Soviet prefer to penetrate a target country through its satellites and a satellite.*

It is also advantageous for the USSR to support a parallel entry into a specific country both by the USSR and by the satellite countries. *To this extent cooperate closely*

In this area Gomulka works closely together with the Council of Mutual Assistance. *And it must be admitted that he has been quite successful.*

It is true that Gomulka has some remarkable successes within this program. *So far, 23 countries have been recipients of complete plants under this program.*

The list of countries served by the Polish export of complete plants includes countries of the Eastern bloc, of South America, Africa and Asia. *In addition to the new countries a variety of countries are involved.*

A sample list of plants sold by *as to 1958*

In one of my former reports in Washington I listed the plants sold by the Polish Administration of Export of Complete Plants up to 1958. *was submitted by source in form of administrative reports.*

However, there are further remarkable developments and plans in this area. It is evident that this area has become one of Gomulka's primary goals. *Probably then the export of complete plants takes a considerable increase of these export activities*

may be expected

And

Attached is a list of contracts of export of complete plants *with 23 countries, including export machinery provided in 1960.*

LIST OF FOREIGN CONTRACTS
FOR EXPORT OF COMPLETE PLANTS
OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
FOR EXPORT OF COMPLETE PLANTS //

/ CEKOP*/

by January 1960

NEUTRAL AND UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

in
~~of~~ ASIA AND AFRICA

I. INDIA 1. Repair depot for rolling stock.

Started 1956, will be finished in 1960

2. Extension of *HARBOR* port

Project built in cooperation with Czechoslovakia
and East Germany

3. Electric meters factory .

Value of project \$ 335 000 . Started 1959.

4. Two steel construction assembling ~~plants~~.

Started 1959.

II. FIJONGSLA

----- 5
* CEKOP Centrala Exportu Kompletnych Objektów Przemysłowych
/ Centrale of Export of Complete Industrial Plants/

LIST OF EXPORT OF PLANTS/ Continued/

NEUTRAL COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND AFRICA / Continued/

II. INDONESIA. 5. Four Shipyards for Construction of fishing

Cutters.

Total value of contract \$ 5 000 000.

Location of plants:

Java. Capacity 40 wooden ships per year . Length
of ship 25 meters.

Repair of wooden and steel ships ~~of a length~~
of 30 meters *long*

Celebes. Similar shipyard

Sumatra ditto

Island Ceram ditto.

Contract signed 1959

Rice-

III. BURMA

6. Storage tanks ~~for rice~~ (Silos/)

200 small steel tanks finished 1959.

Program extended and continued.

IV. CEYLON

7. Cane sugar factory

Start in 1960

UAR

V. ~~UNITED ARAB~~ REPUBLIC

8. Petroleum Storage Tanks in Egypt

Almost Finished. Program extended and continued.

9. Engineering Scientific cooperation with the USSR

at the construction of the *ASWAN* ~~Assuan~~ dam.

Petrification of Soil for dam foundation, using the
Polish method of electro-osmosis developed by pro-
fessor Cebertowicz of the Politechnic of Gdansk.

VI. IRAQUE

10. Two sugar plants.

One is in the last stage of construction, the other was
~~is~~ started in 1959

10a Railroad line ~~project~~ 800 kilometers long .

Design, cost estimates. ~~contract awarded~~ etc

LIST OF EXPORT OF PLANTS

NEUTRAL COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND AFRICA /continued/

Contract for construction negotiated with Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Poland has no chance to get the construction contract. Probably Poland will cooperate in design and engineering.

11. Electric bulb factory

Value \$ 500 000. Start in 1960

12. Radio-sets assembling plant

Value \$ 500 000 . Start in 1960

13. Television-sets assembling plant

Value \$ 700 000. Start in 1960

Several other projects in the stage of final negotiation.

VII. GHANA.

1200-
14. Two blast furnaces ~~for iron~~

15. Electric bulb factory

Capacity 4 500 000 bulbs per year.

16. Radio-sets assembling factory

17. Glue material manufacturing plant

Glue
/Produced of bones /

Enamel
18. Enamelled Appliances for housing equipment

Value of the four above contracts totals \$ 5 000 000

19. Second electric bulb factory and
~~factory of sanitary equipment~~ for housing
are in the final stage of negotiation.

LIST OF EXPORT OF PLANTS/ continued/

SOUTH AMERICA

20.
IX. ARGENTINA Cane sugar factory in Santa Fe
Capacity 3000 tons per year
20a. Sugar refinery and destiliry of alcohol in Florencia
- X. BRASIL 21. Railway ~~stock~~ rolling stock plant / Started 1959/
22 Soda plant / Start in 1960/
- XI. VENEZUELA
23. Steel bridge 750 meters long
Construction started 1959.

EUROPE, NEUTRAL COUNTRIES, ~~AND~~ WESTERN COUNTRIES,
AND YUGOSLAVIA

- XII. FINNLAND 24. Two petroleum storage ^{tanks} ~~reservoirs~~
Value \$ 50 000 . Finished 1959/1960
- XIII. Norvegia 25. Petroleum tanks
26. Steel towers for power lines
These are minor contracts 1958 - 1960.
- XIV. YUGOSLAVIA 27. Naphtalene plant
Chemical plant capacity 700 tons naphtalene per year
28. Cellular concrete plant
Capacity equal to 70 million ceramic units
Both plants started 1959/1960

LIST OF EXPORT OF PLANTS / continued/

COUNTRIES OF THE EASTERN BLOC

- XV. USSR 29. Ten cellular concrete factories.
One factory in Leningrad finished 1959/1960.
Nine in Siberia under construction
30. Six sugar factories
Start in 1961. Value 170 million rubles
- XVI. BULGARIA 31. Cement factory
Capacity 1 200 000 tons cement per year
/ one of the biggest in Europe/
32. Cellular concrete factory
Capacity equals 92 million ceramic units/ bricks/
33. Two glass factories
34. Porcelain and pottery plant
35. Two fire-proof material producing plants
The above projects will be started in 1960
- XVII. ALBANIA 36. Textile Mill
Built in cooperation with the USSR
37. Extension of port
Built in cooperation with the USSR.

LIST OF EXPORT OF PLANTS

EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES/ continued/

- XVIII. EAST GERMANY 38. Cellular concrete factory
Start in 1960
- XIX. CZECHOSLOVAKIA 39. Ten cellular concrete factories
Capacity of each of them 92 to 194 million
ceramic units / bricks/
First plant finished in 1959.
Nine other plants will be constructed
during 1960 - 1963. The majority in Slovakia.
- XX. RUMANIA 40. Hard-fiber, wooden tiles factory
/ Desintegrated wood fiber plant/ Start in 1960
- XXI. CHINA 41. Flotation Plant for coal
Province Hunan. Capacity 1 800 000 tons of coal
flotation. Will be completed 1960.
42. Coal Flotation Plant
Taijuan, province Shanai. Capacity 2 000 000 tons
per year
The above two plants are the largest coal flotation
plants in China. A third plant of 2 000 000 capacity
is built in Matou by the USSR.
43. Cement factory
Capacity 500 000 tons per yesr. Started 1959.
44. Two cane sugar factories
Will be completed 1960
45. Railway rolling stock factory
Wagons and railroad cars. Start 1960.

LIST OF EXPORT OF PLANTS /
EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES /continued/

XXII. NORTH-VIETNAM 46. Two coal flotation plants

Each of them with a capacity of 2 000 000 tons. First plant started 1959. Second 1960

47. Repair depot for railway rolling stock.

Started 1959

XXIII. NORTH KOREA 48. Two coal mines

Under construction

49. Locomotive / Steam Engine/ Plant

Capacity: Employes 3300 workers and 180 engineers
Will be completed 1960. Already in exploitation.

50. Housing settlements reconstruction

Two towns in North Korea connected with the mines and plants built

~~The~~ ^{development} of these export activities ~~is illustrated~~
~~by the following figures:~~ since October 1956, when
Gomulka started his policy of expansion ^{may} of export ~~might~~ be illustrated
by the following figures:

Value of export of complete plants
in million dollars

1956	13
57	15
58	18
59	30
60	44 (planned and contracts signed).

In the period 1956 - 1960 this export increased four-fold.

But Further expansion is planned.

The new plan provides for ~~1965~~ an export of plants of a value ~~of~~
^{at} 100 million dollars ^{in 1965}

It is hard to say whether or not this goal will be achieved.

However the most difficult problem is ^{opening up} ~~the entry~~ of a ^{new} market.

Since Poland has already trade ~~relations~~ ^{of which} relations consisting of (export
of plants) with 23 countries in this 14 outside the Eastern bloc,
^{considerable} a ~~remarkable~~ increase of this export activity ^{may} ~~might~~ be expected.

IV. CONCLUSION

The first objective of Gomulka, i. e. to increase the absolute value of foreign trade ^{has been achieved} is embodied successfully.

The total value of import and export of goods in 1959 ^{came to 10.5} was already 11 billion (devise - zlotys) that is nominally

2.6 billion dollars

Then call for In 1960 this volume ^{to increase to 1960 to} is planned 11 billion zlotys, that is, 2.6 billion dollars.

2.73 billion dollars.

Another goal of Gomulka ^{is not achieved} to increase the share of trade with the countries outside the East bloc, in order to get dollars, ^{is not accomplished} is not accomplished.

The trade relations with the East bloc ^{cover} still make up for 63 % of the total exchange and this share is almost constant, even slightly increasing in 1960 as compared with 1959.

The foreign trade with the USSR represents 30 % of the total value of Poland's foreign trade.

The absolute increase of foreign trade does not automatically produce a better economic situation.

As quoted in one of the preceeding chapters ~~the debt of Poland~~ ^{debt} increased considerably during Gomulka's regime.

Gomulka admitted during the III Plenum, October 1959, that the increase in foreign debts during 1957 - 1959 / three years / represents a value of 1 696 million (devise zlotys) that is

424 million dollars.

There is no sound ^{how} ~~a reasonable~~ program ^{now} in Poland ^{now} to reduce this debt and how to improve this situation ^{on} which is at the edge of bankruptcy.

The ~~policies of foreign trade~~ ^{set} established by Gomulka will be continued. The following trends and developments ^{may} ~~might~~ be predicted.

1. Increase of the absolute value of foreign trade by 5% ~~averagely~~ ^{or} per year ~~on the average~~.
2. ~~In this the~~ ^{account to} increase in trade with the Western countries will ~~be~~ also ~~4-5%~~ ^{4-5%}.
3. ~~Forcing the~~ ^{Pressure for} export of machinery to ~~the~~ underdeveloped countries at low prices ^{will be continued}. The share of the machinery export within the total Polish export volume will increase from 26 % in 1959 to 33 % in 1965.
4. Reduction of ~~import of~~ ^{huge} machinery from ~~the~~ Western countries, because of lack of dollars and ~~tremendous~~ debts.
5. Reduction of ~~the import~~ ^{imports} of industrial consumer goods & perishable goods ^{resulting from reduced} ~~in connection with a lowering of the purchasing power~~ of ^{the} population.
6. Increased ~~of~~ purchase of licenses and designs from ~~the~~ Western countries. This is ~~unavoidable~~ ^{inevitable} because a huge program of industrial construction is under way in Poland. Especially licenses ^{for} ~~of~~ the chemical industry will be purchased, because in this area ^{the USSR} ~~Russia~~ and the satellites have nothing to offer.

Purchase of licenses is cheaper than purchase of complete machinery.

7. Continuation and increase of efforts to sell complete industrial plants to ~~the~~ underdeveloped countries and ~~to~~ the East bloc countries.
8. Maintenance of ~~level~~ ^{the} export ^{level} of food, bacon, eggs etc. ^{insofar}
9. Maintenance of export of coal, as far as possible, even to lower price.
10. Continuation and even increase of engineering contacts with the West World.
11. Attempts to get a long term loan from the Western countries for machinery. Poland is afraid of short-range loans because of the fatal financial situation and high ^{rates of} interest. ~~But~~ Poland is anxious to get long term loans at a modest interest rate, to buy machinery from the West World for the industrial construction program.
12. Attempts to improve the import-export balance and to reduce the level of debts. But this is hard to achieve. The only one result that might be expected will be ^{to prevent} ~~the stop of~~ further increase of debts, and maintaining the present level ~~of debts~~.
13. The policy of export established by Gomulka is a big burden for the domestic industry. However, there is no way out. Despite losses and great difficulties for the domestic supply of spare parts etc, the policy of export at any price, regardless ^{of} ~~to~~ losses, will be continued.

Generally speaking, Gomulka's ~~policy~~ of export and foreign trade *policy* might be evaluated positively. Several defeats and failures, increased debts, are due to other reasons: to failure in agriculture to low productivity and to objective conditions such as decline in coal prices. However a modification of the policy of machinery export and more elasticity in this area, less exaggeration and more consideration for profitable business, would be of advantage to the Polish economy. The planned increase ~~from~~ 26 % to 33 % of the share of machinery export is exaggerated, unrealistic and will increase losses. Poland should maintain or slightly lower the present level of this export and concentrate on export of products in series, . Poland must improve the quality of machines . With the present quality there is no hope that Poland could held the entered markets.

Despite all mistakes, errors, etc the area of foreign trade ~~is this field of business that~~ represents a field of reasonable policies. In this area Gomulka's policies brought ^{some} ~~an~~ improvement some new ideas, that should produce better results in future.

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA

To Report: " Gomulka's Export Policy "

Part IX

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT 7 March 1960 /

Predictions on the Effect the Changes in Gomulka's Policies Will Have in Poland's Internal and Foreign Affairs.

II Gomulka's Export Policy ~~xxMarch 1960xxxx~~

In this report ^{of} ~~for~~ March 1960 a list of
Export of complete plants was included containing about
50 items to 23 countries. In Trybuna Ludu, January, 6 1960
new data were published ^{that allow to supplement the said list} as follows.

NO. Country in former report	NO Item
XXIV AFGANISTAN	51. Textile Factory
XXV. AUSTRIA	52. Reconstruction and modernization of a die-cast iron factory.
XXVI GREECE	53 Cooling Storage Building (for food storage)
I INDIA	54 Facility of Power Station i.e. Coal supply/ automatically/
XXII N. VIETNAM	55 Two power houses/expansion and modernization of two existing power houses/
V. UNITED ARABIC REPUBLIC	56 Two steel bridges with openable span / turnable bridges / in Egypt.
XI CHINA	57 Fertilizer Plant
XVI BULGARIA	58 Yeast Plant
IX RUMENIA	59 Distillation Rectification Plant for Lead and Cynk/ Zn = chemi- cal sign /
VI IRAQUE	60 Engineering of construction of power house 45 000 kilowatt / The contractor is an English firm , the supervision and engineering is Polish / Location of power house in Basra. 61 Irrigation project, channel Czarraf , South Iraque, only engineering , the contractor is a West - German firm.

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON COAL EXPORT

In "Trybuna Ludu" January, 15, 1960, Dr. Eng. R. Krupinski published following data. / Krupinski is the Preses of the ^{State} Council of Mining of Poland, former Viceminister of Mining during 1946 - 1955, Professor of the Academy of Mining and Metallurgy in Cracow. He is ⁶⁸~~65~~ and is the best expert in mining in Poland./

During 1945 - 1959 the Polish coal mines	
produced million large tons	*
Millions tons / large tons/ :	1,180
of this ^{were} exported during 1945 - 1959	
million tons	310
For this export Poland received	
Million dollars	4,289

Besides:

During 1945-1959 production of b r o w n	
coal amounted to million tons	77
of this there were exported	
million tons	50
for which Poland received million dollars	130

Besides During 1945 - 1959 production of coke	
million tons	101.5
of which were exported million tons	25.5
for which Poland obtained million dollars	524

* metric tons

Krupinski computed the total amount of
or equivalents in dollar value
dollars received for export of coal, brown coal and
coke during 1945 - 1959 at / rounded /

5 billion dollars

Krupinski's information deserve to be treated
seriously because he has access to all materials
and knows everything about coal in Poland.

PREDICTIONS OF THE EFFECT THE CHANGES
IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES WILL HAVE *ON*
POLAND'S *DOMESTIC* ~~INTERNAL~~ AFFAIRS

22
Personnel
GOMULKA'S ~~PERSONAL~~ POLICY

Part I

GOMULKA'S PERSONAL POLICY

I THE HIDDEN "MERRY-GO-ROUND" IN THE PERSONAL POLICY

The changes in basic policies made by Gomulka in 1959 ^{have accompanied by a major} ~~are paralleled by a significant~~ shake up ⁱⁿ at the top level of government in Poland.

A characteristic feature of these ^{personnel} ~~personal~~ changes ^{at} the top level is the reappointment of former Stalinists and former top executives and party functionaries ^{with the exception of} ~~Except~~ a few Vice-Ministers, ^{there are} no new men, no new names, ^{among} ~~are within~~ these new appointments.

All former top leaders who held important positions in the Polish government ^{recent} during 1945 - 1956 are ^{still} ~~highly~~ unpopular and disliked by the Polish people. The criterion, who was a more fanatic or less fanatic stalinist, is sometimes ^{hazy} ~~uncertain or vague~~

but this is not ^{of no importance} ~~a decisive matter~~. As a matter of fact, all these ^{newly reappointed as well as the old ones} ~~men that are now reappointed as well as these men that are~~ ^{followers of the} ~~at the top~~ from October 1956 were obedient adherents and performers of the

~~Stalinist policies~~ ^{of} stalinistic policies under the Bierut regime.

^{All of them are} ~~There are all former Stalinists and the majority of them~~ ^{most} ~~are still now~~ ^{at} ~~are certainly~~ up to today Stalinists in their mind and heart.

This ~~conservative and reactionary~~ ^{what people's} character of Gomulka's regrouping of top-level leaders adds to the disappointment of the people ^{In Poland, the} ~~This phenomenon of comeback of the same men after they have lost~~ ^{their loss} ~~of~~ ^{and their appointment to high positions} ~~their face in public opinion and appointing these men a gain in it~~ ^{with no regard for} ~~the~~ public opinion is called in Poland "the merry-go-round" or the "carrousel" (in Polish "karuzella").

Witaszewski was sent to Hungary as ~~Military~~ Military Attaché.

Franciszek Eli Blinowski the man who ~~was~~ directly responsible for ~~the policy of low wages under Bierut~~. In 1957 Blinowski, ~~After being fired~~ *(in October 1956)* ~~in October 1956 from his job of deputy chairman, of the State Planning Commission~~.

Motor Vehicle -

* this department has 5 deputies of the chief of department

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of the Central Committee in charge of heavy industry . From this position he emerged in October 1959 as VicePremier.

Jozef Jerzy O l s z e s k i the former First Secretary of the Party Committeee of Silesia , that was one of the most influencial positions in the party leadership /became Chief of the Economical Department of the Central Committeee . This was done in 1957 but became public much later in 1958.

Artur ~~Starewicz~~ S t a r e w i c z the man who leads the Polish censorship policy and controls the freedom of press was reappointed Chief of the Department of Press of the Central Committee, ~~already~~ in 1957, after He was previously ~~a period of holding a position of~~ second secretary of the Central Council of Labor Unions in 1956. This reappointment became public only during the riots of students in summer 1957. ^{The riots were} organized by the academic students, after Gomulka rejected the ~~y~~ continuation of the publishing of the Magazine " Poprostu", the most recolutionairy magazine in Poland.

Andrzej W e r b l a n the form r personal secretary of Bierut was appointed (after a longer period of demotion him from official positions) Chief of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda in the Central Committee of the Party in 1957. This is a key position.

Jerzy N i e d z w i e c k i the former deputy chief of the Economic Department of the Central Committee under Bierut " disappeared" for a while but already in 1957 was back on this same position.

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The hated ~~former~~ First Secretary of the ~~Polish~~ the Party Committee of the Voivodship of ^{Bydgoszcz} ~~Rzeszów~~ expelled as an ardent Natolinist K r u c z e k (fno) landed after a half year of 'banition' on a similar ~~post~~ in Bydgoszcz. Rzeszów. i. e. became First Secretary of the Committee of the Party of the Voivodship ~~Pomerze~~. Rzeszów

In general Gomulka started the " carousel " very promptly but he used at first a method of " hidden " reappointments . He tried to avoid a " provocative " approach ^{and shaking the public opinion} and assigned to these former top men diplomatic duties or functions within the apparatus of the party. Gomulka preferred at this time to avoid ^{direct} offense of public opinion. People was already excited that Gomulka left General ~~Bordzilkowski~~ ^{B o r d z i l o w s k i} a Russian general and former Rokossowski's deputy / ~~a Russian general~~ / on his post as chief of the General Staff; that Zenon N o w a k a Natolinist was not fired from his post as VicePremier; that Roman Z a m b r o w s k i ~~partially~~ responsible to a great part for the terror of the security policy especially during 1948 - 1952 still remained member of the Politbureau. People also was disappointed that the majority of the former Ministers and top ^{party} leaders responsible for the Bierut-regime were kept on their positions. For example Zygfryd S ~~S~~ z n e k Viceminister of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs responsible for hard conditions of repatriation of Polish citizens from the USSR was left on his post. Sznek is the Polish representant in the Repatriation Committee and a blindly obedient to the Russians. Due to Sznek's concessions and weakness in negotiation thousands of Polish citizens are not allowed to return to Poland because of formalistic approach in proving their Polish citizenship.

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Several heavily discredited stakinists were ^{kept} retained on their middle - echelon positions such as director of (departments , personal chiefs etc or simply tr~~ans~~ferred to the same position in another ministry.

Spychalski for example started another policy. He fired several dishonest or incapable officers from high posts. He called every officer who has been released under Rokossowski by Witaszewski (the former Personal Chief under Rokossowski) and offered restitution of job and honors. People saw that Spychalski started a true 'sanation' of the personal policies within the Ministry of Defense. All prewar pilots ^{in 1951/52} who had been fired by Witaszewski were assigned jobs corresponding with their background, and responsible posts.

People expected that Gomulka will follow a similar policy. But soon it became obvious that Gomulka is far from this. Gradually he stopped the personal policy of Spychalski and ^{and employing} insisted on retaining several Russian generals. A part of the Russian officers accepted Polish citizenship, of course on instructions from Moscow, for example General Szymonowski Chief of the Engineering Branch of the Army. (Sapers)

From October 1956 to July 1957 Gomulka continued this concealed "carrousel".

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Not less bitterness among people was evoked by Gomulka's conduct with respect to punishment of the former leaders and chiefs of the security police.

The former Vicepremier ^{Jakub} Berman and the former Minister of the Security Police were suspended from the party membership of the party and released from their posts for three years. But nothing more happened to them.

A Investigation Committee appointed in October 1956 by Gomulka to determine who was responsible, besides Rokossowski, for the order to the army to occupy Warsaw in October 1956 and for concentration of military forces around Warsaw at this time ~~came out with~~ ~~no resolution that~~ was dissolved without resolution. in June 1957

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II OPEN REAPPOINTMENTS OF FORMER STALINISTS

Gradually Gomulka departed from the concealed way of reappointments and several nominations were announced publicly.

As a matter of fact, after short time all the listed before nominations ~~which~~ of party functionaires became well known, anyway.

In 1957 and 1958 the public opinion was surprised by announcement that Jerzy Staszewski former First Secretary of the Warsaw Party Committee demoted in December 1956 / he was not reelected / is appointed President of the Polish Press Agency / Polska Agencja Prasowa, P.A.P./

It was made public that ^{Józef} Alster former Chief of the Department of Internal and Security Affairs in the Central Committee responsible directly for the terror regime under Bierut / together with others/ is appointed Vice Minister in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in charge of the ^{security} same affairs.

Former Minister of Chemical Industry Ruminski, a Natolinist became (after a couple of months of being without any assignment) Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Food Processing and Food Purchase. / Food Contractation/

In 1958 it was evident that again the key positions within the government and the party apparatus are occupied by the same people as before. But still Gomulka restrained himself from appointing the Stalinists to the supreme top positions, such as ~~Vice-President, General Secretary of the Economic Committee of~~ ^{Vice-President, etc.}

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In 1957 the appointment of Eugeniusz S z y r to General Secretary of the new created Economic Council of Ministers was announced. At this time ^{People was} the importance of this position was not too well conceived, ~~It was~~ told that this is a technical duty of not decisive importance.

Poman F i d e l s k i former Minister of the Machine Industry directly responsible for the strike in the Cegielski Plant in Poznań from which the Poznań Uprising was started, ^{who has been} and fired immediately in October 1956 was appointed in 1958 Chairman of the new created in 1958 Committee of Cooperation with Foreign Countries.

(fnv)

R o s z a k a former second secretary of the Wrocław party Committee became Chief of the Passport-Bureau, a key position in Poland.

The former Minister of Food Industry Mieczysław H o f f m a n fired in December 1956 was appointed ^{in 1957} Chairman of a Committee ^{responsible for} screening the application for passports from the point of view of special investigations.

In 1958 it became already quite evident that Gomulka is restituting gradually and persistently the old men in key positions. This was done openly. Gomulka did not care more to conceal this his policy.

In this period of the "open carrousel" Gomulka however still hesitated to appoint the Stalinists to the highest positions of leadership.

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Wikt^{or} K l o s i e w i c z ^{once a} leading Natolinist and the most vehement adversary of Gomulka in 1956 and in spring 1957, became Vice minister of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Klosiewicz, a bricklayer ^{of} ~~from~~ profession, was previously Chairman of the Supreme Council of Labor and Trade Unions. Because of his stubbornity and low intelligence combined with blind admiration of everything that came from the USSR, he was hated and simultaneously ridiculous in the opinion of people.

The employees of the Ministry of Social Welfare ignored him completely, and a boycott within the ministry was organized against Klosiewicz. After sitting ^{for} two weeks alone in his room ^{in the office} he went on vacation and returned after two months. In the meantime the public opinion became used and less sensitive to Gomulka's "carrousell" and Klosiewicz finally started to work as Viceminister.

Kazimierz M i j a l ^{was} former Bieruts personal helper in all secret matters. ^{He specialized} ~~especially~~ in preparing accusations against top men that had lost for various reasons Bieruts confidence but still were in high positions. Mijal was in most close cooperation with the Minister of the Security Police. He was Bierut's watchdog his ears and eyes in spying Ministers, and top ~~officers~~ executives. His position was Chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers ~~and~~ and he had the title and rank of a minister. In 1956 he joined the Natolinists and started an action of diffaming Gomulka. It might be also ^{noted} ~~said~~, that in 1948

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during the ~~Party Congress~~ Plenum at which Gomulka was condemned for titoism and other " sins" Mijal delivered the most offensive and disgraceful speech against Gomulka. He also prepared material during 1948 - 1954 for the trial that was planned against Gomulka. This man was appointed by Gomulka in spring 1957 to President of the Investment Bank. This nomination evoked the most resentful indignation among people. Yet in July 1957 Mijal attacked Gomulka's policies during a Plenum of the Central Committee. Gomulka's tolerance at this time seemed strange. It is however true that the Russian ambassador insisted on Gomulka / in the name of Chruszczew / that Mijal must be kept on a high position.

In this way Gomulka placed gradually all natolinists in key positions during 1957. In July 1957 there were only three leading Natolinists and a few minor natolinists that were not taken care by Gomulka because they refused to work for Gomulka. Stanislaw Dworakowski former Chairman of the Security Committee / this Committee replaced in 1959 the former Ministry of Security/ and former Vicepremier, a locksmith from profession/ Stanislaw Lapot former Vicepremier Juljan Tokarski who a few months later was assigned a influential job within the ^{Party} Central Committee apparatus.

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Dworakowski and Lapot rejected several offered high posts in order
that
to demonstrate ~~publicly~~ they disagree with Gomulka's policies
and don't want to make any compromise.

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III CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP

The year 1959 brought a critical economic situation in Poland. An acceleration of the gradual development became necessary. Gomulka could not more delay a thorough revision of the basic features of his policies.

This required a shakeup of the leadership. The course back to collectivization and back to low standard of living could hardly be endorsed by the same personalities who ^{carried out} during 1956 - 1958 ~~executed~~ Gomulka's former policies.

Gomulka reached for the former leaders that were known as specialists in endorsing of programs of austerity and pressure. The change in policies was ^{already} so vehement and astonishing to the public opinion especially the return to collectivization, the increase in food prices, that there was no more need for Gomulka to hesitate with "personal" surprises.

To a certain degree Gomulka wanted to affirm by these new nominations of feared men, how seriously ^{are} and firmly ^{has} intentions of endorsing the policies of pressure, sharp discipline, and austerity.

To a high degree the selection of the reappointed personalities was dictated by Gomulka's attempt to ~~improve~~ facilitate his action ^{and role as} the repentant ^{"son" who is returning} ~~return~~ to the "family" of "faithful communists." Gomulka has still certain difficulties to convince the Russian party that he really departed from all his former ideas.

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from his " errors" ^{that were} ~~and semi-revisionistic concepts~~ as judged by the party doctrinaires as semi-revisionistic concepts.

The names of Tokarski, Witaszewski, Szyr can be utilized to built up the trust of the Russian Party. For this purpose these men had to be put in the highest positions and equipped with large authority to endorse the difficult program they are assigned to carry out.

~~These~~ are the ~~these~~ reasons for the new appointments that doubtlessly represent a provocation to the public opinion of the people in Poland.

- To use their experience in carrying out hard and unpolpular programs
- To " frighten people and to create an atmosphere of fear already by the names well known of ruthlessness and persistence in breaking resistance.
- To satisfy the demands of the Russian party ^{by} appointing leaders who are known as adherents of the Russian party ^{of} and the party doctrines
- To ^{prove} and to built up the opinion that Gomulka's repentent return to the party ideology is true
- To facilitate relations and negotiations within the Eastern bloc i.e. the Council of Mutual Assistance.

The major changes in the leadership ~~are~~: consist not only of new appointments but also of significant demotions

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1. Transfer of Jerzy M o r a w s k i Secretary of the Central Committee in charge of Propaganda to a relatively minor post as Vice chairman of the Chamber of Control.

Morawski represents the young generation. He tried to avoid ^{of press} censorship and was deemed to be the adherent of relatively 'liberal' policies in the area of culture and press.

Although educated in the " Bierut-ideology " he allowed a large extent of freedom. The Russians were extremely angry because of Morawski's liberal approach to the writers , students etc.

Gomulka always was very critical of Morawski's tolerance to the Polish intelligence. Gomulka dislikes the intelligence and saw in Morawski a sort of defensor of the 'headeggs'.

2. Another Secretary of the Central Committee Stanislaw M a t w i n also a representant of the younger generation and labeled as a 'liberal' communist was already in 1957 transferred to the position of First Secretary of the Wroclaw Party Committee. This is a very important position and he retained the title of a Secretary of the Central Committee but in this " gentle " way he was promoted to the province. In 1959 Matwin lost the title and privileges of a Secretary of the Central Committee
 3. Transfer of Edward O c h a b from the post of Minister of Agriculture to Secreatry of the Central Committee in charge of Propaganda.
- He still is member of the Politbureau.

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This is a top position. Nevertheless this change is an affirmation that

Ochab's activities as Minister of Agriculture in 1956 - 1959 have been evaluated as failure. Gomulka appointed Jagielski as Minister of Agriculture. Jagielski former Chief of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee in 1954 - 1956 is an adherent of forced collectivization.

4. Transfer of Kiejstut Zemaitis from the post of Minister of

Heavy Industry to Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Commission.

This is still an important position. However Zemaitis was Minister of the

Heavy Industry from 1951 and he was the best Minister in Poland.

He is a metallurgical engineer and came back from England only in 1946. During the war Zemaitis was in England.

He ~~never~~ joined the party in 1947. but he always was deemed fanatic and in the party hierarchy he was not

But he was not figured as a party member with long merits and he was high rated. He was

the representant rather of the Polish intelligence.

He ^{was} replaced by Waniolka, a miners son. No comparison can be made

between these two men with respect to managerial qualities,

The demotion of Zemaitis is a hard strike for the Polish engineering intelligence

Zemaitis selected for delegations and trips abroad the best engineers regardless of their political past. Frequently the security police refused to approve the selected men for a passport abroad. Zemaitis talked with these candidates for the trip and if they gave him their personal

word "parole d'honneur" that they will come back, he signed a letter

to the Security authorities, that he, Zemaitis, will be personally responsible

if something happens. No one of these engineers broke his word. There were

among them professors and scientists who ^{always} ^{demonstrated} ~~declared~~ that they disagree

with communism. They felt, however, to be bound by their promise given as engineer to engineer and they came back.

Waniolka never will do such a thing. He will send in delegations

low quality professionals if they only are "sons of workers" and

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approved by the passport authorities.

5. Another Minister K u r y l u k , Minister of Culture

also took on his own responsibility the travels to Western Countries of prominent writers, etc. He was an old communist but 'liberal'.

Under his government 1956 - 1958 there was relative broad freedom of literature in Poland. Słonimski was Preses of the "Writers Association" a non-communist who did not hesitate to criticize sharply the Realism "Socialistic Realism" and the Russian afterwar literature.

Kuryluk guaranteed personally the return of the ^{u famous young} known writer Hlasko.

When Hlasko delayed a couple of months his return, Gomulka took the chance and fired Kuryluk.

Many people who worked immediately with Kuryluk told me that he is one of the most honest ^{men am} ~~communists~~ they have met ^{among communists}

Kuryluk was replaced in 1958 by Galinski a stalinist. ^{is} who ^{and the party supremacy} reconstituting the administrative methods in culture and literature of the Bierut

period.

6.

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in 1959

6. Gomulka fired Julian Hochfeld from the post of Preses of the Chamber of Foreign Trade (Institut of International Affaires). Hochfeld is professor of the University and was in prewar time a member of the Polish Socialistic Party. In 1948 he joined the Communistic party together with Cyrankiewicz and other left-wing socialists. But he was in opposition to the terror regime and under Bierut he restrained himself from politics. After October Hochfeld who is one of the most famous personalities in Poland returned to political life and developed original ideas. The 'Rapacki plan' is the creation of Hochfeld and Manfred Lachs another aide of the Minister Rapacki. / Rapacki is also a former prewar Socialist /
- The demotion of this highly capable man is a sign of return to a rigid foreign policy. It is probable that Hochfeld who is known of his integrity resigned by himself and refused to participate in the new policy of Gomulka. Hochfeld is disliked very much by the Russians. He was replaced by Ostap Dluski former chief of the department of foreign Affairs of the Central Committee of the Party. He is a fanatic pro-Russian communist.
- Dluski's deputy became Kiryluk former ambassador in China / the brother of the mentioned before Minister of Culture / a fanatic communist.

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7. Release of /fnu/ B i e n k o w s k i from the post of Minister of Education. Bienkowski is a communist and one of the few top communists who in 1948 had the courage openly to defend Gomulka and to criticize Stalin's policy against Tito.

He was in 1948 fired by ~~Gomulka~~ Bierut from all posts and later jailed. After release from jail in 1951/2 he did not participate in political life. In October 1956 Gomulka appointed him Minister of Education. The influence of Bienkowski was much greater than it would result from his post.

Bienkowski was Gomulka's "brain" and idea-man during 1956 - 1958.

He was the promotor of the ~~for~~ religious freedom in Poland.

He established the religious instruction in the Polish schools

Bienkowski is an anti ~~stalinist~~ and a true friend of Gomulka. *

He persuaded Gomulka to the liberalization in 1956 - 1957.

When Gomulka shifted to a comeback of the old , doctrinaires

Bienkowski protested and finally in 1959 resigned .

The release of Bienkowski is a sign that Gomulka is now advised only by stalinists and fanatics and that the last bolwark of relatively ^{liberal} ~~democratic~~ ideas, ^{Bienkowski} disappeared.

* at least he was Gomulka's true friend

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS -19-

Gomulka's policy after October 1959 shows clearly that he uses two ways for restitution of the doctrinaire methods of ruling. First; appointing representatives of the orthodox and pro-Russian orientation and Second: demotion of liberal communists from high position. (The new appointees Witaszewski, Tokarski, Szyr Gede have been described separately.)

^{demotion}
This latter is done rather cautiously and without vehemency. But already now the balance of force among the two wings is definitely in favor of the orthodox wing. However a further development in this direction will follow. Gomulka rather made the ~~first~~ decisive step, that is, the filling in of the top leadership positions with ~~a few~~ ^{the} top men. Tokarski, Szyr, Witaszewski, Gede. But the next step will be the replacement of relatively 'liberal' men at high positions, i.e. Ministers, Viceministers, by blindly devoted adherents of the pro-Russian and orthodox wing. This process requires certain time. This will be performed by the ^{new appointed} orthodox leaders themselves, of course with approval of Gomulka but without his detailed interference in details. The details are delegated by Gomulka to the new appointed leaders and to the party of Gomulka. One of the most influential function of the apparatus of the Central Committee is the right to approve or to refuse any nomination beginning from a Director of a Central Administration upwards to the highest level. Every nomination of to a key job must be approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee. / in a protocol/

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The Minister first agrees upon with one of the Secretaries the candidate for nomination and later appoints this man to his job. Nevertheless there are cases that the Secretariat does not approve the candidate / the protocol~~ary~~ approval is usually later / because of objection made by another secretary / there are 7 ~~xxxxxxx~~ of them / and the Minister must cancel ~~thaxx~~ his own ^{decision} appointing .

During 1956 - 1958 the handling of these personal matter was more liberal, i. e. the candidates proposed by the Minister were usually approved by the party, but Beginning from 1959 again the party meddles very much in these matters. This right of the party apparatus ~~rates~~ to decide in personal matters is called in Poland the " Nomenclature". This means that certain levels of managerial positions ^{in other words} are reserved for approval of the party. ~~this means~~ these positions are in the Party (Nomenclature).

The Central Committee decides from the Director of a Central Administration / inclusive/ upwards. The Voidship Party ^{Committee} decides nominations of the Directors ^{their} and his deputies of the Enterprises. As a matter of fact all managerial positions are determined by the Party. The Administrative authorities only propose ~~xxxx~~ the candidates but the last word has the party.

~~The Minister usually appoints xxxxxx~~

Gomulka in his last speeches frequently emphasizes that top managers must make unpopular decisions, if necessary,

During the 'liberalization period' 1956 - 1958 the Ministers usually selected as candidates ^{for responsible jobs} experienced professionals who had authority ^(specialists and managers) among the employees, good professional background etc.

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in other words good managers.

The party however has reverse criteria. The party selects a 'workers ~~son~~' a fanatic communist, a man who will for example enforce lowering of wages, who will exercise pressure on the employees, usually bad ^amanagers.

The new austerity program of Gomulka and the revision of norms which consequently will lower the income of ^{the}wage earners, the restrictions of the wage fund and of the premium ^{bonus}and system that already have been announced by Gomulka this requires ^amanagers of the type preferred by the party.

The further development in personal policies might be predicted as follows:

1. Further demotions of " liberal" men at ^{and middle}top positions replacing of the existing
- 2 A thorough, widespread ~~exchange of~~ professional managers by party fanatics, that ~~will~~ are willing to enforce and to execute the party directives pressure against the will of the employees
- 3 A tightening of screening ^{of} candidates and strengthening of the party interference into personal affairs
- 4 Increased tensions among top level executives and increase of the power of the orthodox communists on all levels of management.
- 5 Exercising of all rights of control guaranteed by the Party Statute for the party cells. These rights are almost unlimited but there ^{have been}are fluctuations of the manner in which they are exercised .

- 6 Decline in managerial authority and increase of party power
in factories and on all levels of administration.

The party has no "moral" authority but through
the "Nomenclature" and through a system of spying, denouncing
and political pressure, the party has the power.

This is called the "supremacy" of the party upon all
matters / the dictatorship of the party/

- 7 Lowering of quality of management . ^{Administration} ~~Ruling~~ from party viewpoints and
not from economical criteria standpoints.

This developments will not progress smoothly there will be tensions
between managers and party functionaires , between "liberal" and
fanatic communists but the result is obvious. The Orthodox
wing will take over because Gomulka himself already
went on the side of the fanatics.